relocation factors in New York

2026The father appeals. [FN2] Where "a parent's relocation initiates the commencement of a custody proceeding resulting in an initial custody determination, strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) is not required" ( Matter of Jesse HH. v Lindsey II. , 233 AD3d 1410 , 1411 [3d Dept 2024], lvs denied 43 NY3d 906 [2025], 43 NY3d 906 [2025]; see Matter of O'Hara v DeMarsh , 161 AD3d 1271 , 1271-1272 [3d Dept 2018]).

2025The father appeals. [FN1] "Where, as here, a parent's relocation initiates the commencement of a custody proceeding resulting in an initial custody determination, strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter [*2]of Tropea v Tropea (87 NY2d 727 [1996]) is not required" ( Matter of Jesse HH. v Lindsey II. , 233 AD3d 1410, 1411 [3d Dept 2024] [citations omitted], lvs denied 43 NY3d 906 [2025], 43 NY3d 906 [2025]; see Matter of Christopher MM. v Mackenzie NN. , 237 AD3d 1271, 1273 [3d Dept 2025]).

2012While a strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 ) was not required, nevertheless respondent-petitioner “mother’s relocation was ‘a very important factor’ among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody” (Matter of Sullivan v Sullivan, 90 AD3d 1172, 1173 ; see Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD3d 1417, 1417 , lv denied 15 NY3d 708 ).

2012While a strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) was not required, nevertheless respondent-petitioner “mother’s relocation was ‘a very important factor’ among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody” (Matter of Sullivan v Sullivan, 90 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2011]; see Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD3d 1417, 1417 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 708 [2010]).

2012While a strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 ) was not required, nevertheless respondent-petitioner “mother’s relocation was ‘a very important factor’ among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody” (Matter of Sullivan v Sullivan, 90 AD3d 1172, 1173 ; see Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD3d 1417, 1417 , lv denied 15 NY3d 708 ).

2012While a strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) was not required, nevertheless respondent-petitioner “mother’s relocation was ‘a very important factor’ among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody” (Matter of Sullivan v Sullivan, 90 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2011]; see Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD3d 1417, 1417 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 708 [2010]).

2018As Family Court appropriately realized, an initial custody determination must be based on the best interests of the child ( see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]), upon consideration of such factors as "the parents' past performance and relative fitness, their willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent, as well as their ability to maintain a stable home environment and provide for the child's overall well-being" ( Matter of Whetsell v Braden , 154 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[W]here, as here, an

1996Nevertheless, the error did not adversely affect Supreme Court’s decision as the court ultimately based its de cisión on the best interests of the children (see, supra, at 741-742; see also, Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171 ).

2013The mother waived any argument that it was error for Family Court to bypass a relocation analysis by failing to advance that argument in that court (see Matter of Clark v Ingraham, 88 AD3d 1079, 1079 [2011]).

2013The mother waived any argument that it was error for Family Court to bypass a relocation analysis by failing to advance that argument in that court (see Matter of Clark v Ingraham, 88 AD3d 1079, 1079 [2011]).

1995Without the application of the relocation rule, the dispositive issue turns from whether respondent established excep tional circumstances to whether a change in custody would be in the children’s best interests (see, Matter of Lake v Lake, 192 AD2d 751, 753 ).

1994However, the benchmark against which applicability of the relocation rule is measured is "meaningful access”, i.e., the ability of a noncustodial parent to continue to maintain a close and meaningful relationship with his or her children (see, Matter of Lake v Lake, supra; see also, Matter of Raybin v Raybin, supra), and not when a particular numerical distance is exceeded (see, Matter of Radford v Propper, 190 AD2d 93 ; Murphy v Murphy, supra).

2012While a strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 ) was not required, nevertheless respondent-petitioner “mother’s relocation was ‘a very important factor’ among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody” (Matter of Sullivan v Sullivan, 90 AD3d 1172, 1173 ; see Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD3d 1417, 1417 , lv denied 15 NY3d 708 ).

2012While a strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) was not required, nevertheless respondent-petitioner “mother’s relocation was ‘a very important factor’ among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody” (Matter of Sullivan v Sullivan, 90 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2011]; see Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD3d 1417, 1417 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 708 [2010]).

1995In virtually every case addressing the relocation of the custodial parent a threshold question asked by the court was whether the move disrupted or impaired the noncustodial parent’s close relationship with the child (see, e.g., Matter of Bennett v Bennett, 208 AD2d 1042 ; Roush v Roush, 204 AD2d 195 ; Matter of Lake, 192 AD2d 751 ; Matter of Radford v Propper, 190 AD2d 93, 99 ; Leslie v Leslie, 180 AD2d 620 ).

1994However, the benchmark against which applicability of the relocation rule is measured is "meaningful access”, i.e., the ability of a noncustodial parent to continue to maintain a close and meaningful relationship with his or her children (see, Matter of Lake v Lake, supra; see also, Matter of Raybin v Raybin, supra), and not when a particular numerical distance is exceeded (see, Matter of Radford v Propper, 190 AD2d 93 ; Murphy v Murphy, supra).

2026Rather, in considering the initial custodial determination under these circumstances, Family Court must focus on the relevant factors to the paramount concern in the proceeding, the best interests of the child, which "encompasses a variety of factors, including the quality of the parents' respective home environments, the need for stability in the child's life, each parent's willingness to promote a positive relationship between the child and the other parent and each parent's past performance, relative fitness and ability to provide for the child's intellectual and emotional development and o

2024Further, although Family Court recited the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]), strict application of those factors was not necessary as the court was faced with an initial custody determination ( see Daryl N. v Amy O. , 222 AD3d 1054, 1055 [3d Dept 2023]; Matter of O'Hara v DeMarsh , 161 AD3d 1271 , 1272 [3d Dept 2018]; Matter of Saperston v Holdaway , 93 AD3d 1271, 1272 [4th Dept 2012], appeals dismissed 19 NY3d 887 [2012], 20 NY3d 1052 [2013]).

2024To this end, "relocation is but one factor among many [to be considered] in its custody determination" ( Matter of Saperston [*2]v Holdaway , 93 AD3d at 1272 ; see Matter of Vidal v Taneja , 218 AD3d 594, 595 [2d Dept 2023]).

2024To this end, "relocation is but one factor among many [to be considered] in its custody determination" ( Matter of Saperston [*2]v Holdaway , 93 AD3d at 1272 ; see Matter of Vidal v Taneja , 218 AD3d 594, 595 [2d Dept 2023]).

2024Further, although Family Court recited the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]), strict application of those factors was not necessary as the court was faced with an initial custody determination ( see Daryl N. v Amy O. , 222 AD3d 1054, 1055 [3d Dept 2023]; Matter of O'Hara v DeMarsh , 161 AD3d 1271 , 1272 [3d Dept 2018]; Matter of Saperston v Holdaway , 93 AD3d 1271, 1272 [4th Dept 2012], appeals dismissed 19 NY3d 887 [2012], 20 NY3d 1052 [2013]).

2023Because this case involved an initial custody determination, and there was no prior custody order, the court correctly determined that the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) did not govern, and that the effect of the mother's relocation was but one factor in determining the child's best interests ( see Mathiew v Michels , 180 AD3d 403, 403 [1st Dept 2020]; Arthur v Galletti , 176 AD3d 412 , 413 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 1002 [2020]). "[I]n reviewing relocation and other custody issues, deference is to be accorded to the determination render

2023Because this case involved an initial custody determination, and there was no prior custody order, the court correctly determined that the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) did not govern, and that the effect of the mother's relocation was but one factor in determining the child's best interests ( see Mathiew v Michels , 180 AD3d 403, 403 [1st Dept 2020]; Arthur v Galletti , 176 AD3d 412 , 413 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 1002 [2020]). "[I]n reviewing relocation and other custody issues, deference is to be accorded to the determination render

2018As Family Court appropriately realized, an initial custody determination must be based on the best interests of the child ( see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]), upon consideration of such factors as "the parents' past performance and relative fitness, their willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent, as well as their ability to maintain a stable home environment and provide for the child's overall well-being" ( Matter of Whetsell v Braden , 154 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[W]here, as here, an

2018As Family Court appropriately realized, an initial custody determination must be based on the best interests of the child ( see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]), upon consideration of such factors as "the parents' past performance and relative fitness, their willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent, as well as their ability to maintain a stable home environment and provide for the child's overall well-being" ( Matter of Whetsell v Braden , 154 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[W]here, as here, an

2018Although the mother's proposed relocation with the child from Warren County to Rensselaer County served as the impetus for the filing of the instant custody petitions, insofar as Family Court had yet to render an initial custody determination, strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) was not required ( see Matter of Finkle v Scholl , 140 AD3d 1290, 1291 [2016]; Matter of Hill v Dean , 135 AD3d 990, 991 [2016]).

2018Although the mother's proposed relocation with the child from Warren County to Rensselaer County served as the impetus for the filing of the instant custody petitions, insofar as Family Court had yet to render an initial custody determination, strict application of the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) was not required ( see Matter of Finkle v Scholl , 140 AD3d 1290, 1291 [2016]; Matter of Hill v Dean , 135 AD3d 990, 991 [2016]).

2018As Family Court appropriately realized, an initial custody determination must be based on the best interests of the child ( see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]), upon consideration of such factors as "the parents' past performance and relative fitness, their willingness to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent, as well as their ability to maintain a stable home environment and provide for the child's overall well-being" ( Matter of Whetsell v Braden , 154 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[W]here, as here, an

2011“Recognizing the advantageous position of Family Court to evaluate the testimony and assess the credibility of witnesses, we accord great deference to that court’s custodial determination provided that it is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Mat ter of Torkildsen v Torkildsen, 72 AD3d at 1406 [citations omitted]).

2011As the parties and court recognized, the court was not required to strictly apply the relocation factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 739-741 [1996]), although the mother’s relocation was “a very important factor” among all factors to be considered in making a best interests determination, as was the effect of the move on the child’s relationship with the father if the mother were awarded custody (see Matter of Baker v Spurgeon, 85 AD3d 1494, 1496 [2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 897 [2011]; Matter of Lynch v Gillogly, 82 AD3d at 1530 ; Matter of Schneider v Lascher, 72 AD

2010That contention is raised for the first time on appeal and thus is not properly before us (see CPLR 5501 [a] [3]; see generally Matter of Shad S. [Amy C.Y.], 67 AD3d 1359 [2009]; Matter of Wood v Hargrave, 292 AD2d 795 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 608 [2002]).

2010As both parties acknowledge, Family Court was not required to engage in a strict application of the relocation factors established in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) in this initial custody determination, although the mother’s relocation is “a very important factor among the constellation of factors to be considered in arriving at a best interests determination” (Ostrander v McCain, 68 AD3d 1480, 1481 [2009] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]; see Malcolm v Jurow-Malcolm, 63 AD3d 1254, 1255 [2009]).