Nicastro v. Park, 186 A.D.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). · Go Syfert
Search
Nicastro v. Park, 186 A.D.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Matter of Lundy-Smith (Smith) (nysurctnyc, 2024-06-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Lundy-Smith (Smith)
N.Y. Surr. Ct., New York Cty. · 2024 · confidence medium
"It is settled law that the Surrogate bears the ultimate responsibility of deciding what constitutes reasonable legal compensation, regardless of the existence of a retainer agreement" [Matter of Nicastro, 186 AD2d 805, 805 [2d Dept 1992] [internal citation omitted] [finding the Surrogate did not improvidently exercise his discretion in fixing attorney compensation in an application for leave to compromise and settle a wrongful death claim]; see Matter of Diamond, 219 AD2d 717, 717 [2d Dept 1995] [affirming the Surrogate's decision to not award disbursements]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Sucheron
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Notwithstanding that the Surrogate’s Court has the “ultimate responsibility of deciding what constitutes reasonable legal compensation, regardless of the existence of a retainer agreement” (M atter of Nicastro, 186 AD2d 805, 805 [1992] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Talbot, 84 AD3d 967 [2011]; Matter of Massey, 73 AD3d 1179 [2010]; Matter of Piterniak, 38 AD3d 780, 781 [2007]), the award to Cassisi, which represented 35% of the net contingent attorney’s fee, was an improvident exercise of discretion. “ ‘In evaluating what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee, factors to be …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Talbot
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Surrogate’s Court, which is in the best position to assess and consider the necessary factors in fixing and determining an attorney’s fee (see Matter of Piterniak, 38 AD3d 780, 781 [2007]; Matter of Szkambara, 53 AD3d 502, 502 [2008]; Nicastro v Park, 186 AD2d 805, 805 [1992]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Estate of Drossos
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
It is well settled that “[t]he evaluation of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Surrogate, who is in a ‘far superior position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees such as the time, effort and skill required’ ” (Matter of Pekofsky v Estate of Cohen, 259 AD2d 702, 702 [1999], quoting Matter of Nicastro, 186 AD2d 805, 805 [1992] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Aaron, 30 NY2d 718, 719-720 [1972]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pekofsky v. Estate of Cohen
N.Y. App. Div. · 1999 · confidence medium
The evaluation of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Surrogate, who is in a “ ‘ “far superior position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees such as the time, effort and skill required” ’ ” (Matter of Nicastro, supra, at 805; see also, Matter of McCann, 236 AD2d 405 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of the Estate of Alexander Nicastro, Deceased Dorothy Nicastro, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Alexander Nicastro
v.
Marion Park, as of Fred E. Park
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 26, 1992.
186 A.D.2d 805
1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12212
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published

— In an application, inter alia, for leave to compromise and settle a wrongful death claim arising out of the death of the petitioner’s decedent Anthony Nicastro and for the judicial settlement of the administrator’s account, Dorothy Nicastro and Gina Marie Nicastro appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a resettled order of the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County (Brown, S.), dated January 10, 1991, as awarded their attorney only the sum of $4,500 from an attorneys’ compensation fund established in a stipulation creating the structured settlement of the wrongful death action, and as denied their application to direct the petitioner’s attorneys to pay them $1,498.40 in satisfaction of a judgment entered June 29, 1989, in their favor and against the decedent’s estate.

Ordered that the resettled order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable by the appellants personally.

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the Surrogate did not improvidently exercise his discretion in fixing the amount of compensation to which their attorney was entitled. It is settled law that the Surrogate bears the ultimate responsibility of deciding what constitutes reasonable legal compensation (see, Matter of Phelan, 173 AD2d 621; Matter of Verplanck, 151 AD2d 767), regardless of the existence of a retainer agreement (see, Matter of Lanyi, 147 AD2d 644), or whether all of the interested parties have consented to the amount of fees requested (see, Matter of Van Hofe, 145 AD2d 424). The evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the court (see, De Cabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881), which is in a " 'far superior position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees such as the time, effort and skill required’ * * * and the review of contemporaneous time records” (Lefkowitz v Van Ess, 166 AD2d 556, quoting from Shrauger v Shrauger, 146 AD2d 955, 956). Applying these principles at bar, we are satisfied that the appellants’ attorney was awarded fair and reasonable compensation.

We have examined the parties’ remaining contentions and[*806] find that they are without merit. Eiber, J. P., Ritter, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.