McCoy v. Tepper, 261 A.D.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). · Go Syfert
McCoy v. Tepper, 261 A.D.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dempster v. Liotti (nyappdiv, 2011-05-24)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dempster v. Liotti
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Here, Liotti’s inexcusable failure to file timely opposition papers to the RICO defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and to file a timely notice of appeal from the District Court’s order granting such motion, clearly falls below the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession (see Conklin v Owen, 72 AD3d at 1007 ; McCoy v Tepper, 261 AD2d 592, 593 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Theresa Striano Revocable Trust v. Blancato
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Here, the defendant’s reliance upon the advice of the borrower’s attorney reflects a failure to exercise ordinary reasonable skill (see Shopsin v Siben & Siben, 268 AD2d 578 [2000]; McCoy v Tepper, 261 AD2d 592, 593 [1999]; Logalbo v Plishkin, Rubano & Baum, 163 AD2d 511, 514 [1990]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank v. Pepe
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2000 · confidence medium
“An attorney may be liable for his ignorance of the rules of practice, for his failure to comply with conditions precedent to suit, for his neglect to prosecute or defend an action, or for his failure to conduct adequate legal research” (McCoy v Tepper, supra, at 593 [emphasis supplied]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Patrick McCoy
v.
Noel Tepper
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 24, 1999.
261 A.D.2d 592
1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5691
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Bernhard, J.), dated April 30, 1998, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Lead Opinion

In January 1991 the plaintiff retained the defendant, a New York attorney, to represent him in a personal injury action. The underlying action arose out of a one-car accident in New Jersey, in which the plaintiff was a passenger in a car owned and operated by New Jersey residents. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to take appropriate action to prosecute the plaintiff’s claim before the Statute of Limitations expired in New Jersey, and, as a result, the plaintiff commenced this legal malpractice action.

An attorney is liable in a malpractice action if the plaintiff[*593] can prove that the attorney failed to exercise the skill commonly exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community, that such negligence was the proximate cause of damages, and that “but for” such negligence, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action (see, Marshall v Nacht, 172 AD2d 727). An attorney may be liable for his ignorance of the rules of practice, for his failure to comply with conditions precedent to suit, for his neglect to prosecute or defend an action, or for his failure to conduct adequate legal research (see, Grago v Robertson, 49 AD2d 645, 646; Gardner v Jacon, 148 AD2d 794).

There are questions of fact as to whether the defendant informed the plaintiff that he was required to retain an attorney from New Jersey in order to timely institute his personal injury action in New Jersey before the Statute of Limitations ran. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. O’Brien, J. P., Gold-stein, Luciano and Schmidt, JJ., concur.