Presbyterian Hosp. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 241 A.D.2d 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). · Go Syfert
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Presbyterian Hosp. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 241 A.D.2d 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Matter of Phillips v. New York State Div. of Human Rights (nyappdiv, 2023-06-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Phillips v. New York State Div. of Human Rights
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · confidence medium
Auth. v Nevins , 295 AD2d 887, 887 [4th Dept 2002]; Matter of Presbyterian Hosp. of City of N.Y. v State Div. of Human Rights , 241 AD2d 319, 320 [1st Dept 1997]).
discussed Cited "see" Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Patari
N.Y. App. Div. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
In any event, whether any prejudice to plaintiffs resulted from the Division’s delay in hearing their complaints must first be determined during the course of the administrative proceeding; “a court may not intervene in an administrative proceeding, for reason of adjudicatory delay, until a hearing has been held and an official order rendered” (Matter of Cortlandt Nursing Home v Axelrod, 66 NY2d 169, 180 , rearg denied 66 NY2d 1035 , cert denied 476 US 1115 ; see, Matter of Presbyterian Hosp. v State Div. of Human Rights, 241 AD2d 319, 320 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Presbyterian Hospital of the City of New York
v.
State Division of Human Rights
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jul 1, 1997.
241 A.D.2d 319
1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7030
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Parness, J.), entered on or about September 4, 1996, which denied petitioner employer’s application pursuant to CPLR article 78 to prohibit respondent State Division of Human Rights from proceeding further on a complaint of employment discrimination based on sex and national origin, and dismissed the petition, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the petition insofar as it seeks to prohibit respondent from proceeding against petitioner on the additional charges brought in the amendment to the complaint, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

There is no question that the unexplained 11-year delay between the filing of the discrimination complaint and the scheduling of the hearing is properly characterized by petitioner as “egregious”. Nevertheless, the time limits set forth in Executive Law § 297 have been held to be directory rather than mandatory (Corning Glass Works v Ovsanik, 84 NY2d 619, 623-624) and respondent’s violation of them, even by so extraordinary a period of time, does not deprive it of jurisdiction (see, Tessy Plastics Corp. v State Div. of Human Rights, 47[*320] NY2d 789). The question of whether the prejudicial consequences to petitioner of such delay, in that key witnesses are allegedly no longer in petitioner’s employ or otherwise available, as well as the consequences of respondent’s alleged failure to disclose the documents it intends to use at the hearing, are such as to make a fair hearing impossible, should be determined during the course of the administrative proceeding or by subsequent judicial review (see, Matter of Town of Huntington v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 NY2d 783, 786).

However, we find that respondent should be prohibited from proceeding as to the charges of harassment and retaliatory termination which were brought in the amendment served on June 24, 1996, as well as to any further charges which respondent intends to prefer in the future. Under 9 NYCRR 465.4 (a), respondent’s power is limited to making amendments “reasonably and fairly”. That standard has not been met.

We have considered petitioner’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.