Melo v. Grullon, 101 A.D.3d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). · Go Syfert
Melo v. Grullon, 101 A.D.3d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Cited for
q1 “permanent consequential limitation of use”2 citing cases2 citing courts quote it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (71%) · 1 listed here
At page 453 lumbar spine, and diagnosed him with a resolved lumbar sprain/ strain (see Baez v Boyd, 90 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2011]). In opposition, plaintiff raised an issue…1 citing caseopening of page *453 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Diaz Ex Rel. Diaz v. Barimah, 144 A.D.3d 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2016).published
    Defendants also established prima facie that the infant plaintiff did not suffer a 90/180-day injury, through her own testimony that she missed only one day of school and the absence of any evidence of a “medically determined” injury, in o…
Pedro Melo
v.
Jose Grullon
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 6, 2012.
Published opinion
101 A.D.3d 452
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published

Defendant established prima facie that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury resulting in either a “permanent consequential” or a “signifícant” limitation of use of his lumbar spine by submitting an affirmation by a neurologist who examined plaintiff and found a full range of motion of the[*453] lumbar spine, and diagnosed him with a resolved lumbar sprain/ strain (see Baez v Boyd, 90 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2011]).

In opposition, plaintiff raised an issue of fact by submitting an MRI report by his radiologist, who found a disc herniation at L4-5; a report by a physician who opined that a subsequent MRI of the lumbar spine revealed an acute compression fracture of the endplate at L3 and disc herniations at L4-5 and other levels; his chiropractor’s affidavit showing range of motion limitations contemporaneous with the accident; and affirmations by three physicians who found continuing limitations and opined that these limitations were permanent and that the lumbar injuries were directly caused by the accident (see Thompkins v Ortiz, 95 AD3d 418 [1st Dept 2012]). This record does not support plaintiff’s contention that he suffered a permanent loss of use of his lumbar spine (see Oberly v Bangs Ambulance, 96 NY2d 295, 299 [2001]).

Defendant established prima facie that plaintiff did not sustain a 90/180-day injury by submitting plaintiff’s bill of particulars and deposition testimony acknowledging that he was confined to bed and home for only a week; in opposition, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (see Hospedales v “John Doe”, 79 AD3d 536 [1st Dept 2010]). Concur — Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Moskowitz, Abdus-Salaam and Feinman, JJ.