Alvarado v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). · Go Syfert
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Alvarado v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
12 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rowland v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. (nyappdiv, 2026-05-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rowland v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2026 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Dist. , 196 AD3d 686, 687; cf. Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. , 134 AD3d 1440, 1441). "[E]ven if a storm is ongoing, once a property owner elects to remove snow or ice, it must do so FN2 with reasonable care or it could be held liable for creating a hazardous condition or exacerbating a natural hazard created by the storm" ( Polis v City of New York , 230 AD3d at 808 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marrero v. Oak-Michigan Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
It is well settled that "[a] landowner is not responsible for a failure to remove snow and ice until a reasonable time has elapsed after cessation of the storm" ( Cerra v Perk Dev. , 197 AD2d 851, 851 [4th Dept 1993]; see Brierley v Great Lakes Motor Corp., 41 AD3d 1159, 1160 [4th Dept 2007]; Baia v Allright Parking Buffalo, Inc., 27 AD3d 1153, 1154 [4th Dept 2006]), and evidence that it was not precipitating or only lightly precipitating at the time of an accident does not render the storm in progress doctrine inapplicable ( see generally Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. , 134 AD3d 1440, 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ayers v. Pioneer Cent. Sch. Dist.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
We conclude that defendants did not meet their initial burden of establishing that plaintiff's injuries were the result of "an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter" ( Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth. , 27 NY3d 1019, 1020-1021 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; cf. Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. , 134 AD3d 1440, 1441 [4th Dept 2015]; Witherspoon v Tops Mkts., LLC , 128 AD3d 1541, 1541 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schoonmaker v. Starfire Realty Holdings, LLC
N.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
May 4, 2020) (citing Alvardo v. Wegmans Food Market, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1440, 1441 (4th Dep’t 2015) (affirming trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in case involving slip and fall on snow and ice because “evidence that it was only snowing lightly at the time of the accident does not render the storm in progress doctrine inapplicable.”); Zima v. North Colonie Cent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Govenettio v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
A defendant seeking to avail itself of the storm in progress doctrine meets its prima facie burden by establishing as a matter of law that there was a storm in progress at the time of the accident ( see Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc ., 134 AD3d 1440, 1440 [4th Dept 2015]; Glover v Botsford , 109 AD3d 1182, 1183 [4th Dept 2013]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Battaglia v. MDC Concourse Ctr., LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Where, as here, a defendant's own submissions do not raise an issue of fact whether the icy condition existed before the storm, the burden shifts to the plaintiff "to raise a triable issue of fact whether the accident was caused by a slippery condition at the location where the plaintiff fell that existed prior to the storm, as opposed to precipitation from the storm in progress, and that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the preexisting condition' " ( Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. , 134 AD3d 1440, 1441 [4th Dept 2015]; see e.g.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wrobel v. Tops Markets, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was a storm in progress inasmuch as defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a storm in progress (see Walter v United Parcel Serv., Inc., 56 AD3d 1187 , 1187 [4th Dept 2008]; cf. Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 134 AD3d 1440, 1441 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bunn v. Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare
N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oneida Cty. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
Stalker v. Crestview Cadillac Corp., 284 A.D.2d 977 (4th Dept., 2001); see also Alvarado v. Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1440 (4th Dept., 2015] and Glover v. Botsford, 109 A.D.3d 1182 (4th Dept. 2013).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Luz Alvarado
v.
Wegmans Food Markets, Inc.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 23, 2015.
134 A.D.3d 1440
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

[*1441] Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered January 5, 2015. The order granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on snow or ice in defendant’s parking lot. Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. “Defendant met its initial burden by establishing that a storm was in progress at the time of the accident and, thus, that it ‘had no duty to remove the snow [or] ice until a reasonable time ha[d] elapsed after cessation of the storm’ ” (Witherspoon v Tops Mkts., LLC, 128 AD3d 1541, 1541 [2015]). In opposition to the motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact “whether the accident was caused by a slippery condition at the location where the plaintiff fell that existed prior to the storm, as opposed to precipitation from the storm in progress, and that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the preexisting condition” (Meyers v Big Six Towers, Inc., 85 AD3d 877, 878 [2011]). Contrary to plaintiffs contention, evidence that it was only snowing lightly at the time of the accident does not render the storm in progress doctrine inapplicable. The “ ‘doctrine is not limited to situations where blizzard conditions exist; it also applies in situations where there is some type of less severe, yet still inclement, winter weather* ” (Camacho v Garcia, 273 AD2d 835, 835 [2000]). The assertions of plaintiff’s property management expert that defendant’s snow and ice removal practices deviated from accepted and customary practices of property management also failed to raise an issue of fact, inasmuch as “defendant’s duty in this regard was suspended until a reasonable period of time after the storm ended” (Wood v Converse, 263 AD2d 860, 861 [1999]). Present — Scudder, P.J., Smith, Valentino, Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.