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38 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1984–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2018The statute of limitations for a civil RICO claim is four years ( Agency Holding Corp. v Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 US 143, 156 [1987]). 2011In Agency Holding Corp. v Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc. ( 483 US 143, 156 [1987]), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the statute of limitations for civil RICO claims is four years, but expressly declined to decide when such claims accrue (see Rotella v Wood, 528 US 549, 552 [2000]). | 2 | 2 |
Crab House of Douglaston, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc.green2 sentences2010As the fourth RICO counterclaim based upon 18 USC § 1962 (d), and alleging a conspiracy, is dependent upon the third RICO counterclaim alleging a substantive RICO violation, dismissal of the third RICO counterclaim also necessitates the dismissal of the fourth counterclaim on this alternate ground (see Crab House of Douglaston, Inc. v Newsday, Inc., 418 F Supp 2d 193, 212 [2006]; Farberware, Inc. v Groben, 764 F Supp 296, 307 [1991]). 2008Because the substantive RICO claim was deficient, so was the conspiracy claim (Crab House of Douglaston, Inc. v Newsday, Inc., 418 F Supp 2d 193, 212 [2006]; see generally Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43, 57 [1999]). | 2 | 2 |
Dempster v. Liottigreen2 sentences2015“A RICO claim is deemed to have accrued when the plaintiff ‘knew or should have known of his or her injury, regardless of when he or she discovered the underlying fraud’ ” (id. at 849-850, quoting Dempster v Liotti, 86 AD3d 169, 178 [2011]). 2015“A RICO claim is deemed to have accrued when the plaintiff ‘knew or should have known of his or her injury, regardless of when he or she discovered the underlying fraud’ ” (id. at 849-850, quoting Dempster v Liotti, 86 AD3d 169, 178 [2011]). | 1 | 3 |
Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia National Corporationgreen2 sentences2023"To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show:'(1) a violation of the RICO Statute 18 USC§ 1962, (2) an injury to business or property and (3) the injury was caused by the violation of Section 1962." Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F3d 286 ,305 (2d Cir 2001) quoting Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat'[ Corp., 101 F3d 900 ,904 (2d Cir 1996); See also Hecht v, 31 31 of 34 [* 31] FILED: ORANGE COUNTY CLERK 03/21/2023 10:34 AM INDEX NO. 2023"To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show:'(1) a violation of the RICO Statute 18 USC§ 1962, (2) an injury to business or property and (3) the injury was caused by the violation of Section 1962." Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F3d 286 ,305 (2d Cir 2001) quoting Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat'[ Corp., 101 F3d 900 ,904 (2d Cir 1996); See also Hecht v, 31 31 of 34 [* 31] FILED: ORANGE COUNTY CLERK 03/21/2023 10:34 AM INDEX NO. | 1 | 2 |
De Falco v. Bernasgreen2 sentences2023"To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show:'(1) a violation of the RICO Statute 18 USC§ 1962, (2) an injury to business or property and (3) the injury was caused by the violation of Section 1962." Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F3d 286 ,305 (2d Cir 2001) quoting Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat'[ Corp., 101 F3d 900 ,904 (2d Cir 1996); See also Hecht v, 31 31 of 34 [* 31] FILED: ORANGE COUNTY CLERK 03/21/2023 10:34 AM INDEX NO. 2023"To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show:'(1) a violation of the RICO Statute 18 USC§ 1962, (2) an injury to business or property and (3) the injury was caused by the violation of Section 1962." Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F3d 286 ,305 (2d Cir 2001) quoting Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat'[ Corp., 101 F3d 900 ,904 (2d Cir 1996); See also Hecht v, 31 31 of 34 [* 31] FILED: ORANGE COUNTY CLERK 03/21/2023 10:34 AM INDEX NO. | 1 | 2 |
Holschauer v. Fishergreen2 sentences2011In any event, the plaintiffs conclusory claims that her complaint would have survived the RICO defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint if Liotti had advanced new injuries, separate and apart from the fraudulent transfer of marital assets, are speculative and, thus, not sufficient to support a cause of action alleging legal malpractice (see Dupree v Voorhees, 68 AD3d at 813 ; Hashmi v Messiha, 65 AD3d 1193, 1195 [2009]; Vlahakis v Mendelson & Assoc., 54 AD3d 670 [2008]; Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553, 554 [2004]). 2011In any event, the plaintiffs conclusory claims that her complaint would have survived the RICO defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint if Liotti had advanced new injuries, separate and apart from the fraudulent transfer of marital assets, are speculative and, thus, not sufficient to support a cause of action alleging legal malpractice (see Dupree v Voorhees, 68 AD3d at 813 ; Hashmi v Messiha, 65 AD3d 1193, 1195 [2009]; Vlahakis v Mendelson & Assoc., 54 AD3d 670 [2008]; Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553, 554 [2004]). | 1 | 2 |
Browning Avenue Realty Corp. v. Rubingreen2 sentences2000Realty Corp. v Rubin, 207 AD2d 263, 266-267 [where Federal court dismissed RICO claim, subsequent State law claims raising same issue barred by collateral estoppel], Iv denied 85 NY2d 804 ). 1998Realty Corp. v Rubin, 207 AD2d 263, 266-267 , Iv denied 85 NY2d 804 ). | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Reiss Eisenpress L.L.P.green2 sentences2025Co. v Buziashvili, 49 AD3d 423, 423 [1st Dept 2008]). 2025Co. v Buziashvili, 49 AD3d 423, 423 [1st Dept 2008]). | 1 | 1 |
Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp.green2 sentences2024However, Frank does not argue that the Complaint fails to plead the requisite elements of a claim under RICO ( cf. Abraham v Torati , 219 AD3d 1275 , 1281-1282 &1286 [2d Dept 2023]), [FN2] and a defaulting defendant like Frank is "deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that flow from them" ( Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp. , 100 NY2d 62, 71 [2003]). 2024However, Frank does not argue that the Complaint fails to plead the requisite elements of a claim under RICO ( cf. Abraham v Torati , 219 AD3d 1275 , 1281-1282 &1286 [2d Dept 2023]), [FN2] and a defaulting defendant like Frank is "deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that flow from them" ( Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp. , 100 NY2d 62, 71 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
Fekety v. Gruntal & Co.green2 sentences2021The "elements constituting a RICO claim must be pleaded with particularity" ( Fekety v Gruntal & Co. , 191 AD2d 370, 370-371 [citation omitted]; see Board of Mgrs. of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams St., LLC , 136 AD3d 680, 685 ). 2021The "elements constituting a RICO claim must be pleaded with particularity" ( Fekety v Gruntal & Co. , 191 AD2d 370, 370-371 [citation omitted]; see Board of Mgrs. of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams St., LLC , 136 AD3d 680, 685 ). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Managers of Beacon Tower Condominium v. 85 Adams Street, LLCgreen2 sentences2021The "elements constituting a RICO claim must be pleaded with particularity" ( Fekety v Gruntal & Co. , 191 AD2d 370, 370-371 [citation omitted]; see Board of Mgrs. of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams St., LLC , 136 AD3d 680, 685 ). 2021The "elements constituting a RICO claim must be pleaded with particularity" ( Fekety v Gruntal & Co. , 191 AD2d 370, 370-371 [citation omitted]; see Board of Mgrs. of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams St., LLC , 136 AD3d 680, 685 ). | 1 | 1 |
Ritchie v. Carvel Corp.green2 sentences2017Accordingly, in the absence of a properly pleaded and particularized claim alleging that defendants engaged in racketeering through a pattern of mail fraud ( see Richie v Cavel Corp ., 180 AD2d 786, 787 [2d Dept 1992]), the civil RICO claim must be dismissed. 2017Accordingly, in the absence of a properly pleaded and particularized claim alleging that defendants engaged in racketeering through a pattern of mail fraud ( see Richie v Cavel Corp ., 180 AD2d 786, 787 [2d Dept 1992]), the civil RICO claim must be dismissed. | 1 | 1 |
Perks v. Lauto & Garabediangreen2 sentences2016The estate's successor counsel had "sufficient time and opportunity to adequately protect" the estate's rights by timely asserting a RICO claim against Neiman and GT ( accord Maksimiak v Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 AD3d 652 , 652 [1st Dept 2011]; see Perks v Lauto & Garabedian, 306 AD2d 261, 262 [2d Dept 2003] ["The introduction of new counsel serves as an intervening cause in a legal malpractice, severing the chain of causation between the negligent actions of an attorney and a plaintiff's injuries, so long as new counsel has sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiff 2016The estate's successor counsel had "sufficient time and opportunity to adequately protect" the estate's rights by timely asserting a RICO claim against Neiman and GT ( accord Maksimiak v Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 AD3d 652 , 652 [1st Dept 2011]; see Perks v Lauto & Garabedian, 306 AD2d 261, 262 [2d Dept 2003] ["The introduction of new counsel serves as an intervening cause in a legal malpractice, severing the chain of causation between the negligent actions of an attorney and a plaintiff's injuries, so long as new counsel has sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiff | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. Waywellgreen2 sentences2014Maersk, Inc. v Sahni, 450 Fed App 3 [2d Cir 2011]). “[Establishing a RICO violation requires more than proof of common-law fraud or conspiracy to defraud” (id. at 331; see Cofacredit, S.A. v Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F3d 229, 242 [2d Cir 1999]; Gross v Waywell, 628 F Supp 2d 475, 488 [SD NY 2009]; Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 F Supp 2d 340, 346 [SD NY 1998]). 2014Maersk, Inc. v Sahni, 450 Fed App 3 [2d Cir 2011]). “[Establishing a RICO violation requires more than proof of common-law fraud or conspiracy to defraud” (id. at 331; see Cofacredit, S.A. v Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F3d 229, 242 [2d Cir 1999]; Gross v Waywell, 628 F Supp 2d 475, 488 [SD NY 2009]; Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 F Supp 2d 340, 346 [SD NY 1998]). | 1 | 1 |
Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co. Inc.green2 sentences2014Maersk, Inc. v Sahni, 450 Fed App 3 [2d Cir 2011]). “[Establishing a RICO violation requires more than proof of common-law fraud or conspiracy to defraud” (id. at 331; see Cofacredit, S.A. v Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F3d 229, 242 [2d Cir 1999]; Gross v Waywell, 628 F Supp 2d 475, 488 [SD NY 2009]; Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 F Supp 2d 340, 346 [SD NY 1998]). 2014Maersk, Inc. v Sahni, 450 Fed App 3 [2d Cir 2011]). “[Establishing a RICO violation requires more than proof of common-law fraud or conspiracy to defraud” (id. at 331; see Cofacredit, S.A. v Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F3d 229, 242 [2d Cir 1999]; Gross v Waywell, 628 F Supp 2d 475, 488 [SD NY 2009]; Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 F Supp 2d 340, 346 [SD NY 1998]). | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Fleet Bankgreen2 sentences2014Maersk, Inc. v Sahni, 450 Fed App 3 [2d Cir 2011]). “[Establishing a RICO violation requires more than proof of common-law fraud or conspiracy to defraud” (id. at 331; see Cofacredit, S.A. v Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F3d 229, 242 [2d Cir 1999]; Gross v Waywell, 628 F Supp 2d 475, 488 [SD NY 2009]; Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 F Supp 2d 340, 346 [SD NY 1998]). 2014Maersk, Inc. v Sahni, 450 Fed App 3 [2d Cir 2011]). “[Establishing a RICO violation requires more than proof of common-law fraud or conspiracy to defraud” (id. at 331; see Cofacredit, S.A. v Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 187 F3d 229, 242 [2d Cir 1999]; Gross v Waywell, 628 F Supp 2d 475, 488 [SD NY 2009]; Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 F Supp 2d 340, 346 [SD NY 1998]). | 1 | 1 |
Hashmi v. Messihagreen2 sentences2011In any event, the plaintiffs conclusory claims that her complaint would have survived the RICO defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint if Liotti had advanced new injuries, separate and apart from the fraudulent transfer of marital assets, are speculative and, thus, not sufficient to support a cause of action alleging legal malpractice (see Dupree v Voorhees, 68 AD3d at 813 ; Hashmi v Messiha, 65 AD3d 1193, 1195 [2009]; Vlahakis v Mendelson & Assoc., 54 AD3d 670 [2008]; Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553, 554 [2004]). 2011In any event, the plaintiffs conclusory claims that her complaint would have survived the RICO defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint if Liotti had advanced new injuries, separate and apart from the fraudulent transfer of marital assets, are speculative and, thus, not sufficient to support a cause of action alleging legal malpractice (see Dupree v Voorhees, 68 AD3d at 813 ; Hashmi v Messiha, 65 AD3d 1193, 1195 [2009]; Vlahakis v Mendelson & Assoc., 54 AD3d 670 [2008]; Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553, 554 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
| Rotella v. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Service Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2011Sys., Inc., 271 F3d 374, 380 [2001]; First Nationwide Bank v Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F3d 763 , 767 [1994], cert denied 513 US 1079 [1995]). | 1 | 1 |
| McCoy v. Teppergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farberware, Inc. v. Grobengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| FD Property Holding, Inc. v. US Traffic Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anitora Travel, Inc. v. Lapiangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeldergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cianci v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Haydengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fuentes v. Shevingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Union Oil Co. of California v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp.
green
2 sentences1999Moss v Newman, 465 US 1025 ). 1998Moss v Newman, 465 US 1025 ). | 3 | 1993–1999 |
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.
green
2 sentences1995The elements that must be pleaded to state a civil RICO claim are "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity” (Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 473 US 479, 496 ; see also, McCool v Strata Oil Co., 972 F2d 1452, 1464 [7th Cir] ["(t)he elements of a civil RICO claim * * * are 1) a violation of the RICO statute, including proof that the defendant has participated in a pattern of racketeering, and 2) an injury to business or property”]). 1991L. v Imrex Co., 473 US 479 .) Additionally, the RICO claim was supported by verified pleadings, court records and criminal indictments issued against City-Wide’s officers and employees. | 3 | 1989–1995 |
Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v. Feldstein
green
2 sentences2021The defendant's failure to plead a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (c) warrants the conclusion that he also failed to plead a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (d) ( see Daskal v Tyrnauer , 123 AD3d 652 ; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v Feldstein , 72 AD3d at 894 ). 2021The defendant's failure to plead a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (c) warrants the conclusion that he also failed to plead a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (d) ( see Daskal v Tyrnauer , 123 AD3d 652 ; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v Feldstein , 72 AD3d at 894 ). | 2 | 2010–2021 |
Spool v. World Child International Adoption Agency
green
2 sentences2024Turning to the RICO claims, to succeed on a RICO claim, the moving party must demonstrate three elements: (1) a violation of the RICO statute, 18 USG §1962; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) the injury was caused by the violation of section 1962 (Spool v. World Child Int'l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178 [2d. 2024Turning to the RICO claims, to succeed on a RICO claim, the moving party must demonstrate three elements: (1) a violation of the RICO statute, 18 USG §1962; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) the injury was caused by the violation of section 1962 (Spool v. World Child Int'l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178 [2d. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Daskal Ex Rel. 333-345 Green LLC v. Tyrnauer
neutral
2 sentences2021The defendant's failure to plead a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (c) warrants the conclusion that he also failed to plead a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (d) ( see Daskal v Tyrnauer , 123 AD3d 652 ; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v Feldstein , 72 AD3d at 894 ). 2021The defendant's failure to plead a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (c) warrants the conclusion that he also failed to plead a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation pursuant to 18 USC § 1962 (d) ( see Daskal v Tyrnauer , 123 AD3d 652 ; Greenstone/Fontana Corp. v Feldstein , 72 AD3d at 894 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Maksimiak v. Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C.
green
2 sentences2016The estate's successor counsel had "sufficient time and opportunity to adequately protect" the estate's rights by timely asserting a RICO claim against Neiman and GT ( accord Maksimiak v Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 AD3d 652 , 652 [1st Dept 2011]; see Perks v Lauto & Garabedian, 306 AD2d 261, 262 [2d Dept 2003] ["The introduction of new counsel serves as an intervening cause in a legal malpractice, severing the chain of causation between the negligent actions of an attorney and a plaintiff's injuries, so long as new counsel has sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiff 2016The estate's successor counsel had "sufficient time and opportunity to adequately protect" the estate's rights by timely asserting a RICO claim against Neiman and GT ( accord Maksimiak v Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 AD3d 652 , 652 [1st Dept 2011]; see Perks v Lauto & Garabedian, 306 AD2d 261, 262 [2d Dept 2003] ["The introduction of new counsel serves as an intervening cause in a legal malpractice, severing the chain of causation between the negligent actions of an attorney and a plaintiff's injuries, so long as new counsel has sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiff | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Shapiro v. Rockville Country Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016A cause of action alleging violations of the RICO Action is governed by a four-year statute of limitations ( Kenny v RBC Royal Bank, 22 AD3d 385 , 386 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 705 [2006]). 2016A cause of action alleging violations of the RICO Action is governed by a four-year statute of limitations ( Kenny v RBC Royal Bank, 22 AD3d 385 , 386 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 705 [2006]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
DiRaimondo v. Calhoun
green
2 sentences2016A RICO claim accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury, regardless of when she discovered the underlying fraud ( DiRaimondo v Calhoun, 131 AD3d 1194 [2d Dept 2015]). 2016A RICO claim accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury, regardless of when she discovered the underlying fraud ( DiRaimondo v Calhoun, 131 AD3d 1194 [2d Dept 2015]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Kenny v. RBC Royal Bank
green
2 sentences2016A cause of action alleging violations of the RICO Action is governed by a four-year statute of limitations ( Kenny v RBC Royal Bank, 22 AD3d 385 , 386 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 705 [2006]). 2016A cause of action alleging violations of the RICO Action is governed by a four-year statute of limitations ( Kenny v RBC Royal Bank, 22 AD3d 385 , 386 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 705 [2006]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Burrowes v. Combs
green
2 sentences2016However, CRA could not have been on inquiry notice of these "storm warnings" in 2006 because, according to plaintiff's own submissions, CRA's mental capacity [*6] at that time was extremely diminished. [FN3] Further, CRA's incapacity would have likely tolled the limitations period on the hypothetical RICO claim until Luke's appointment as guardian, in March 2008 ( cf Burrowes v Combs, 25 AD3d 370 , 371-72 [1st Dept], 7 NY3d 704 [2006]). 2016However, CRA could not have been on inquiry notice of these "storm warnings" in 2006 because, according to plaintiff's own submissions, CRA's mental capacity [*6] at that time was extremely diminished. [FN3] Further, CRA's incapacity would have likely tolled the limitations period on the hypothetical RICO claim until Luke's appointment as guardian, in March 2008 ( cf Burrowes v Combs, 25 AD3d 370 , 371-72 [1st Dept], 7 NY3d 704 [2006]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Boyle v. United States
green
1 sentence2012It is true that in Boyle the RICO requirement of enterprise structure was deemed satisfied simply by proof of the underlying pattern of criminal activity and the inference of structure that that proof would bear (see 556 US at 947-948 ). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Vlahakis v. Mendelson & Associates green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Dupree v. Voorhees green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Conklin v. Owen green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bingham v. Zolt green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Docket No. 97-9205 green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hildebrand v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence2011Sys., Inc., 271 F3d 374, 380 [2001]; First Nationwide Bank v Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F3d 763 , 767 [1994], cert denied 513 US 1079 [1995]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Pittston Co. v. Babbitt green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Besicorp, Ltd. v. Kahn green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Lester v. Braue green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Mayer v. Sanders green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Bel Geddes v. Zeiderman green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Mazzilli v. City of New York green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| cluster 659855 green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. And Harvey Shapiro v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Callas v. Eisenberg green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Calderone v. Levites Realty Management Corp. neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Patton v. Sourbeer green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| S. J. T., Inc., Dba Tj Smiles v. Richmond County, Georgia green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc. v. Kemp green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Scofield v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Browning Avenue Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| McCright v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Dow v. Meyers neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Walker v. Sheldon green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Simpson Electric Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| County of Cook v. Midcon Corp. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.