Jeffrey Lee Ring v. Robert A. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
Jeffrey Lee Ring v. Robert A. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
90 citation events (31 in the last 25 years) across 21 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Roberts (idaho, 2023-04-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Roberts
Idaho · 2023 · confidence medium
In addition, one federal circuit has held that a trial court’s determination that a “doctor was consulted for purposes of medical treatment” is a “finding of fact.”2 Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lloyd Grass v. Robert Reitz
8th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992); Crespo v. Armontrout, 818 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir.1987); see also Wilson v. Thaler, 450 Fed.Appx. 369, 374-75 (5th Cir.2011), cert denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 81 , 183 L.Ed.2d 721 (2012).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
In Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992), the court of appeals held that the statement of a three-year-old victim to an examining physician was not pertinent to her diagnosis or treatment for purposes of Rule 803(4) because she was simply too young to grasp that she was talking to a doctor, and therefore could not be assumed to possess the self-interested motive necessary to guarantee trustworthiness.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor, Rashik Ali
Tex. Crim. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
In Ring v. Erikson , 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8 th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals held that the statement of a three-year-old victim to an examining physician was not pertinent to her diagnosis or treatment for purposes of Rule 803(4) because she was simply too young to grasp that she was talking to a doctor, and therefore could not be assumed to possess the self-interested motive necessary to guarantee trustworthiness.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor, Rashik Ali
Tex. Crim. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
In Ring v. Erikson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals held that the statement of a three-year-old victim to an examining physician was not pertinent to her diagnosis or treatment for purposes of Rule 803(4) because she was simply too young to grasp that she was talking to a doctor, and therefore could not be assumed to possess the self-interested motive necessary to guarantee trustworthiness.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Telford
Conn. App. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 1003 (1995); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450 (8th Cir. 1993) (insufficient evidence to establish that child-complainant understood social worker was conducting interview in order for social worker or another to provide medical diagnosis or treatment); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1993) (no evidence that child knew she was talking to physician); State v. Wade, 136 N.H. 750, 756 , 622 A.2d 832 (1993) (state failed to establish that child understood medical purpose of examination).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Krasky (2×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir.2000) (determining medical interview unreliable without interviewer’s discussion of why questions were important to diagnosis and treatment "and why it was important for the child to tell the truth regarding the identity of the abuser”); State v. Salazar, 504 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1993) (hinging admissibility on showing that child knew she was speaking to medical personnel "and that it was important she tell the truth”) (citing Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Horner v. State (4×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
After hearing Quintanilla's testimony outside the jury's presence, the court allowed her to testify under the medical diagnosis exception, but only as to C.S.'s statements and as to the questions Quintanilla asked C.S. [4] Relying on Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1993), appellant also contends the statement should not have been admitted because: (1) the victim did not herself seek the doctor's help; and (2) there was no evidence that she even knew she was talking to a doctor.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. N. Turning Bear, III
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
The district court's finding that M.T.B. used "somewhat age appropriate language" does not, we think, count for much, as the language was found to be only "somewhat" age appropriate, and we have noted in the past that "the fact that [a child] used terminology typical of a child her age is not particularly helpful" in conducting the Wright trustworthiness inquiry, Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nicholas Turning Bear, Iii, Also Known as Nicholas Turning Bear, Jr., III
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
The district court’s finding that M.T.B. used “somewhat age appropriate language” does not, we think, count for much, as the language was found to be only “somewhat” age appropriate, and we have noted in the past that “the fact that [a child] used terminology typical of a child her age is not particularly helpful” in conducting the Wright trustworthiness inquiry, Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Capano v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Del. · 2001 · confidence medium
Ring v. Erickson, 8th Cir., 983 F.2d 818, 820 (1993); see also State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987) (admitting testimony of psychologist under Iron Shell test); State v. Altgilbers, App., 109 N.M. 453 , 786 P.2d 680, 686 (1990) (same); Felix v. State, 109 Nev. 151 , 849 P.2d 220, 249-50 (1993) ("In proffering statements made to psychiatrists or psychologists for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis, the proponent of the evidence must show, directly or indirectly, and the trial court must satisfy itself, that the patient understood the need to speak truthfully an…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States of America v. Wilbur Gabe, Also Known as Charles Gabe
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Rule 803(4) is premised on the patient’s selfish motive in receiving proper medical treatment; therefore, the proponent must establish that the declarant’s frapie of mind when making the hearsay declaration “was that of a patient seeking medical treatment.” Olesen v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1999); accord United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (8th Cir.1993); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Wilbur Gabe
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Rule 803(4) is premised on the patient’s selfish motive in receiving proper medical treatment; therefore, the proponent must establish that the declarant’s frame of mind when making the hearsay declaration “was that of a patient seeking medical treatment.” Olesen v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1999); accord United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (8th Cir. 1993); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Larry Schaal v. James Gammon
8th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Larson v. Nutt, 34 F.3d 647, 648 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that child witness's unavailability to testify was irrelevant for purposes of the Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111 (1995); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 819-21 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding admission of "available" child declarant's videotaped statements at trial violated defendant's confrontation rights).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Larry Schaal, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. James A. Gammon, Appellant/cross-Appellee
8th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Larson v. Nutt, 34 F.3d 647, 648 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (finding that child witness’s unavailability to testify was irrelevant for purposes of the Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111 , 115 S.Ct. 901 , 130 L.Ed.2d 785 (1995); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 819-21 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding admission of “available” child declarant’s videotaped statements at trial violated defendant’s confrontation rights).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hinnant (2×)
N.C. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 , 115 S.Ct. 2002 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1995); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450 (8th Cir.1993) (insufficient evidence to establish that child-victim understood social worker was conducting an interview in order for her or another to provide medical diagnosis or treatment); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992) (no evidence that child knew she was talking to doctor); State v. Wade, 136 N.H. 750, 756 , 622 A.2d 832, 836 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Lee Olesen v. Joe Class
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Such a rule is consistent with the rationale underlying the hearsay exception for medical treatment and diagnosis, because the exception "is based on the belief that a person seeking medical treatment is unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her, since it is in her best interest to tell the truth." Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Lee Olesen v. Joe Class, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Such a rule is consistent with the rationale underlying the hearsay exception for medical treatment and diagnosis, because the exception “is based on the belief that a person seeking medical treatment is unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her, since it is in her best interest to tell the truth.” Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Carol M.D. (2×)
Wash. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815 , 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 , 111 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kevin L. C.
Wis. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
See State v. Sorenson, 152 Wis. 2d 471, 491-96 , 449 N.W.2d 280, 288-90 (Ct. App. 1989); but also see Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 819-20 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)). 3 Section 908.04(1), Stats., provides that a declarant is unavailable as a witness if, among other things, the declarant *175 "[plersists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the judge to do so" § 908.04(l)(b), or "[tjestifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s statement," § 908.04(l)(c). 4 Even if…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rohrich
Wash. · 1997 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 638 (1990); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1992). 14 Unlike the firmly rooted exceptions, nothing about child hearsay indicates the hearsay statement would be more reliable than an in-court declaration of the same accusation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rohrich
Wash. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Wright, 497 U.S. at 817, 110 S.Ct. at 3147-48; Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.1992). [14] Unlike the firmly rooted exceptions, nothing about child hearsay indicates the hearsay statement would be more reliable than an in-court declaration of the same accusation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Olesen v. Class (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.S.D. · 1997 · confidence medium
Compare United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (8th Cir.1993); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bruce Philip Larson v. Gerald Nutt, Sheriff, Martin County
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
We disagree with Larson’s premise. “[W]hether [Larson’s daughter] was unavailable is irrelevant for purposes of the [Confrontation] Clause.” Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir.1992); see White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , -, 112 S.Ct. 736, 741 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (availability analysis necessary only when challenged out-of-court statement was made in earlier judicial proceeding).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. State (2×)
Md. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, for example, Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1387-1388 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580, 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 3030 , 120 L.Ed.2d 901 (1992); United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775-777 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir.1991); [6] United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 262 , 116 L.Ed.2d 215 (1991); Ring v. Erikson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.1993); Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373 , 1379-1380 (9th Cir.1993); United…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Douglas White
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
The reason for this exception to the general rule is that “a person seeking medical treatment is unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her since it’ is in her best interest to tell the truth.” Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Salazar
Minn. · 1993 · confidence medium
Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Goldenstein
Minn. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.1993). 9 Statements admitted under other hearsay exceptions satisfy the confrontation clause reliability requirement only if the state establishes that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements exhibit “a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), quoted in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Pettrey (2×)
W. Va. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.1992), where the court held that Rule 803(4) was not applicable where a child did not even know that the interviewer was a doctor.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Dion Luther Knife
8th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Matteson
Neb. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See, also, Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1992) (medical diagnosis or treatment exception “is based on the belief that a person seeking medical treatment is unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her, since it is in her best interest to tell the truth”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Anderson (2×)
S.D. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1992) (stating “whether [the hearsay declarant] was unavailable is irrelevant for purposes of the [Confrontation] Clause.”). [¶ 42.] Indeed, the rationale for this proposition is that unlike former in-court testimony, Shaina’s statements provide evidence of the kidnapping context that cannot be replicated, even if Shaina were to have testified in court.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Juvenile Nb (2×)
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
For one thing, the fact that a child witness has used age-appropriate language was implicitly rejected as indicative of reliability in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 , 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); see also Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jeffrey Lee RING, Appellant,
v.
Robert A. ERICKSON, Appellee
91-2488.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jan 6, 1993.
983 F.2d 818
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 197
Phyllis J. Kirwin, Fridley, MN, argued, for appellant., Thomas C. McNinch, Elk River, MN, argued, for appellee.
Arnold, Lay, Heaney.
Cited by 58 opinions  |  Published

ORDER

The panel opinion in this case was filed on July 9, 1992. 968 F.2d760. Thereafter, a petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc was filed. The suggestion for rehearing en banc was granted, thus vacating the panel opinion and the judgment entered pursuant thereto.

On its own motion, the panel files an amended panel opinion, which is attached to this order.

A separate order will be entered by the Court en banc with respect to the previous order granting the petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc.

It is so ordered.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, LAY and HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judges. RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Petitioner Jeffrey Lee Ring appeals the District Court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus. Ring was convicted in a Minnesota state court of four counts of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree for sexually abusing two minors — his niece, M.K., and his daughter, C.R. Ring has already served a 54-month sentence for his conviction regarding M.K., and began serving a 21-month sentence regarding C.R. in January, 1992. Ring challenges the admission of two videotaped interviews of C.R., whom the state court determined to be incompetent to testify at trial, claiming their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The District Court denied the writ, holding that Ring’s constitutional rights were not violated. We reverse.

I.

At issue in this case is the admission of two out-of-court statements made by C.R. in response to questions about the alleged abuse. The first statement was made to Dr. Carolyn Levitt on September 9, 1988, more than a month after the alleged abuse took place. The trial court allowed the prosecution to play the videotape of that interview for the jury over Ring’s hearsay objection, holding that it fit within Rule 803(4) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, the hearsay exception for statements made to physicians for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. The second statement challenged by Ring was made in response to questions asked by Luann Heim, a social worker at Sherburne County Social Services. The court admitted this videotaped statement under Minnesota Statutes § 595.02, Subd. 3, a special hearsay exception for statements made by a child describing a sexual act if the court determines it is reliable, the child either testifies or is unavailable, and there is corroborative evidence of the act. Ring argues that the admission of both of these statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We agree.

II.

The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of all out-of-court statements. Additionally, we now know that whether C.R. was unavailable is irrelevant for purposes of the Clause. The Supreme Court recently held in White v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), that[*820] unavailability of the declarant is not constitutionally required. What the Constitution does require, however, is that the hearsay statements “bear[ ] adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3146, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). The Wright Court held, citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), that the reliability requirement can be met in either of two ways: “where the hearsay statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” 497 U.S. at 816, 110 S.Ct. at 3147. “ ‘[Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ must be shown from the totality of the circumstances.” Id., 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. at 3148. The only circumstances which are relevant, however, are those surrounding the making of the statement, not corroborative evidence of the act. Id.

The first statement being challenged by Ring is the videotaped statement made by C.R. to Dr. Carolyn Levitt. The District Court upheld the state trial court’s admission of the hearsay statement under the medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exception, Minn.R.Evid. 803(4), and therefore held its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause, since it fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Ring first argues that since C.R.’s mother did not take her to the doctor because she was experiencing medical problems or because she needed medical treatment, but only to substantiate a claim of sexual abuse, 803(4) does not apply. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 817-19, 110 S.Ct. at 3148 (although child’s statements were made to a medical doctor, the statements did not fall within 803(4)). We disagree. The trial court implicitly found that the doctor was consulted for purposes of medical treatment. This is a finding of fact which a habeas court may disregard only if one of the conditions specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is met. We cannot say that any of these conditions has been met. Specifically, we cannot say that the record of the state-court proceeding does not fairly support the state trial court’s implicit finding.

Secondly, C.R.’s mother, not C.R., sought the “medical treatment,” and there was no evidence suggesting that at the time of the interview C.R. even knew Dr. Levitt was a doctor. C.R. was three years old at the time. The principal reason why 803(4) is a traditional hearsay exception automatically carrying the indicia-of-reliability label is because of the selfish-motive doctrine. This exception is based on the belief that a person seeking medical treatment is unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her, since it is in her best interest to tell the truth. White, — U.S. at - - -, 112 S.Ct. at 742-43. This underlying basis of reliability is not present in a case such as this one, where not only did the patient herself not seek the doctor’s help, [1] but there is no evidence that she even knew she was talking to a doctor. [2] C.R.’s statement to Dr. Levitt did not fall within 803(4), a firmly rooted hearsay exception, nor did the trial court suggest that it was supported by “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Consequently, the statement’s admission was a violation of Ring’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.

The second statement challenged by Ring is a videotaped statement made by C.R. in an interview with a social worker, Luann Heim. The trial court admitted the statement under Minnesota Statutes § 595.02, Subd. 3, which provides:

An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years ... alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual contact or pen[*821] etration performed with or on the child ... by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible as substantive evidence if:
(a) the court or person authorized to receive evidence finds, in a hearing conducted outside of the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is made provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(b) the child ... either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act....

The parties agree that the statute is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. It was enacted in 1984. Thus, C.R.’s statement must be supported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Ring argues that it was not. We agree.

The trial court listed many factors that it found supported the reliability of the statement. The court’s reliance on two of those factors — that Ring had the opportunity to commit the crime and that other evidence corroborated the abuse — was an error of law. Wright held that these factors are irrelevant to a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, and a trial court may not rely on them in analyzing the hearsay statement’s reliability under the Confrontation Clause. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 825-27, 110 S.Ct. at 3152.

When the inappropriate factors relied on by the trial court are disregarded, the other factors do not satisfy the adequate-indicia-of-reliability standard. For example, the fact that C.R. used terminology typical of a child her age is not particularly helpful. Wright lists the fact that a child uses terminology not typical of a child of similar age as an indication of trustworthiness, not the opposite. 497 U.S. at 821-23, 110 S.Ct. at 3150. We hold that the statement is not particularly trustworthy and therefore that its admission violated Ring’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the District Court with directions to grant the writ unless the State retries petitioner on the charges concerning C.R. within such reasonable time as the District Court may fix.

It is so ordered.

1

. We do not mean to imply that a doctor-patient relationship cannot be established by a parent. In this case, the fact that the relationship was established by a parent instead of by the child herself is simply one fact relevant to the question whether the child knew it was a physician that she was speaking to.

2

. A child who is a competent witness could testify that she knew the person she was talking to was a physician. Here, the trial court ruled that C.R. was not competent to testify, but other witnesses, either the parents or the physician, could testify (if it is in fact the case) that the treating doctor's role was explained to the child and that the child understood it.