necessary factors in New York

2025Taken as a whole, in short, "Supreme Court took into account all of the necessary factors and, as such, we defer to the court's findings of fact and credibility and affirm this distributive award" ( Allen v Allen , 179 AD3d at 1320; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5]).

2025Taken as a whole, in short, "Supreme Court took into account all of the necessary factors and, as such, we defer to the court's findings of fact and credibility and affirm this distributive award" ( Allen v Allen , 179 AD3d at 1320 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5]).

2014Evaluating the Board’s written determination here in the context of the parole hearing transcript (see Matter of Siao-Pao v Dennison, 11 NY3d 777, 778 [2008]; Matter of Montane v Ev ans, 116 AD3d at 203 n 2), we conclude that the Board properly considered the necessary factors in denying petitioner’s request for parole release and founded its determination upon the facts of this particular case.

2014Evaluating the Board’s written determination here in the context of the parole hearing transcript (see Matter of Siao-Pao v Dennison, 11 NY3d 777, 778 [2008]; Matter of Montane v Ev ans, 116 AD3d at 203 n 2), we conclude that the Board properly considered the necessary factors in denying petitioner’s request for parole release and founded its determination upon the facts of this particular case.

2023Despite the wife's contentions to the contrary, [FN5] "it is clear from the record that Supreme Court took into account all of the necessary factors and, as such, we defer to the court's findings of fact and credibility and affirm this distributive award" ( Allen v Allen , 179 AD3d 1318, 1320 [3d Dept 2020]; see Arthur v Arthur , 148 AD3d 1254, 1255 [3d Dept 2017]).

2023Despite the wife's contentions to the contrary, [FN5] "it is clear from the record that Supreme Court took into account all of the necessary factors and, as such, we defer to the court's findings of fact and credibility and affirm this distributive award" ( Allen v Allen , 179 AD3d 1318, 1320 [3d Dept 2020]; see Arthur v Arthur , 148 AD3d 1254, 1255 [3d Dept 2017]).

2025Additionally, the process server's statement as to any attempts he made to ascertain the place of employment of [defendant] were, at best, conclusory and ambiguous, and insufficient to show that the necessary inquiry was made." Leviton v. Unger , 56 AD3d 731 , 732, 868 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (2d Dept. 2008).

2025Additionally, the process server's statement as to any attempts he made to ascertain the place of employment of [defendant] were, at best, conclusory and ambiguous, and insufficient to show that the necessary inquiry was made." Leviton v. Unger , 56 AD3d 731 , 732, 868 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (2d Dept. 2008).

2024In any event, while the decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction are entitled to respectful consideration, they are not binding. [ East River Realty Co., LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation , 22 Misc 3d 404, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2008), aff'd 68 AD3d 564 (1st Dept. 2009); Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer , 6 Misc 3d 228, 236 (Sup. Ct. 2004), aff'd 26 AD3d 88 (3d Dept. 2005), aff'd 7 NY3d 653 (2006)].

2024In any event, while the decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction are entitled to respectful consideration, they are not binding. [ East River Realty Co., LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation , 22 Misc 3d 404, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2008), aff'd 68 AD3d 564 (1st Dept. 2009); Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer , 6 Misc 3d 228, 236 (Sup. Ct. 2004), aff'd 26 AD3d 88 (3d Dept. 2005), aff'd 7 NY3d 653 (2006)].

2024In any event, while the decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction are entitled to respectful consideration, they are not binding. [ East River Realty Co., LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation , 22 Misc 3d 404, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2008), aff'd 68 AD3d 564 (1st Dept. 2009); Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer , 6 Misc 3d 228, 236 (Sup. Ct. 2004), aff'd 26 AD3d 88 (3d Dept. 2005), aff'd 7 NY3d 653 (2006)].

2024In any event, while the decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction are entitled to respectful consideration, they are not binding. [ East River Realty Co., LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation , 22 Misc 3d 404, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2008), aff'd 68 AD3d 564 (1st Dept. 2009); Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer , 6 Misc 3d 228, 236 (Sup. Ct. 2004), aff'd 26 AD3d 88 (3d Dept. 2005), aff'd 7 NY3d 653 (2006)].

2017“The Surrogate is in the best position to assess and consider the necessary factors in fixing and determining an attorney’s fee, such as the . . . time, effort and skill actually required and time expended” (Matter of Piterniak, 38 AD3d 780, 781 [2007]).

2011The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Surrogate’s Court, which is in the best position to assess and consider the necessary factors in fixing and determining an attorney’s fee (see Matter of Piterniak, 38 AD3d 780, 781 [2007]; Matter of Szkambara, 53 AD3d 502, 502 [2008]; Nicastro v Park, 186 AD2d 805, 805 [1992]).

1958The United States Supreme Court has established the necessary principle that motion picture licensing may be conducted only pursuant to a statute which is so clear in its terms that the licensor is furnished with a definite standard which he may apply (Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 504-505 ; see, also, Superior Films v. Department of Educ. of Ohio and Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 346 U. S. 587 ).

1958The United States Supreme Court has established the necessary principle that motion picture licensing may be conducted only pursuant to a statute which is so clear in its terms that the licensor is furnished with a definite standard which he may apply ( Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson , 343 U. S. 495, 504-505 ; see, also, Superior Films v. Department of Educ. of Ohio and Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents , 346 U. S. 587 ).

2011The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Surrogate’s Court, which is in the best position to assess and consider the necessary factors in fixing and determining an attorney’s fee (see Matter of Piterniak, 38 AD3d 780, 781 [2007]; Matter of Szkambara, 53 AD3d 502, 502 [2008]; Nicastro v Park, 186 AD2d 805, 805 [1992]).

2007The Surrogate is in the best position to assess and consider the necessary factors in fixing and determining an attorney’s fee, such as the reasonable value time, effort and skill actually required and time expended (see Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1 ; Matter of Gluck, 279 AD2d 575 [2001]; Matter of Nicastro, supra).

2011“In evaluating what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee, factors to be considered include the time and labor expended, the difficulty of the questions involved and the required skill to handle the problems presented, the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation, the amount involved, the customary fee charged for such services, and the results obtained” (Matter of Szkambara, 53 AD3d at 502-503 ; see Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9 [1974]).

2007The Surrogate is in the best position to assess and consider the necessary factors in fixing and determining an attorney’s fee, such as the reasonable value time, effort and skill actually required and time expended (see Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1 ; Matter of Gluck, 279 AD2d 575 [2001]; Matter of Nicastro, supra).

1992Given the particular circumstances of the questioning here, including the police-dominated atmosphere beginning at defendant’s home (see, Miranda v Arizona, supra, at 445), defendant’s status as a suspect from the time the investigation commenced (cf, People v Centono, supra; People v Medvecky, 95 AD2d 921, 922 ), a fact that was communicated to defendant by the nature of the police interrogation, the restraints on defendant’s ability to move, and her isolation from and inability to communicate with her family and friends, we cannot say that County Court’s determination that defendant was subj

1968The Court of Appeals went on to adopt the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda {supra): “‘By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way ’ ” (21 N Y 2d 1, 9).

2025In light of the foregoing, we must vacate defendant's sentence — not the conviction or plea — and remit the matter for assignment of new counsel on defendant's application to withdraw his plea and for County Court to make the necessary inquiry to determine whether to relieve assigned counsel — the Public Defender — and appoint substitute counsel ( see People v Sides , 75 NY2d at 825; People v Maldonado , 183 AD3d at 1131; People v Faulker , 168 AD3d at 1319).

2025In light of the foregoing, we must vacate defendant's sentence — not the conviction or plea — and remit the matter for assignment of new counsel on defendant's application to withdraw his plea and for County Court to make the necessary inquiry to determine whether to relieve assigned counsel — the Public Defender — and appoint substitute counsel ( see People v Sides , 75 NY2d at 825 ; People v Maldonado , 183 AD3d at 1131 ; People v Faulker , 168 AD3d at 1319).

2025In light of the foregoing, we must vacate defendant's sentence — not the conviction or plea — and remit the matter for assignment of new counsel on defendant's application to withdraw his plea and for County Court to make the necessary inquiry to determine whether to relieve assigned counsel — the Public Defender — and appoint substitute counsel ( see People v Sides , 75 NY2d at 825; People v Maldonado , 183 AD3d at 1131; People v Faulker , 168 AD3d at 1319).

2025In light of the foregoing, we must vacate defendant's sentence — not the conviction or plea — and remit the matter for assignment of new counsel on defendant's application to withdraw his plea and for County Court to make the necessary inquiry to determine whether to relieve assigned counsel — the Public Defender — and appoint substitute counsel ( see People v Sides , 75 NY2d at 825 ; People v Maldonado , 183 AD3d at 1131 ; People v Faulker , 168 AD3d at 1319).

2024Although we are empowered to reach such determination, the record on appeal is insufficient to permit the necessary inquiry, so we must remit the matter to Family Court for a new hearing [*3]to determine whether parenting time with the mother is appropriate or whether it would be detrimental to the child's welfare ( see Matter of Theressa M. v Gaddiel M. , 228 AD3d at 1041; Matter of Jessica HH. v Sean HH. , 196 AD3d at 755-756 ; Matter of Jill Q. v James R. , 185 AD3d 1106, 1110 [3d Dept 2020]).

2023Given the foregoing, it is clear from the record that Family Court weighed all of the necessary factors and, as such, we find that its decision that relocation is in the best interests of the children is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of James TT. v Shermaqiae UU. , 184 AD3d 975 , 977-978 [3d Dept 2020]; Matter of Brent O. v Lisa P. , 161 AD3d 1242 , 1245-1246 [3d [*4]Dept 2018]; Matter of Hoffman v Turco , 154 AD3d 1136, 1138-1139 [3d Dept 2017]).