United States v. John Doe 1, & John Doe 2, 996 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
United States v. John Doe 1, & John Doe 2, 996 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
38 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Cited for
At page 607 Reviewing the extent of downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.128 citing cases“We therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.”the opinion's own words at *607 · 27 listed here
  • United States v. Guzman, 287 F. App'x 956 (2d Cir. 2008).unpublished
    Similarly, a defendant ordinarily has no right to appeal the extent of a downward departure, see, e.g., United States v. Hargrett, 156 F.3d 447, 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048 , 119 S.Ct. 607 , 142 L.Ed.2d 547 (1998); United St…
  • United States v. Gilmore, 282 F. App'x 953 (2d Cir. 2008).unpublished
    First, “[t]he district court may consider a downward departure for a defendant’s substantial assistance only if the government makes a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.” United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam).
  • United States v. Levy, 272 F. App'x 56 (2d Cir. 2008).unpublished
    Similarly, a defendant ordinarily has no right to appeal the extent of a downward departure, see, e.g., United States v. Hargrett, 156 F.3d 447, 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048 , 119 S.Ct. 607 , 142 L.Ed.2d 547 (1998); United St…
  • United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651 (2d Cir. 2008).published
    Under the pre Booker sentencing regime, a defendant had no right to appeal the sentencing court’s discretionary refusal to grant a downward departure, see, e.g., United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 267-68 (2d Cir.2007); United States v.…
  • United States v. Tolentino, 257 F. App'x 376 (2d Cir. 2007).unpublished
    Similarly, a defendant ordinarily has no right to appeal the extent of a downward departure, see, e.g., United States v. Hargrett, 156 F.3d 447, 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048 , 119 S.Ct. 607 , 142 L.Ed.2d 547 (1998); United St…
  • United States v. Salcedo, 137 F. App'x 398 (2d Cir. 2005).unpublished
    In particular, “[a] defendant cannot generally appeal the extent of a departure made pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.” United States v. Lucas, 17 F.3d 596, 599 (2d Cir.1994); accord United States v. Gonzalez, 192 F.3d 350, 353 (2d Cir.1999) (…
  • United States v. Timewell, 124 F. App'x 55 (2d Cir. 2005).unpublished
    See United States v. Moe, 65 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Lawal, 17 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993).
  • United States v. Santiago, 82 F. App'x 720 (2d Cir. 2003).unpublished
    Denial of a discretionary downward departure is generally unappealable and, since “disappointment with the extent of a district judge’s downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 falls in none of the [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’] appealable…
  • United States v. Chen Wei Ren, 20 F. App'x 13 (2d Cir. 2001).unpublished
    United, States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (“[I]t is beyond question that we may not review a district court’s discretionary determination not to grant a downward departure.
  • United States v. Hargrett, 156 F.3d 447 (2d Cir. 1998).published
    See United States v. Moe, 65 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam). 12 For the reasons stated in Lawal, we believe that a simple failure to explain the extent of a downward departur…
Show 17 more citing cases
  • United States v. Hargrett, 156 F.3d 447 (2d Cir. 1998).published
    See United States v. Moe, 65 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam).
  • United States v. James Roe, John Doe, 104 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 1996).unpublished
    United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam). 10 Doe recognizes that we may not review the extent of Judge Raggi's departure, but frames his appeal as a challenge to the fairness of the procedure by which the court ma…
  • United States v. Ming He, Also Known as Tony Jai, 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996).published
    A sentencing court’s refusal to depart downwardly, see, e.g., United States v. Ekhator, 17 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir.1994), and the extent of departure granted upon the government’s § 5K1.1 motion, see, e.g., United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606,…
  • United States v. Leo Eshekha Momoh, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996).unpublished 2 cites
    United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam). 9 Momoh first argues that the district court ignored the extent of his assistance to the government.
  • United States v. Wilson Lipscomb, A/K/A Bay Bay, 70 F.3d 1263 (4th Cir. 1995).unpublished
    See, e.g., United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C.Cir.1991) (methodology and justifications for degree of downward departure not reviewable); United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (citing cases). 3 We therefore dism…
  • United States v. Stephan Gary Hill, 70 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1995).published
    See respectively, United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam); United States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Alvarez, 51 F.3d 36,…
  • United States v. Zaw Moe, Amir Humuntal Lubman Tobing, San Lwin, 65 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1995).published
    It follows logically, then, that neither may we review, at defendant’s request, the extent of any departure the court may grant.” United States v. Lawal, 17 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d C…
  • United States v. Steven Peter Amato & Nicola Sinis, John Sinis, 46 F.3d 1255 (2d Cir. 1995).published
    While the district court’s discretionary determination of the extent of a downward departure is generally not reviewable, United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam), here, the record suggests that the district court…
  • United States v. Frank Gangi, 45 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1995).published
    E.g., United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 896 (2d Cir.1992).
  • United States v. James P. Mastronardi, 30 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1994).unpublished
    AFFIRMED 1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.1992) 2 See United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Correa, 995 F.2d 686, 687 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Bromberg, 933 F.2d 895, 8…
  • United States v. Randolph Allen Lucas, 17 F.3d 596 (2d Cir. 1994).published
    United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993).
  • United States v. Genevieve Lawal, Francis Wiredu, Augustina Erskine, Hannah Nemo, Agnes Anane, Constance Hagan, & Osman El-Alana, Adu Gyanfi Wiredu, 17 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1994).published
    It follows logically, then, that neither may we review, at defendant’s request, the extent of any departure the court may grant.” United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted).
  • United States v. Pan Liang Xin, 20 F. App'x 30 (2d Cir. 2001).unpublished
    See United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam) (“[I]t is beyond question that we may not review a district court’s discretionary determination not to grant a downward departure.
  • United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273 (1st Cir. 1993).published 2 cites
    See United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir. ___ _____________ ___ 1993); United States v. Correa, 995 F.2d 686, 687 (7th Cir. _____________ ______ 1993); United States v. Womack, 985 F.2d 395, 401 (8th Cir.), ______________ ______…
  • United States v. Shand, 739 F.3d 714 (2d Cir. 2014).published
    See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam).
  • United States v. Gary A. Johnson, A/K/A Chub, 46 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995).unpublished
    See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (listing cases); United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C.Cir.1991).
  • United States v. Jeffrey Evans Lark, 37 F.3d 1496 (4th Cir. 1994).published
    See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir.1993) (listing cases).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
John DOE # 1, Defendant, and John Doe #2, Defendant-Appellant
830, Docket 92-1416.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jun 23, 1993.
Published opinion
996 F.2d 606
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15220
Thomas J. Spargo, East Berne, NY, for defendant-appellant., Paul D. Silver, Asst. U.S. Atty., N.D.N.Y. (Gary L. Sharpe, U.S. Atty., of counsel), for appellee.
Pratt, Jacobs, Knapp, Southern, York.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
[*607] PER CURIAM:

John Doe pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846. Doe’s crime called for a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The government, however, found that Doe contributed substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person and accordingly moved for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 from the mandatory minimum and from Doe’s calculated guidelines’ range of 63-78 months. The district court granted the government’s departure motion and sentenced Doe to 30 months’ imprisonment.

Doe’s sole claim on appeal is that, in view of his extraordinary assistance to the government in infiltrating and setting up major drug suppliers in New York State, the district judge should have granted a more substantial downward departure than he did.

We write today to clarify our lack of jurisdiction to review the extent of a downward departure granted under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Surprisingly, this issue has not been the subject of a published opinion in our circuit.

The district court may consider a downward departure for a defendant’s substantial assistance only if the government makes a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. If the government does so move, it is beyond question that we may not review a district court’s discretionary determination not to grant a downward departure. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 896 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1991). It follows logically, then, that neither may we review, at defendant’s request, the extent of any departure the court may grant.

Our conclusion is supported by the statute that defines our jurisdiction to review a sentence on an appeal by the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). That statute limits a defendant’s right of appeal from a sentence to cases in which the sentence imposed was (1) in violation of law; (2) a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and that is plainly unreasonable; or (4) greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range. Since disappointment with the extent of a district judge’s downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 falls in none of the appeal-able categories, the extent of such a departure lies wholly within a district judge’s discretion.

Other circuits considering this issue have reached the same conclusion. See United States v. McHenry, 968 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Albers, 961 F.2d 710, 712 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Gregory, 932 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 383, 116 L.Ed.2d 334 (1991); United States v. Pomerleau, 923 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217-18 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991); United States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Wright, 895 F.2d 718, 721-22 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam).

We therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.