At page 465 Analyzing late notice of claim under municipal law3 citing casesOrder, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas McKeon, J.), entered March 12, 1997, which denied petitioner’s application to serve a late notice of claim upon…
- Matter of Romero v. City of New York, 235 A.D.3d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2025).publishedFurther, the metal plate upon which plaintiff slipped and fell was set in a cracked and broken portion of the sidewalk, thus "was not transitory nor likely to dissipate over the period of delay" ( id. at 465-466).
- Ansong v. City of New York, 308 A.D.2d 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003).publishedWhile petitioner failed to support his contention of physical incapacitation with any medical evidence (compare Matter of Silva v City of New York, 246 AD2d 465, 465-466 [1998]), the lack of a reasonable excuse is not, standing by itself,…
- Dubowy v. City of New York, 305 A.D.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003).publishedFurther, petitioner’s physical incapacity, which she cites as the root cause of her delay, is bolstered by the submission of medical records, and is an acceptable excuse for the delay (see Matter of Silva v City of New York, 246 AD2d 465,…
At page 466 “was not transitory nor likely to dissipate over the period of delay”1 citing case
- Mouzalas v. City of New York, 2003 NY Slip Op 51637(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2003).unpublishedSee Silva v. City of New York , 246 AD2d 465, 466 (1st Dept 1998); Williams v. New York City Hous.
v.
City of New York
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas McKeon, J.), entered March 12, 1997, which denied petitioner’s application to serve a late notice of claim upon respondents nunc pro tunc, unanimously reversed, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, and the application granted.
This is an application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5). On December 28, 1995, petitioner allegedly slipped and fell on a metal plate set in a cracked and broken portion of a Bronx sidewalk. Two weeks later, after experiencing severe pain, he was transported to Lincoln Hospital where he was diagnosed with fractures of his lower back. After a 20-day hospitalization, petitioner undertook a course of physical therapy, and retained counsel only on April 1, 1996, five days after expiration of the statutory 90-day period for filing notice of claim (§ 50-e [1] [a]). Respondents received the required statutory notices on April 5th and 8th, respectively nine and twelve days after the deadline.
In view of the medical and other evidence submitted, we find[*466] that petitioner’s disabling injury provides a reasonable excuse for the short delay in filing (see, Matter of Annis v New York City Tr. Auth., 108 AD2d 643). Furthermore, any prejudice to respondents was minimal, since the alleged defect was not transitory nor likely to dissipate over the period of delay (cf., Matter of Green v New York City Hous. Auth., 180 AD2d 586). Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Wallach, Rubin and Tom, JJ.