At page 726 Interpreting separation agreements based on plain meaning11 citing cases“A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract’s apparent meaning”
- D.G. v. M.G., 2024 NY Slip Op 50741(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2024).unpublishedRegardless, the law on the issue is clear, a party may not "reform the parties' separation agreement by way of motion." ( Scalabrini v Scalabrini , 242 AD2d 725, 726 [2d Dep't 1997]).
- Keller-Goldman v. Goldman, 149 A.D.3d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2017).published "A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract's apparent meaning"…
- Tamburello v. Tamburello, 113 A.D.3d 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2014).published “A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert or, under the guise of construction, add or excise terms, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the apparent meaning” (Ayers v Ayers…
- Makara v. Makara, 65 A.D.3d 1018 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009).publishedA challenge to a stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce must be made by plenary action, and not by motion (see Candela v Kiel, 33 AD3d 833, 834 [2006]; Spataro v Spataro, 268 AD2d 467, 468…
- Hanlon v. Hanlon, 62 A.D.3d 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009).published“Where the stipulation’s terms are unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be gleaned from the plain meaning of the words used by the parties” (Linsalato v Giuttari, 59 AD3d 682, 683 [2009]; see Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302, 308 [1971]; Matter…
- Candela v. Kiel, 33 A.D.3d 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).publishedThe Referee properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to vacate this provision of the stipulation, since a postjudgment motion is not the proper method to challenge a separation agreement incorporated but not merged in…
- Kalman v. Kalman, 300 A.D.2d 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2002).published“A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract’s…”
- Cardone v. Cardone, 249 A.D.3d 994 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2026).published "A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract's apparent meaning"…
- Toscano v. Toscano, 153 A.D.3d 1440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2017).published“A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract’s apparent meaning”…
- Matter of Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 147 A.D.3d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2017).published“A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract’s apparent meaning”…
Other citing cases
- Berlin v. Berlin, 192 A.D.3d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2021).published
- Cohen v. Cohen, 187 A.D.3d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2020).published
- Matter of English v. Smith, 173 A.D.3d 1022 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2019).published
- J.A.H. v. E.G.M., 2019 NY Slip Op 2505 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2019).published
- Matter of Brady v. White, 2018 NY Slip Op 1181 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2018).published
- Kirdahy v. Scalia, 280 A.D.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2001).published
- Friedman v. Friedman, 247 A.D.2d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998).published
v.
Gino Scalabrini
In a support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Scancarelli, J.), entered June 5, 1996, as denied his objections to an order of the same court (Mrsich, H.E.), entered April 15, 1996, which, after a hearing, directed him to pay the principal sum of $26,616.73 to the mother for arrears of college tuition for the parties’ only child.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
[*726] A separation agreement entered into by spouses in contemplation of divorce is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation (see, Matter of Meccico v Meccico, 76 NY2d 822, 823-824; Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d 106, 109; see also, Mancini v Mancini, 236 AD2d 449; Matter of Tillim v Fuks, 221 AD2d 642, 643; Lambert v Lambert, 142 AD2d 557, 558). A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, and it may not construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract’s apparent meaning (see, Matter of Tillim v Fuks, supra, at 643; Slamow v Del Col, 174 AD2d 725, 727; Tantleff v Truscelli, 110 AD2d 240, affd 69 NY2d 769). The words and phrases used in an agreement must be given their plain meaning so as to define the rights of the parties (see, Matter of Tillim v Fuks, supra, at 643; see also, Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205).
Here, the Family Court correctly determined that, pursuant to the terms of the parties’ separation agreement which had been incorporated into the judgment of divorce, the father was obligated to reimburse the mother the sum of $26,616.73 for the child’s college expenses.
The court properly rejected the father’s attempt to reform the parties’ separation agreement by way of motion (see, Darragh v Darragh, 163 AD2d 648, 649; Lambert v Lambert, supra, at 558; Surlak v Surlak, 95 AD2d 371, 381; see also, Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 72; 2 Foster, Freed and Brandes, Law and the Family New York § 12:62, at 1017-1022 [2d ed]).
The father’s remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J. P., Ritter, Santucci and Florio, JJ., concur.