Lyerly v. City of New York, 283 A.D.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · Go Syfert
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Lyerly v. City of New York, 283 A.D.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Kelly v. City of New York (nyappdiv, 2017-09-27)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Auth., 149 AD3d 509, 510 [2017]; Matter of Lyerly v City of New York, 283 AD2d 647, 648 [2001]; Pavone v City of New York, 170 AD2d 493 [1991]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Since the Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York is a separate jural entity, the notice of claim received and acknowledged by it cannot be imputed to the defendant, NYCHA (see Khela v City of New York, 91 AD3d 912, 914 [2012]; Singh v City of New York, 88 AD3d 864, 865 [2011]; Matter of Lyerly v City of New York, 283 AD2d 647, 648 [2001]; Matter of Hobgood v New York City Hous.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Singh v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 148 [2008]; Pappalardo v City of New York, 2 AD3d 699 [2003]; Matter of Lyerly v City of New York, 283 AD2d 647, 648 [2001]; Matter of Ealey v City of New York, 204 AD2d 720, 721 [1994]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Aceituno v. Lai On Chan
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Finally, the plaintiff failed to establish that NYCHHC would not be substantially prejudiced by granting the application (see Matter of Lyerly v City of New York, 283 AD2d 647, 648 [2001]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kalambalikis v. New York City Housing Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Finally, he failed to establish that the respondent would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay in its defense on the merits (see Matter of Lyerly v City of New York, 283 AD2d 647, 648 [2001]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Cora Lyerly
v.
City of New York, and New York City Housing Authority
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 29, 2001.
283 A.D.2d 647
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

—In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the New York City Housing Authority appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated August 3, 2000, which granted the petitioner’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the application is denied.

[*648] The key factors to be considered in deciding an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are whether the petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the public corporation’s opportunity to investigate and defend against the claim was substantially prejudiced by the delay (see, Matter of James v City of New York, 242 AD2d 630). The petitioner failed to meet this standard.

The excuse proffered by the petitioner, an unelaborated contention of “law office inadvertence,” is not acceptable. Furthermore, while the petitioner maintains that the appellant, New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter the Housing Authority), acquired actual knowledge of the claim based upon a notice of claim served upon the City of New York, notice to the City cannot be imputed to the Housing. Authority (see, Matter of Martinez v New York City Hous. Auth., 250 AD2d 686). Lastly, because the petitioner’s contention that the Housing Authority would not be prejudiced by the grant of her application is predicated on the incorrect assumption that the Housing Authority acquired “actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting her claim” (General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]), she also failed to satisfy the third requirement. Santucci, J. P., S. Miller, Luciano, Feuerstein and Adams, JJ., concur.