Muye v. Liben, 282 A.D.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · Go Syfert
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Muye v. Liben, 282 A.D.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2009–2021 · 2 courts · …the defendant driver should reasonably have anticipated and been prepared to deal with the situation with which he was confronted. ✓
13 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dunn v. Garrett (nyappdiv, 2016-04-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. Garrett
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a cross-examiner at trial is “bound by the answers of the witness to questions on collateral matters inquired into solely to affect credibility” (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]), and extrinsic evidence cannot be used to impeach a witness’s credibility after the witness has provided an answer with which the cross-examiner is unsatisfied (see Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d 629, 634-636 [1990]; Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. Garrett
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a cross-examiner at trial is “bound by the answers of the witness to questions on collateral matters inquired into solely to affect credibility” (Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]), and extrinsic evidence cannot be used to impeach a witness’s credibility after the witness has provided an answer with which the cross-examiner is unsatisfied (see Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d 629, 634-636 [1990]; Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [2001]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mughal v. Rajput
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Corp., 8 AD3d 451, 452 [2004]; Bellantone v Toddy Taxi, 307 AD2d 979, 980 [2003]; Gadon v Oliva, 294 AD2d 397, 398 [2002]; Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [2001]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mughal v. Rajput
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Corp., 8 AD3d 451, 452 [2004]; Bellantone v Toddy Taxi, 307 AD2d 979, 980 [2003]; Gadon v Oliva, 294 AD2d 397, 398 [2002]; Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Krynski v. Chase
E.D.N.Y · 2009 · confidence medium
It does not apply to situations where, as here, “the defendant driver should reasonably have anticipated and been prepared to deal with the situation with which [he] was confronted.” Muye v. Liben, 282 A.D.2d 661 , 723 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (2001) (inside quotations omitted) (quoting Pincus v. Cohen, 198 A.D.2d 405 , 604 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lamuraglia v. New York City Transit Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2002 · confidence medium
There is no merit to the Transit Authority’s contention that the trial evidence supported its request for a jury charge regarding the “emergency doctrine.” An emergency instruction is improper where, as here, the “driver should reasonably have anticipated and been prepared to deal with the situation with which [he or she] was confronted” (Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172 ).
discussed Cited "see" Lifson v. City of Syracuse
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
However, “[a]n emergency instruction is not proper where the situation is neither sudden nor unexpected or could have been reasonably anticipated in light of the surrounding circumstances” (Smith v Perfectaire Co., 270 AD2d 410 [2000]; see Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [2001]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Amodeo v. Cumella
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Consequently, the court should not have given an emergency instruction (see Caristo v Sanzone, supra; Mertsaris v 73rd Corp., supra; see also Muye v Liben, 282 AD2d 661, 662 [2001]; Shaw v Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Co., 95 AD2d 738, 739 [1983]).
Lule Muye
v.
Muse D. Liben
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 23, 2001.
282 A.D.2d 661
2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4033
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the • Supreme Court, Rockland County (Weiner, J.), dated May 14, 1999, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the complaint is reinstated, and a new trial is granted, with costs to abide the event.

On the afternoon of March 21, 1995, the defendant Muse D. Liben was operating a vehicle owned by the defendant Michael G. Collins. As Liben was driving downhill on Maple Avenue in the Town of Monsey, he lost control of the vehicle, and crashed into a tree. The plaintiff, Lule Muye, a passenger in the vehicle, was seriously injured in the collision. Liben admitted that the car was traveling at a high rate of speed just before the accident. It is also undisputed that the roadway was wet and slippery from rain at the time of the accident.

Muye contends that the court committed reversible error by giving the jury an emergency doctrine instruction because there is no evidence that Liben lost control of the vehicle due to a sudden and unanticipated emergency. We agree. An emergency instruction may be given where a reasonable view of the evidence presented at trial would support a finding that the party requesting the charge was confronted by a “sudden and unforeseen occurrence” not of his or her own making (Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327). Here, however, viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the party seeking the charge (see, Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, at 326), there was no proof that Liben lost control of the vehicle because he was either faced with or react[*662] ing to an emergency situation. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that Liben was an inexperienced driver traveling downhill at a high rate of speed on a wet and slippery roadway who lost control of his vehicle. “An emergency instruction should not be given where, as here, the defendant driver should reasonably have anticipated and been prepared to deal with the situation with which [he] was confronted” (Pincus v Cohen, 198 AD2d 405, 406; Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 175; Hardy v Sicuranza, 133 AD2d 138; see also, Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751).

Furthermore, the court erred in permitting Collins to present extrinsic evidence to impeach Muye’s credibility on a collateral matter unrelated to the issue of whether Liben’s negligence caused the accident (see, Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d 629).

Muye’s remaining contentions are without merit. Altman, J. P., Krausman, Luciano and Cozier, JJ., concur.