At page 629 �In an action to recover a finder’s fee in connection with the leasing of certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court,…2 citing cases
- Futersak v. Perl, 84 A.D.3d 1309 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).publishedIn support of their motion for summary judgment upon the ground that the plaintiffs recovery is barred pursuant to Real Property Law § 442-d, the appellants demonstrated that the subject property was the dominant feature of the transaction…
- Balbuena v. Idr Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246 (N.Y. 2006).published Spivak v Sachs, 16 NY2d 163, 168 [1965]; see also Berg v Wilpon, 271 AD2d 629, 629-630 [2d Dept 2000]; Murray v Interurban St.
v.
Kenneth I. Wilpon
—In an action to recover a finder’s fee in connection with the leasing of certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ponterio, J.), dated February 1, 2000, which, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a decision of the same court dated May 3, 1999, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520 [c]).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject real property was a dominant feature of the transaction at issue. The plaintiff, who did not have a real estate broker’s license, was therefore barred from collecting a fee for his endeavors, which were in the nature of brokerage services (see, [*630] Real Property Law § 440 [1], [3]; §§ 442-a, 442-d; G.C. Fortune Mgt. Co. v Stockade Mobile Home Park, 246 AD2d 739; Eaton Assocs. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603; Sorice v DuBois, 25 AD2d 521). O’Brien, J. P., Friedmann, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur. [See, 180 Misc 2d 956.]