Fekety v. Gruntal & Co., 191 A.D.2d 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Fekety v. Gruntal & Co., 191 A.D.2d 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 4 distinct cases, 1997–2019 · 2 courts · …a broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities. at p. 190 ✓
13 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Aldridge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (ncbizct, 2019-12-31)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Aldridge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) BNP Paribas Mortgage Corp. v. Bank of America, N.A. (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
S.D.N.Y. · 2012 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
a broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Nnn Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Grubb & Ellis Co.; Nnn Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship 2016 Ncbc 93a
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Melrose Credit Union v. Canizares
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
The "elements constituting a RICO claim must be pleaded with particularity" ( Fekety v Gruntal & Co. , 191 AD2d 370, 370-371 [citation omitted]; see Board of Mgrs. of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams St., LLC , 136 AD3d 680, 685 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fesseha v. TD Waterhouse Investor Services, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
The claim for breach of fiduciary duty was properly dismissed since plaintiff opened a nondiscretionary trading account, and the relationship between plaintiff and defendant was merely that of broker and customer (see Matter of Dean Witter Managed Futures, 282 AD2d 271 , supra; Perl v Smith Barney, 230 AD2d 664, 666 [1996]; Fekety v Gruntal & Co., 191 AD2d 370, 371 [1993]; Bissell v Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 937 F Supp 237, 246 [1996], affd 157 F3d 138 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
Profit Sharing Plan v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 964 F.Supp. 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting Fekety v. Gruntal & Co., 191 A.D.2d 370 , 595 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190-91 (1st Dep’t 1993)); accord Perl v. Smith Barney Inc., 230 A.D.2d 664 , 646 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (1st Dep’t 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) A. Ronald Sirna, Jr., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Prudential Securities, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
New York courts repeatedly have held that “a broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.” Fekety v. Gruntal & Co., 191 A.D.2d 370 , 595 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190-91 (1st Dept.1993); accord, e.g., Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Index Nos. 95/123358, 95/124988, slip op. at 3 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fesseha v. TD Waterhouse Investor Services, Inc.
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
First, “under New York law * * * [i]n the absence of discretionary trading authority,” which is not alleged here, “a broker does not owe a general fiduciary duty to his client.” (Bissell v Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc, 937 F Supp 237, 246 [SD NY 1996], affd 157 F3d 138 [2d Cir 1998]; see also, Fekety v Gruntal & Co., 191 AD2d 370 [1st Dept 1993].) Second, plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty is duplicative of his contract claim.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James Fekety
v.
Gruntal & Co., Inc.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Mar 25, 1993.
191 A.D.2d 370
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 74%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (2) · North Carolina Business Court (1)

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Tompkins, J.), entered January 6, 1992, which, insofar as appealed from, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint to the extent of dismissing the first cause of action for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18 USC § 1961 et seq.) with prejudice, and the fifth cause of action for common law fraud with leave to replead, and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to add causes of action for violation of fiduciary duty, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The seven elements constituting a RICO claim (see, Moss v Morgan Stanley 719 F2d 5, 17, cert denied sub nom. Moss v [*371] Newman, 465 US 1025) must be pleaded with particularity (Dow v Meyers, 182 AD2d 1128, 1129). This plaintiffs failed to do with respect to their claim of violation of section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j [b]; see, Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185), and thus no predicate act sufficient to support a RICO claim was shown. We also agree with the IAS Court that plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite continuity of racketeering activity (see, Airlines Reporting Corp. v Aero Voyagers, 721 F Supp 579, 584-585), and that the claim for common law fraud was not pleaded with sufficient particularity (CPLR 3016 [b]; see, Flickinger v Brown & Co., 947 F2d 595, 599). The amendments plaintiffs proposed for breach of fiduciary duty were properly denied as plainly without merit since a broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities (see, Rush v Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F Supp 1045, 1055). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Ross, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.