Shapira v. Kruger, 231 A.D.2d 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1996). · Go Syfert
Shapira v. Kruger, 231 A.D.2d 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Cited for
At page 510 Reconciling verdict with reasonable view of evidence2 citing casesUnder the circumstances of this case, the jury could have reasonably found that the plaintiff caused the ensuing chain reaction of collisions by his own…opening of page *510 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Casella v. City of New York, 69 A.D.3d 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    A contention that a verdict is inconsistent and irreconcilable must be reviewed in the context of the court’s charge (see Shapira v Kruger, 231 AD2d 509, 510 [1996]; Gross v Napoli, 216 AD2d 524, 525 [1995]).
  • Harris v. Marlow, 18 A.D.3d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005).published
    Because that view is based on a fair interpretation of the evidence and is consistent with the jury’s finding that Harris was 100% at fault in the happening of the accident, the jury may be presumed to have adopted it (see Shapira v Kruger…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Pinhas Shapira
v.
Alexander Kruger
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sep 9, 1996.
Published opinion
231 A.D.2d 509
1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8841
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Golden, J.), entered June 19, 1995, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants and against them dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

This action arises from an automobile accident in which a car operated by the plaintiff Pinhas Shapira (hereinafter the plaintiff) struck a car operated by the defendant Alexander Kruger whom he was following. This accident caused a chain reaction wherein the vehicle operated by the defendant Martin R. Hornstein struck the plaintiff’s vehicle and the vehicle operated by the defendant Bruce Molinari struck Hornstein’s vehicle. The plaintiff testified that the lead driver stopped short after hitting a construction barrier along the roadway which caused his and the subsequent collisions. Alexander Kruger, the defendant in the lead car, on the other hand, testified that he was struck first by the plaintiff, and then propelled into the construction barrier. Other defendants testified that the plaintiff was at fault in causing the accident and that they could not avoid the collisions.

[*510] Under the circumstances of this case, the jury could have reasonably found that the plaintiff caused the ensuing chain reaction of collisions by his own collision with the Kruger vehicle which he was following. "Where the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” (Koopersmith v General Motors Corp., 63 AD2d 1013, 1014). The jury could have concluded that, although the defendants were negligent in the operation of their vehicles, the sole proximate cause of the accident was the plaintiff’s own collision with the Kruger vehicle (see, Gross v Napoli, 216 AD2d 524; Rubin v Pecoraro, 141 AD2d 525; Glick v Hittner & Sons, 111 AD2d 150). Moreover, this view of the evidence is consistent with the court’s charge, which distinguished between negligence and proximate cause and permitted a finding of fault from 0% to 100% (see, Rubin v Pecoraro, supra; Maze v DiBartolo, 130 AD2d 720). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. Miller, J. P., O’Brien, Sullivan and Florio, JJ., concur.