Mayer v. Sanders, 264 A.D.2d 827 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). · Go Syfert
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Mayer v. Sanders, 264 A.D.2d 827 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2003 · …bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration at p. 828 ✓
21 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dziekonski v. Uber Tech., Inc. (nysupctkings, 2024-06-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dziekonski v. Uber Tech., Inc.
N.Y. Sup. Kings · 2024 · confidence medium
However, bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true ( see Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v Susskind , 43 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2007]; Mayer v Sanders , 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Antoine v. Kalandrishvili
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
However, bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true (see Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2007]; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Aviaev v. Nissan Infiniti LT
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
However, bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true (see Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2007]; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Khan v. MMCA Lease, Ltd.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
However, bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true (see Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2007]; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Khan v. MMCA Lease, Ltd.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
However, bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true (see Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2007]; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berman v. Christ Apostolic Church International Miracle Center, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
“The facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, although bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration” (Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]; see Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucia v. Goldman
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
The facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference (see Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]; Salvatore v Kumar, 45 AD3d 560, 563 [2007]; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gershon v. Goldberg
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
This entails an inquiry into whether or not a material fact claimed by the pleader is a fact at all and whether a significant dispute exists regarding it (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, supra, at 275; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:25, at 39)” (Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765 [1996]; see Mohan v Hollander, 303 AD2d 473, 474 [2003]; Rattenni v Cerreta, 285 AD2d 636, 637 [2001]; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]; Sotomayor v Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, 252 AD2d 554 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Operative Cake Corp. v. Nassour
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
The complaint further alleges that the defendant Aharon Nutovics, in concert with others, misappropriated confidential information, including the customer lists of the plaintiffs drivers, which he then used to create and operate a competing venture, the defendant King Edward Food Distribution Corp. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “[t]he sole criterion is whether ‘from [the complaint’s] four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ” (Mayer v Sanders, 264 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guzov v. Manor Lodge Holding Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
The plaintiff’s bare legal conclusions and factual allegations which were plainly contradicted by the record were insufficient to sustain the plaintiffs new theory of liability or establish a good-faith basis for the amendment to the complaint (see Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]; Curran v Auto Lab Serv.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mohan v. Hollander
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
However, “bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration” (Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827, 828 [1999]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sanford Mayer
v.
Alan J. Sanders, and Third-Party David W. Chefec, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sep 27, 1999.
264 A.D.2d 827
1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9390
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (DiNoto, J.), entered January 22, 1998, which granted the motion of the third-party defendant to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiffs Sanford Mayer and Beverly Mayer commenced an action against the defendants third-party plaintiffs Alan J. Sanders and Michael B. Solomon, individually and d/b/a Sanders & Solomon, Esqs. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Sanders & Solomon) alleging legal malpractice. The Mayers alleged that Sanders & Solomon, who were retained as nominees and attorneys for the Mayers in various second mortgage loan transactions, were negligent in “making and collecting” these loans and that the interests of Sanders & Solomon were in conflict with their own.

Sanders & Solomon brought a third-party action against the third-party defendant David W. Chefec who was retained by the Mayers to commence proceedings against the underlying[*828] debtors pursuant to the advice of Sanders & Solomon. The third-party complaint alleged that Chefec was negligent and therefore liable to Sanders & Solomon for any damages the Mayers may have suffered.

Chefec moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The court granted the motion and Sanders & Solomon have appealed.

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the pleadings must be liberally construed (see, CPLR 3026). The sole criterion is whether “from [the complaint’s] four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; see also, Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765). The facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, although bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration (see, Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481; Doria v Masucci, supra; Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, affd 66 NY2d 946). Applying these standards to the case at bar, the third-party complaint was properly dismissed. The third-party plaintiffs have merely set forth conclusory allegations of negligence on the part of the third-party defendant. There are no factual allegations in the complaint sufficient to state a cause of action for contribution and/or indemnification. Thus, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Joy, J. P., Krausman, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.