Lutsic v. Lutsic, 245 A.D.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). · Go Syfert
Lutsic v. Lutsic, 245 A.D.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Matter of HALL v. DAVIS (nyappdiv, 2019-10-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of HALL v. DAVIS
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
The court, however, is not required to first determine that there was such an intentional reduction in income prior to imputing income ( see Matter of D'Andrea v Prevost , 128 AD3d 1166 , 1167 [2015]; Goddard v Goddard , 256 AD2d 545, 546 [1998]; Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic , 245 AD2d 637, 637-638 [1997]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D'Andrea v. Prevost
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Initially, we reject the father’s contention that Family Court was required to determine that he had deliberately reduced his income in order to reduce or avoid his child support obligation in order to impute income to him (see Goddard v Goddard, 256 AD2d 545, 546 [1998]; Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, 245 AD2d 637, 637-638 [1997]; Matter of Darling v Darling, 220 AD2d 858, 859 [1995]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D'Andrea v. Prevost
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Initially, we reject the father’s contention that Family Court was required to determine that he had deliberately reduced his income in order to reduce or avoid his child support obligation in order to impute income to him (see Goddard v Goddard, 256 AD2d 545, 546 [1998]; Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, 245 AD2d 637, 637-638 [1997]; Matter of Darling v Darling, 220 AD2d 858, 859 [1995]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carr v. Carr
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
A reduction in a payor’s net income, while a primary element of the analysis, does not limit Family Court’s ability to examine the financial circumstances at the time of the prior order and the financial circumstances at the time of the application for modification (see Rosen v Rosen, 193 AD2d 661, 662 [1993]) and to consider whether the payor has the means or ability to comply with the prior order of support (see Kay v Kay, 37 NY2d 632, 636, 637 [1975]; Matter of Bouchard v Bouchard, 263 AD2d 775, 777 [1999]; Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, 245 AD2d 637, 637-638 [1997]; Matter of Darling v Dar…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller McMillen v. Miller
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
However, where, as here, the parties’ affidavits demonstrate conflicting evidence disclosing the existence of a genuine issue of fact regarding defendant’s income and earning potential, plaintiff correctly argues that a hearing was necessary (see Wyser-Pratte v Wyser-Pratte, 66 NY2d 715 [1985]; Severino v Severino, 243 AD2d 702 [1997]; Schnoor v Schnoor, 189 AD2d 809 [1993]; Grimaldi v Grimaldi, 167 AD2d 443 [1990]) because “a parent’s child support obligation is not necessarily determined by his or her existing financial situation but, rather, by his or her ability to provide support�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellenbogen v. Ellenbogen
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
Significantly, “a parent’s child support obligation is not necessarily determined by his or her existing financial situation but, rather, by his or her ability to provide support” (Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, 245 AD2d 637, 638 [1997]; see Matter of Bouchard v Bouchard, 263 AD2d 775, 777 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heyn v. Burr
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
“This obligation ‘is not necessarily determined by [respondent’s] existing financial situation but, rather, by his . . . ability to provide support’ ” (Matter of Bouchard v Bouchard, supra at 777, quoting Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, 245 AD2d 637, 638 [1997]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Liepman v. Liepman
N.Y. App. Div. · 2001 · confidence medium
Contrary to defendant’s contention that Supreme Court improperly imputed income to him, we find that the court properly exercised its discretion (see, Barnaby v Barnaby, 259 AD2d 870, 872 ) based upon its assessment of his “ ‘ability to provide support’ ” (Matter of Ciampi v Sgueglia, 252 AD2d 755, 756 , quoting Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, 245 AD2d 637, 638 ), despite no indication that his income was reduced for the purpose of avoiding a support obligation (see, Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, supra, at 637).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bouchard v. Bouchard
N.Y. App. Div. · 1999 · confidence medium
This obligation “is not necessarily determined by [petitioner’s] existing financial situation but, rather, by his * * * ability to provide support” (Matter of Lutsic v Lutsic, supra, at 638).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Richard Lutsic
v.
Shirley Lutsic
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 4, 1997.
245 A.D.2d 637
1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12599
III.
Cited by 22 opinions  |  Published
Crew III, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Pines, J.), entered June 12, 1996, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, for a downward modification of petitioner’s child support obligation.

Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, petitioner and respondent are the biological parents of twins (born in 1981), both of whom reside with respondent. In January 1990, petitioner was ordered to pay child support for the twins in the amount of $115 per week. Following his loss of employment in December 1994 petitioner, formerly a technical laboratory specialist with International Business Machines, commenced this proceeding seeking a downward modification of his support obligation. The matter proceeded to a hearing at which petitioner, his current spouse and respondent appeared and testified. At the conclusion thereof, the Hearing Examiner granted petitioner’s application and reduced his support obligation to $84 per week, which was based upon income imputed to petitioner in the amount of $17,500 (after deductions for FICA). In response to the objections filed by petitioner, Family Court affirmed the Hearing Examiner’s findings and this appeal by petitioner ensued.

We affirm. As a starting point, we note that petitioner’s primary argument on appeal—that Family Court was without authority to impute income to him under the Child Support Standards Act (Family Ct Act § 413) absent some indication that he deliberately reduced his income to avoid his child support obligation or actually possessed other resources, such as nonincome producing assets, that could be used to satisfy his support obligation—previously has been considered and rejected by this Court (see, Matter of Darling v Darling, 220 AD2d 858, 859). Both Family Court Act § 413 (1) (a) and Domestic Relations Law § 32 (3) impose a support obligation upon parents who are “possessed of sufficient means or able to earn [*638] such means” (emphasis supplied). Thus, a parent’s child support obligation is not necessarily determined by his or her existing financial situation but, rather, by his or her ability to provide support (see, Matter of Collins v Collins, 241 AD2d 725, 727).

Even accepting that petitioner could not secure comparable employment in Broome County at a rate commensurate with his final salary prior to termination (approximately $40,000), the record fully supports a finding that petitioner indeed was employable, and we find no error in Family Court’s decision to impute income to petitioner in the amount of $17,500 for purposes of determining his child support obligation. Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Mikoll, J. P., Casey, Yesawich Jr. and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.