reliability requirement in South Dakota

2022Thus, the Court held that “[b]ecause only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities.” Id. -10- #29832 [¶25.] Rosa asserts that the fact that A.R. was an identifiable informant and related to Rosa does not end the reliability inquiry, arguing that the mother/daughter relationship between Rosa and A.R. complicates the determination of reliability because there could be ulterior motive

2022See State v. Discola, 184 A.3d 1177, 1189 (Vt. 2018); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), holding clarified by State v. Antonio Lujan, 459 P.3d 992 , 999–1000 (Utah 2020) (recognizing that the new Utah Rule of Evidence 617 created an evidentiary standard for assessing the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness identifications with Ramirez’s due process considerations as a constitutional backstop—this new evidentiary standard does not include consideration of witness certainty in the reliability analysis); State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571 , 575–76 (Kan. 2003) (adopting the Ramirez c

2022See State v. Discola, 184 A.3d 1177, 1189 (Vt. 2018); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), holding clarified by State v. Antonio Lujan, 459 P.3d 992 , 999–1000 (Utah 2020) (recognizing that the new Utah Rule of Evidence 617 created an evidentiary standard for assessing the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness identifications with Ramirez’s due process considerations as a constitutional backstop—this new evidentiary standard does not include consideration of witness certainty in the reliability analysis); State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571 , 575–76 (Kan. 2003) (adopting the Ramirez c

2022See State v. Discola, 184 A.3d 1177, 1189 (Vt. 2018); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), holding clarified by State v. Antonio Lujan, 459 P.3d 992 , 999–1000 (Utah 2020) (recognizing that the new Utah Rule of Evidence 617 created an evidentiary standard for assessing the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness identifications with Ramirez’s due process considerations as a constitutional backstop—this new evidentiary standard does not include consideration of witness certainty in the reliability analysis); State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571 , 575–76 (Kan. 2003) (adopting the Ramirez c

2007A court has “ ‘considerable leeway’ in deciding in each case ‘how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.’ ” Wells v. Howe Heating & Plumbing, Inc., 2004 SD 37, ¶ 16 , 677 N.W.2d 586, 592 (quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. at 1176 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 ). “[N]o single factor disposes of a reliability inquiry.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796-98 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

2007A court has “ ‘considerable leeway’ in deciding in each case ‘how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.’ ” Wells v. Howe Heating & Plumbing, Inc., 2004 SD 37, ¶ 16 , 677 N.W.2d 586, 592 (quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. at 1176 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 ). “[N]o single factor disposes of a reliability inquiry.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796-98 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

2007A court has “ ‘considerable leeway’ in deciding in each case ‘how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.’ ” Wells v. Howe Heating & Plumbing, Inc., 2004 SD 37, ¶ 16 , 677 N.W.2d 586, 592 (quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. at 1176 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 ). “[N]o single factor disposes of a reliability inquiry.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796-98 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

2007A court has “ ‘considerable leeway’ in deciding in each case ‘how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.’ ” Wells v. Howe Heating & Plumbing, Inc., 2004 SD 37, ¶ 16 , 677 N.W.2d 586, 592 (quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. at 1176 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 ). “[N]o single factor disposes of a reliability inquiry.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796-98 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

2000The reliability requirement can be met in either of two ways: “where the hearsay statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 110 S.Ct. at 3147 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 653 ).

2000The reliability requirement can be met in either of two ways: “where the hearsay statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 110 S.Ct. at 3147 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 653 ).

2000The reliability requirement can be met in either of two ways: “where the hearsay statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 110 S.Ct. at 3147 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 653 ).

2000The reliability requirement can be met in either of two ways: “where the hearsay statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” White, 502 U.S. at 356 , 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 110 S.Ct. at 3147 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 653 ).

2000There is a preference for live testimony over offering out-of-court statements because of the importance of cross-examination, however, “where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.” Id. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 ; State v. Orelup, 520 N.W.2d 898, 901 (S.D.1994) (Orelup II); Ring, 983 F.2d at 820 (citing White, Wright, 497 U.S. at 815 , 110 S.Ct. at 3146 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 652 ). [¶ 44.] The State argues Shaina’s statements were excited utterances, and thus

2000There is a preference for live testimony over offering out-of-court statements because of the importance of cross-examination, however, "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." Id. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 743 , 116 L.Ed.2d at 859 ; State v. Orelup, 520 N.W.2d 898, 901 (S.D.1994) ( Orelup II ); Ring, 983 F.2d at 820 (citing White, Wright, 497 U.S. at 815 , 110 S.Ct. at 3146 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 652 ). [¶ 44.] The State argues Shaina's statements were excited utterances, and th

1984Further, though Reinesch might have arranged the identification in a better fashion, as stated in United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 370 (9th Cir.1976), “the issue before us is not whether a better procedure was available, but whether the procedure used, under all the circumstances, was constitutionally defective.” Even if it may be found that Rein-esch tainted this identification with suggestibility, the identification still merits admission under the reliability factors set forth in Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 . 1) Opportunity of the witness to view the crimin

1984Further, though Reinesch might have arranged the identification in a better fashion, as stated in United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 370 (9th Cir.1976), “the issue before us is not whether a better procedure was available, but whether the procedure used, under all the circumstances, was constitutionally defective.” Even if it may be found that Rein-esch tainted this identification with suggestibility, the identification still merits admission under the reliability factors set forth in Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 . 1) Opportunity of the witness to view the crimin

1936We endeavored to limit our ruling on the point to an appreciably different and much narrower proposition; to wit: “That it does not sufficiently appear from the record in this case that modern medical science is agreed upon the transmissibility of blood characteristics to such an extent that it can be accepted as an unquestioned scientific fact that, if the blood groupings of the parents are known, the blood group of the offspring can be necessarily determined, or that, if the blood groupings of the mother and child are known, it can be accepted as a positively *312 established scientific fact

1936We endeavored to limit our ruling on the point to an appreciably different and much narrower proposition; to wit: “That it does not sufficiently appear from the record in this case that modern medical science is agreed upon the transmissibility of blood characteristics to such an extent that it can be accepted as an unquestioned scientific fact that, if the blood groupings of the parents are known, the blood group of the offspring can be necessarily determined, or that, if the blood groupings of the mother and child are known, it can be accepted as a positively *312 established scientific fact