emergency doctrine in New York

2010The emergency instruction is appropriate “where the evidence supports a finding that the party requesting the charge was confronted by ‘a sudden and unexpected circumstance [that] leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration’ ” (id. at 175, quoting Rivera, 77 NY2d at 327 ).

2006The emergency doctrine “recognizes that when an actor is faced with sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Rivera, 77 NY2d at 327 ; see Amaro v City of New York, 40 NY2d 30, 36 [1976]).

2025The emergency doctrine provides "that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation[,] or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context" ( Caristo v Sanzone , 96 NY2d 172, 174 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Martin v PTM Mgt.

2025The emergency doctrine " 'recognizes that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context . . . , provided the actor has not created the emergency' " ( Zynda v Waid , 221 AD3d 1578, 1578 [4th Dept 2023], quoting Caristo v Sanzone , 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001]).

2026The record supports the court's conclusion that the warrantless entry into defendant's apartment was justified under the emergency doctrine ( see People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]; People v Mitchell , 39 NY2d 173, 177-178 [1976], cert denied 426 US 953 [1976]).

2026The emergency exception reflects "the general obligation of police officers to assist persons whom they reasonably believe to be in distress" ( Mitchell , 39 NY2d at 177 ), and may apply even where the police do not definitely know whether a crime has occurred ( see People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]; see generally People v Molnar , 98 NY2d 328, 332-333 [2002]).

2026The emergency exception reflects "the general obligation of police officers to assist persons whom they reasonably believe to be in distress" ( Mitchell , 39 NY2d at 177 ), and may apply even where the police do not definitely know whether a crime has occurred ( see People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]; see generally People v Molnar , 98 NY2d 328, 332-333 [2002]).

2024The emergency doctrine, however, allows police to act only to "assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury" ( Brigham City v Stuart , 547 US 398, 403 [2006]; see Caniglia , 593 US at 198; Molnar , 98 NY2d at 332 ["(T)he police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).

2024The emergency doctrine, however, allows police to act only to "assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury" ( Brigham City v Stuart , 547 US 398, 403 [2006]; see Caniglia , 593 US at 198; Molnar , 98 NY2d at 332 ["(T)he police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).

2020Although "warrantless entries into a home are 'presumptively unreasonable'" ( People v Molnar , 98 NY2d 328, 331 , quoting Payton v New York , 445 US 573, 586 ), a warrantless search and seizure in a protected area may be lawful under some circumstances, pursuant to the emergency doctrine ( see Bringham City, Utah v Stuart , 547 US 398, 403 ; People v Mitchell , 39 NY2d 173, 177-178 ).

2022By the defendant driver's own admissions in the police accident report and her affidavit, she did not see the infant plaintiff prior to the accident, which she only realized had occurred upon "hear[ing] the impact," and she continued to drive into the crosswalk after being "blinded" by sun glare, which "caus[ed] her to collide into [the infant plaintiff]." Further, as the plaintiffs contend, the foreseeable occurrence of sun glare while the defendant driver was driving west at sundown did not constitute a "qualifying emergency" under the emergency doctrine ( Lifson v City of Syracuse , 17 NY3d

2019Under the emergency doctrine, " when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the [driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context' . . . , provided the [driver] has not created [or contributed to] the emergency" ( Caristo v Sanzone , 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001]; see Lifson v City of Syracuse , 17 NY3d 492

2023"To be granted summary judgment based on the emergency doctrine, a driver must establish as a matter of law that he or she did not contribute to the creation of the emergency situation, and that his or her reaction was reasonable under the circumstances such that he or she could not have done anything to avoid the collision" ( Cahoon v Frechette , 86 AD3d 774, 775 [3d Dept 2011] [citation omitted]).

2023"To be granted summary judgment based on the emergency doctrine, a driver must establish as a matter of law that he or she did not contribute to the creation of the emergency situation, and that his or her reaction was reasonable under the circumstances such that he or she could not have done anything to avoid the collision" ( Cahoon v Frechette , 86 AD3d 774, 775 [3d Dept 2011] [citation omitted]).

2015Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. *725 “Under the emergency doctrine, ‘when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context’ ” (Miloscia v New York City Bd. of Educ., 70 AD3d 904, 905 [2010], quoting Rivera v New York City Tr.

2014“Under the emergency doctrine, ‘when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context’ ” (Miloscia v New York City Bd. of Educ., 70 AD3d 904, 905 [2010], quoting Rivera v New York City Tr.

2018The [*4]Supreme Court of the United States has eliminated any consideration of subjective intent — i.e., the second prong of the New York test — from the emergency exception under the Fourth Amendment ( see Brigham City v Stuart , 547 US 398, 404-405 [2006]), and the Court of Appeals has yet to address whether the second prong of the New York test remains viable in the wake of that Supreme Court determination ( see People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665 , 671 n [2013], cert denied ___ US ___, 134 S Ct 1552 [2014]; People v Dallas , 8 NY3d 890, 891 [2007]).

2016We conclude that the People established the requisite elements of the emergency doctrine (see People v Dallas, 8 NY3d 890, 891 [2007], citing People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-178 [1976], cert denied 426 US 953 [1976]).

2013“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Marks v Robb, 90 AD3d 863, 863-864 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Vitale v Levine, 44 AD3d 935, 936 [2007]). “ ‘This is not to

2013“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Marks v Robb, 90 AD3d 863, 863-864 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Vitale v Levine, 44 AD3d 935, 936 [2007]). “ ‘This is not to

2026However, "the emergency doctrine is premised on reasonableness, not certitude" ( People v Doll , 21 NY3d at 671 ).

2026The emergency exception reflects "the general obligation of police officers to assist persons whom they reasonably believe to be in distress" ( Mitchell , 39 NY2d at 177 ), and may apply even where the police do not definitely know whether a crime has occurred ( see People v Doll , 21 NY3d 665, 671 [2013], cert denied 572 US 1022 [2014]; see generally People v Molnar , 98 NY2d 328, 332-333 [2002]).

2024Defendant opposed the motion and sought judgment dismissing the complaint based upon the affirmative defense of the emergency doctrine, by which "a driver who confronts a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration may be relieved of [*2]liability if the actions taken in response are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context" ( Cancellaro v Shults , 68 AD3d 1234, 1236 [3d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]; see Kandel v FN; Taxi; Inc. , 137 AD3d 980, 981-982 [2d Dept 20

2023A defendant may establish the right to summary judgment under the emergency doctrine based on his or her own testimony ( see Cancellaro v Schults , 68 AD3d at 1236-1237 ).

2022The officer knew only that a 911 caller had stated that "there were six dogs in the apartment that were not being taken care of, they were not being fed, and there was dog feces, as well [as] garbage, in the apartment." These assertions do not support the application of the emergency doctrine, which is to be construed "narrowly," to justify the officer's entry and search of the apartment, to ascertain that a "substantial threat of imminent danger" to the dogs may have existed ( People v Mitchell , 39 NY2d at 178 ; see also People v Mormon , 100 AD3d 782, 783 [2012]; People v Guins , 165 AD2d 5

2012The emergency exception “sanctions warrantless searches and seizures in circumstances presenting immediate danger to life or property” (People v Calhoun, 49 NY2d 398, 403 [1980]; see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173 [1976], cert denied 426 US 953 [1976]; People v Guins, 165 AD2d 549, 552 [1991]).

2019Such an event constitutes a classic emergency situation, thus implicating the emergency doctrine ( see Gajjar v Shah , 31 AD3d 377, 378 ; Cheung v Dominican Convent of Our Lady of Rosary , 22 AD3d 450, 451 ).

2017“A driver is not obligated to anticipate that a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction will cross over into oncoming traffic, and such an event constitutes a classic emergency situation, thus implicating the emergency doctrine” (Vargas v Akbar, 123 AD3d 1017 , 1019 [2014], citing Ardila v Cox, 88 AD3d 829, 830 [2011]; see Gajjar v Shah, 31 AD3d 377, 377-378 [2006]).

2013Defendant further contends that she is entitled to summary judgment based upon application of the emergency doctrine, which provides that “a defendant will not be considered negligent. . . if he or she is faced with an emergency situation, not of his or her own making, has little or no time to consider an alternative course of conduct and acts reasonably under the circumstances” (Schlanger v Doe, 53 AD3d 827, 828 [2008]; see Hubbard v County of Madison, 93 AD3d 939, 940 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805 [2012]).

2013Defendant further contends that she is entitled to summary judgment based upon application of the emergency doctrine, which provides that “a defendant will not be considered negligent. . . if he or she is faced with an emergency situation, not of his or her own making, has little or no time to consider an alternative course of conduct and acts reasonably under the circumstances” (Schlanger v Doe, 53 AD3d 827, 828 [2008]; see Hubbard v County of Madison, 93 AD3d 939, 940 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805 [2012]).

2022Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendant was not precluded from relying on the emergency doctrine by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense ( see CPLR 3018[b]; Vitale v Levine , 44 AD3d 935, 936 ).

2020"Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context'" ( Vitale v Levine , 44 AD3d 935, 936 , quoting Rivera v New York City Tr.

2013Defendant further contends that she is entitled to summary judgment based upon application of the emergency doctrine, which provides that “a defendant will not be considered negligent. . . if he or she is faced with an emergency situation, not of his or her own making, has little or no time to consider an alternative course of conduct and acts reasonably under the circumstances” (Schlanger v Doe, 53 AD3d 827, 828 [2008]; see Hubbard v County of Madison, 93 AD3d 939, 940 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805 [2012]).

2013Defendant further contends that she is entitled to summary judgment based upon application of the emergency doctrine, which provides that “a defendant will not be considered negligent. . . if he or she is faced with an emergency situation, not of his or her own making, has little or no time to consider an alternative course of conduct and acts reasonably under the circumstances” (Schlanger v Doe, 53 AD3d 827, 828 [2008]; see Hubbard v County of Madison, 93 AD3d 939, 940 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805 [2012]).

2015Under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, the police may make a warrantless entry into a protected area if (1) they have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; (2) the search was not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence; and (3) there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched (see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173 , 177 *1001 [1976]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 283

2014Under the emergency exception, the police may make a warrantless entry into a protected area if (1) they have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; (2) the search was not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence; (3) and there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched (see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177 [1976]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d at 283 ; People v Desmarat, 38 AD3d 913, 9

2014While the emergency doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case (see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2011], citing Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172 [2001]; Ferrer v Harris, 55 NY2d 285 [1982]; Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc., 101 AD3d 812 [2012]; Williams v City of New York, 88 AD3d 989 [2011]; Jacobellis v New York State Thruway Auth., 51 AD3d 976 [2008]), Bang’s deposition testimony nevertheless raises an issue of fact as to whether she could have safely continued to operate her vehicle while on the bridge, and whether it was reasonable for her to stop the vehicle under

2011The record demonstrates that even assuming the applicability of the emergency doctrine, the bus driver’s actions “may still be found to be negligent if, notwithstanding the emergency, the acts are found to be unreasonable” (Ferrer v Harris, 55 NY2d 285, 293 [1982] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2020"Without such evidence, the assertion that the [plaintiffs'] vehicle came to a sudden stop was insufficient to rebut the inference that [Miller] was negligent" ( Auguste v Jeter , 167 AD3d 560 , 560-561; see Mallen v Su , 67 AD3d 974, 975 ), and failed to demonstrate that the emergency doctrine was applicable to this case ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; Ordonez v Lee , 177 AD3d at 757; Shehab v Powers , 150 AD3d at 920 ; Comas-Bourne v City of New York , 146 AD3d 855, 856 ; see also Jacobellis v New York State Thruway Auth. , 51 AD3d 976, 977 ).

2018However, the emergency doctrine is typically not available to the rear driver in a rear-end collision, who is responsible for maintaining a safe distance ( Jacobellis v New York State Thruway Auth. , 51 AD3d 976, 977 [2d Dept 2008]).

2026Whatever might have been uncovered by a thorough assessment of the tracking capabilities of the victim's phone is inapposite, as the emergency doctrine contemplates that decisions must be made swiftly and without the luxury of intense scrutiny of any potential flaws or ambiguity in the information on hand ( see People v Gibson , 117 AD3d at 1319; People v Rodriguez , 77 AD3d 280, 291 [2d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 955 [2010]).

2015Under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, the police may make a warrantless entry into a protected area if (1) they have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; (2) the search was not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence; and (3) there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched (see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173 , 177 *1001 [1976]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 283

2025Inasmuch as the plaintiff sought to hold the transit defendants liable on the basis that Blake failed to use reasonable care as she was approaching the intersection, and not for actions Blake took after an alleged emergency situation arose, the transit defendants were not entitled to a jury charge on the emergency doctrine ( see Vasquez v Couty of Nassau , 91 AD3d 855, 857 ; Jablonksi v Jakaitis , 85 AD3d 969, 970 ).

2025Inasmuch as the plaintiff sought to hold the transit defendants liable on the basis that Blake failed to use reasonable care as she was approaching the intersection, and not for actions Blake took after an alleged emergency situation arose, the transit defendants were not entitled to a jury charge on the emergency doctrine ( see Vasquez v Couty of Nassau , 91 AD3d 855, 857 ; Jablonksi v Jakaitis , 85 AD3d 969, 970 ).

2022Thus, the court properly denied that part of defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint pursuant to the emergency doctrine, regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff's opposition papers ( see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

2020In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the accident, or whether the emergency doctrine applied to this case ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324 ). "[T]he emergency doctrine does not apply to typical accidents involving rear-end collisions because trailing drivers are required to leave a reasonable distance between their vehicles and vehicles ahead" ( Lowhar-Lewis v Metropolitan Transp.

2014In opposition to the motions, defendants in appeal No. 1 and plaintiff in appeal No. 2 failed to raise an issue of fact as to the applicability of the emergency doctrine to Hill’s actions (see Stewart, 100 AD3d at 1390 ; see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).

2014Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is an issue of fact with respect to the applicability of the emergency doctrine to decedent’s actions (cf. Stewart, 100 AD3d at 1390 ; see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).