delay defense in New York

2016Under those circumstances, the fact that the petitioner could not show a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the appellant (see Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk, 89 AD3d 1025, 1027 [2011]; Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007]; Matter of Corvera v Nassau County Health Care Corp., 38 AD3d 775, 776-777 [2007]; Matter of Tapia v New York City Health & Hosps.

2011Finally, the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice (see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776, 778 [2010]; Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d 734, 735 [2008]; Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007]).

2024However, they argue that the delay claim is subject to the continuous-wrong doctrine, which extends the statute of limitations "when the contract imposes a continuing duty on the breaching [*16]party" ( Henry v Bank of Am. , 147 AD3d 599, 601 [1st Dept 2017]).

2024However, they argue that the delay claim is subject to the continuous-wrong doctrine, which extends the statute of limitations "when the contract imposes a continuing duty on the breaching [*16]party" ( Henry v Bank of Am. , 147 AD3d 599, 601 [1st Dept 2017]).

2024NYUHC argues that the PSA does "not create a continuing duty subject to repeated breaches over a period of time" (NYSCEF Doc No. 143 at 7; cf. Garron v Bristol House, Inc. , 162 AD3d 857 , 859 [2d Dept 2018] [ongoing duty to "keep the building in good repair and to provide habitable premises"]; 1050 Tenants Corp. v Lapidus , 289 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001] [ongoing "obligation to avoid any conduct that interferes with other lessees' rights, and to comply with all applicable laws and regulations"]).

2024NYUHC argues that the PSA does "not create a continuing duty subject to repeated breaches over a period of time" (NYSCEF Doc No. 143 at 7; cf. Garron v Bristol House, Inc. , 162 AD3d 857 , 859 [2d Dept 2018] [ongoing duty to "keep the building in good repair and to provide habitable premises"]; 1050 Tenants Corp. v Lapidus , 289 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001] [ongoing "obligation to avoid any conduct that interferes with other lessees' rights, and to comply with all applicable laws and regulations"]).

2013Dist., 102 AD3d at 689; Matter of Hursala v Seaford Middle School, 46 AD3d 892, 893 [2007]). “[T]he absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of . . . leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice” (Matter of St.

2013Dist., 102 AD3d at 689; Matter of Hursala v Seaford Middle School, 46 AD3d 892, 893 [2007]). “[T]he absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of . . . leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice” (Matter of St.

2013Dist., 102 AD3d at 689; Matter of Hursala v Seaford Middle School, 46 AD3d 892, 893 [2007]). “[T]he absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of . . . leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice” (Matter of St.

2013Dist., 102 AD3d at 689; Matter of Hursala v Seaford Middle School, 46 AD3d 892, 893 [2007]). “[T]he absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of . . . leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice” (Matter of St.

2011Under those circumstances, the delay in search ing defendant’s property was not unreasonable (see Mutschelknaus, 564 F Supp 2d at 1076-1077 ; see also Brewer, 588 F3d at 1173 [several months’ delay in forensic analysis of computer media did not violate the Fourth Amendment]; Burgess, 576 F3d at 1097 [suppression of evidence not required based upon delay in searching computer and hard drives where probable cause was unaffected by the delay, the government acted in good faith, and the defendant did not identify any prejudice from the delay with the exception that he was temporarily denied access

2011Under those circumstances, the delay in searching defendant’s property was not unreasonable (see Mutschelknaus, 564 F Supp 2d at 1076-1077 ; see also Brewer, 588 F3d at 1173 [several -6- 1198 KA 11-01004 months’ delay in forensic analysis of computer media did not violate the Fourth Amendment]; Burgess, 576 F3d at 1097 [suppression of evidence not required based upon delay in searching computer and hard drives where probable cause was unaffected by the delay, the government acted in good faith, and the defendant did not identify any prejudice from the delay with the exception that he was tempo

2011Under those circumstances, the delay in search ing defendant’s property was not unreasonable (see Mutschelknaus, 564 F Supp 2d at 1076-1077 ; see also Brewer, 588 F3d at 1173 [several months’ delay in forensic analysis of computer media did not violate the Fourth Amendment]; Burgess, 576 F3d at 1097 [suppression of evidence not required based upon delay in searching computer and hard drives where probable cause was unaffected by the delay, the government acted in good faith, and the defendant did not identify any prejudice from the delay with the exception that he was temporarily denied access

2011Under those circumstances, the delay in searching defendant’s property was not unreasonable (see Mutschelknaus, 564 F Supp 2d at 1076-1077 ; see also Brewer, 588 F3d at 1173 [several -6- 1198 KA 11-01004 months’ delay in forensic analysis of computer media did not violate the Fourth Amendment]; Burgess, 576 F3d at 1097 [suppression of evidence not required based upon delay in searching computer and hard drives where probable cause was unaffected by the delay, the government acted in good faith, and the defendant did not identify any prejudice from the delay with the exception that he was tempo

1913In Dunn v. Steubing ( 120 N. Y. 232 ) defendant’s acceptance of plaintiff’s work performed after the contract date was held to have waived the delay as a defense, and defendant’s counterclaim for his damages on account of such delay was allowed.

1903As was said in Dunn v. Steubing ( 120 N. Y. 232, 237 ), “Upon the failure of the plaintiff to perform by the day fixed, the defendant might have insisted on his strict legal rights and then put an end to the contract, but this he did not do, but permitted the plaintiff to continue the work, and for this reason he cannot now insist on the delay as a defense to an action brought to recover the price of the work.” For these reasons we think the trial court’s conclusion that there was no cancellation of the contract sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s claim was correct.

2013The absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice (see id.; Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d at 736 ).

2013The absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice (see id.; Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d at 736 ).

2011In light of the fact that the Department of Education had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim and will not be substantially prejudiced by the delay, the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim (see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d at 778 ; Erichson v City of Poughkeepsie Police Dept., 66 AD3d 820, 821-822 [2009]).

2011Finally, the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice (see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776, 778 [2010]; Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d 734, 735 [2008]; Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007]).

2011Although defendant contends that he was entitled to the immediate return of his property upon his demand for that property after sentencing on his 2009 conviction, we agree with the People that the police had an obligation to search defendant’s property for contraband before returning it to him (see generally United States v Jeffers, 342 US 48, 54 [1951]; United States v LaFatch, 565 F2d 81, 83 [1977], cert denied 435 US 971 [1978]; Matter of Sea Lar Trading Co. v Michael, 94 AD2d 309, 315-316 [1983], appeal dismissed 60 NY2d 860 [1983]).

2011Although defendant contends that he was entitled to the immediate return of his property upon his demand for that property after sentencing on his 2009 conviction, we agree with the People that the police had an obligation to search defendant’s property for contraband before returning it to him (see generally United States v Jeffers, 342 US 48, 54 ; United States v LaFatch, 565 F2d 81, 83, cert denied 435 US 971 ; Matter of Sea Lar Trading Co. v Michael, 94 AD2d 309, 315-316 , appeal dismissed 60 NY2d 860 ).

2011Although defendant contends that he was entitled to the immediate return of his property upon his demand for that property after sentencing on his 2009 conviction, we agree with the People that the police had an obligation to search defendant’s property for contraband before returning it to him (see generally United States v Jeffers, 342 US 48, 54 [1951]; United States v LaFatch, 565 F2d 81, 83 [1977], cert denied 435 US 971 [1978]; Matter of Sea Lar Trading Co. v Michael, 94 AD2d 309, 315-316 [1983], appeal dismissed 60 NY2d 860 [1983]).

2011Although defendant contends that he was entitled to the immediate return of his property upon his demand for that property after sentencing on his 2009 conviction, we agree with the People that the police had an obligation to search defendant’s property for contraband before returning it to him (see generally United States v Jeffers, 342 US 48, 54 ; United States v LaFatch, 565 F2d 81, 83, cert denied 435 US 971 ; Matter of Sea Lar Trading Co. v Michael, 94 AD2d 309, 315-316 , appeal dismissed 60 NY2d 860 ).

2008The absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the court from granting leave to serve a late notice of claim, since here, there is actual notice and an absence of prejudice (see Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007]; Gibbs v City of New York, 22 AD3d 717, 720 [2005]; Montero v New York City Health & Hosps.

2008In any event, the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the court from granting leave to serve a late notice of claim under the extant circumstances (see Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 816 [2007]; Matter of Vasquez v City of Newburgh, 35 AD3d 621, 623-624 [2006]; Gibbs v City of New York, 22 AD3d at 720 ).

2024After conferring with defendant and reviewing the People's exhibits — and after acknowledging that a delay in the hearing could negatively impact defendant's then-impending release date — defense counsel indicated that he was ready to proceed ( compare People v Moore , 208 AD3d 1514, 1515 [3d Dept 2022]).

2024Defense counsel then argued, albeit unsuccessfully, in favor of a downward departure to a risk level two classification citing, among other things, defendant's acceptance of responsibility, successful completion of sex offender treatment and satisfactory conduct while confined, as well as defendant's documented mental health and cognitive issues ( compare id. ).

2019Co. , 19 AD3d 211, 212 [2005]), and noting the lack of detail as to how the Regional Court's delay in hearing the husband's appeal deprived him of the opportunity to be heard that justified enforcement of the temporary order ( see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]), we cannot say that Supreme Court abused its discretion in doing either.

2017Auth., 134 AD3d 1104, 1104-1105 [2015]; Matter of Alvarez v New York City Hous.

2016Under those circumstances, the fact that the petitioner could not show a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the appellant (see Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk, 89 AD3d 1025, 1027 [2011]; Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007]; Matter of Corvera v Nassau County Health Care Corp., 38 AD3d 775, 776-777 [2007]; Matter of Tapia v New York City Health & Hosps.

2016Corp., 27 AD3d 655, 656-657 [2006]; Matter of West v New York City Health & Hosps.

2016Under those circumstances, the fact that the petitioner could not show a reasonable excuse for the delay does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the appellant (see Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk, 89 AD3d 1025, 1027 [2011]; Matter of Rivera-Guallpa v County of Nassau, 40 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2007]; Matter of Corvera v Nassau County Health Care Corp., 38 AD3d 775, 776-777 [2007]; Matter of Tapia v New York City Health & Hosps.