storm in progress rule in New York

2022Under the storm in progress rule, a property owner will not be held liable in negligence for injuries sustained as the result of a slippery snow or ice condition occurring during a storm or for a reasonable time thereafter ( see Solazzo v New York City Transit Auth ., 6 NY3d 734 ).

2013Auth., 92 NY2d 348 [1998] [“The presence of snow or ice upon exposed places on moving cars is an accident of the hour, and no ordinary diligence could, during the prevalence of a storm, wholly remove its effects from the places exposed to its action, so as to prevent accidents to heedless and inattentive travelers.”].) Thus, as the Court of Appeals more recently explained, “[a] property owner will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiffs injuries sustained as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter.” (Solazzo, 6 NY3d at 735

2026Footnote 2 Moreover, New York has not expanded the storm in progress rule to apply to a rain storm that is not also accompanied by snow or ice (see Hilsman v Sarwil Assoc., L.P., 13 AD3d at 693-694; see also Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth., 27 NY3d at 1021 [applying the rule where a mixture “of snow, sleet and rain persisted” until approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes before the accident]; Cammarata v Holy Name of Mary R.C.

2026However, "[u]nder the storm in progress doctrine, a landowner 'will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiff's injuries sustained as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter'" ( Jackson v City of New York , 238 AD3d 1126 , 1127, quoting Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth. , 27 NY3d 1019, 1020-1021 ).

2024Defendant argues that plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed pursuant to the storm-in- progress defense, which "is based on the principle that there is no liability for injuries related to falling on accumulated snow and ice until after the storm has ceased, in order to allow workers a reasonable period of time to clean the walkways" (Powell v MLG Hillside Assocs., L.P., 290 AD2d 345, 345 [!81 Dept 2002] [emphasis added]).

2023However, this only serves to further undermine the reasons for continuing the application of the delay imposed by the storm in progress doctrine, inasmuch as 0.02 of an inch of total daily precipitation does not present a situation where such precipitation is "re-covering [walking surfaces] as fast as they are cleaned, thus rendering the effort fruitless" ( Anson v Monticello Raceway Mgt., Inc. , 217 at 1231, quoting Powell v MLG Hillside Assoc. , 290 AD2d at 345 ; see Scheuer v State of New York , 198 AD3d at 1227 ).

2021The court properly granted defendants' respective summary judgment motions based on the storm-in-progress defense ( Pippo v City of New York , 43 AD3d 303, 304 [1st Dept 2007]; Powell v MLG Hillside Assoc ., 290 AD2d 345, 345 [1st Dept 2002]).

2017Similarly, Sterling’s meteorological expert agreed that the air temperatures were below freezing throughout the day of the accident, and well below freezing at the time of the accident. *537 Under the storm in progress doctrine, a landowner’s duty to take reasonable measures to remedy a dangerous condition caused by a storm is suspended while the storm is ongoing until a reasonable time after the storm has ended (Weinberger v 52 Duane Assoc., LLC, 102 AD3d 618 , 619 [1st Dept 2013]; Pippo v City of New York, 43 AD3d 303, 304 [1st Dept 2007]).

2016The Supreme Court granted the City’s motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “ ‘Under the storm in progress rule, the City generally cannot be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of slippery conditions that occur during an ongoing storm, or for a reasonable time thereafter’ ” (Riviere v City of New York, 127 AD3d 720, 720 [2015], quoting Mazzella v City of New York, 72 AD3d 755, 756 [2010]; see Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth., 27 NY3d 1019 [2016]; Rusin v City of New York, 133 AD3d 648, 648-649 [2015]).

2015“Under the storm in progress rule, the City generally cannot be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of slippery conditions that occur during an ongoing storm, or for a reasonable time thereafter” (Mazzella v City of New York, 72 AD3d 755, 756 [2010]).

2026Footnote 2 Moreover, New York has not expanded the storm in progress rule to apply to a rain storm that is not also accompanied by snow or ice (see Hilsman v Sarwil Assoc., L.P., 13 AD3d at 693-694; see also Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth., 27 NY3d at 1021 [applying the rule where a mixture “of snow, sleet and rain persisted” until approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes before the accident]; Cammarata v Holy Name of Mary R.C.

2026Footnote 2 Moreover, New York has not expanded the storm in progress rule to apply to a rain storm that is not also accompanied by snow or ice (see Hilsman v Sarwil Assoc., L.P., 13 AD3d at 693-694; see also Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth., 27 NY3d at 1021 [applying the rule where a mixture “of snow, sleet and rain persisted” until approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes before the accident]; Cammarata v Holy Name of Mary R.C.

2017Since the evidence submitted by the defendants was in conflict and, thus, could not establish, prima facie, that the storm in progress rule applied (see Abramo v City of Mount Vernon, 103 AD3d 760, 761 [2013]; Kantor v Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 AD3d 1177, 1177 [2012]; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d at 947 ; Lester v Ackerman, 82 AD3d 847, 847 [2011]), the court should have denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Lucia, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York

2014Since the evidence submitted by the defendant was in conflict, it could not establish, as a matter of law, that the storm in progress rule applied (see Kantor v Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 AD3d at 1177 ; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d at 947 ; Lester v Ackerman, 82 AD3d 847, 847 [2011]).

2025However, even when a property owner's duty to engage in snow removal is suspended under the storm-in-progress rule, if a property owner elects to engage in snow removal, "it is required to act with reasonable care so as to avoid creating a hazardous condition or exacerbating a natural hazard created by the storm" ( Balagyozyan v Federal Realty L.P. , 191 AD3d 749, 751 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Corlette v SN Auto Repairs, Inc. , 227 AD3d 858 , 859; Gwinn v Christina's Polish Rest., Inc. , 117 AD3d 789 ; Cotter v Brookhaven Mem.

2025"Under the storm in progress rule, a property owner will not be held responsible for accidents occurring as a result of the accumulation of snow and ice on its premises until an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm" ( McCullagh v City of New York , 201 AD3d 714, 715 ; [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Balagyozyan v Federal Realty L.P. , 191 AD3d 749, 751 ).

2025Thus, defendant's submissions raised an issue of fact as to whether the storm-in-progress doctrine applies ( see Abramo v City of Mount Vernon , 103 AD3d 760, 761 [2d Dept 2013]; Howard v J.A.J.

2025Thus, defendant's submissions raised an issue of fact as to whether the storm-in-progress doctrine applies ( see Abramo v City of Mount Vernon , 103 AD3d 760, 761 [2d Dept 2013]; Howard v J.A.J.

2026Supreme Court properly granted the motion of defendants City of New York and New York City Department of Transportation (together, the City) because they established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment based on the storm-in-progress doctrine by demonstrating that they did not have a reasonable amount of time to discover and remedy the alleged icy condition prior to plaintiff's fall ( see Valentine v City of New York , 86 AD2d 381, 382-383 [1st Dept 1982], affd 57 NY2d 932 [1982]).

2024NO. 97 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/12/2024 Regarding the storm in progress doctrine, a property owner or a public entity such as Transit, is not liable for injuries sustained during falling snow or precipitation nor for a reasonable time thereafter the storm, as property owners do not have a duty to remedy such conditions during a storm (Valentine v. City of New York, 86 AD2d 381 [1 ' 1 Dept 1982]). further the storm in progress doctrine has been held to apply to both exterior and interior walkways, including wet and slippery station platfonns, subway station floors and subway station stairways (see A

2018"As defendant[] demonstrated that the storm in progress doctrine applied, Supreme Court properly shifted the burden to plaintiff[] to produce admissible evidence that the ice that caused plaintiff's slip and fall existed prior to the storm in progress, and that defendant[] had actual or constructive notice of the hazard" ( Harvey v Laz Parking Ltd, LLC , 128 AD3d 1203, 1204 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Parker v Rust Plant Servs., Inc. , 9 AD3d 671, 672-673 [2004]).

2012As a final matter, we reject defendants’ assertion that they are entitled to summary judgment based upon the application of the storm in progress rule, which affords “[a] party in possession or control of real property ... a reasonable period of time after the cessation of a storm in which to take protective measures to correct storm-created hazardous ice and snow conditions” (Parker v Rust Plant Servs., Inc., 9 AD3d 671, 672 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Grinnell v Phil Rose Apts., LLC, 60 AD3d 1256, 1256 [2009]; Mosquera v Orin, 48 AD3d 935, 936 [2008]).

2017Since the evidence submitted by the defendants was in conflict and, thus, could not establish, prima facie, that the storm in progress rule applied (see Abramo v City of Mount Vernon, 103 AD3d 760, 761 [2013]; Kantor v Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 AD3d 1177, 1177 [2012]; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d at 947 ; Lester v Ackerman, 82 AD3d 847, 847 [2011]), the court should have denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Lucia, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York

2014Since the evidence submitted by the defendant was in conflict, it could not establish, as a matter of law, that the storm in progress rule applied (see Kantor v Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 AD3d at 1177 ; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d at 947 ; Lester v Ackerman, 82 AD3d 847, 847 [2011]).

2017Since the evidence submitted by the defendants was in conflict and, thus, could not establish, prima facie, that the storm in progress rule applied (see Abramo v City of Mount Vernon, 103 AD3d 760, 761 [2013]; Kantor v Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 AD3d 1177, 1177 [2012]; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d at 947 ; Lester v Ackerman, 82 AD3d 847, 847 [2011]), the court should have denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Lucia, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York

2014Since the evidence submitted by the defendant was in conflict, it could not establish, as a matter of law, that the storm in progress rule applied (see Kantor v Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 AD3d at 1177 ; Weller v Paul, 91 AD3d at 947 ; Lester v Ackerman, 82 AD3d 847, 847 [2011]).

2026Realty, LLC , 221 AD3d 1210, 1211 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Scheuer v State of New York , 198 AD3d 1225, 1227 [3d Dept 2021]).

2023However, this only serves to further undermine the reasons for continuing the application of the delay imposed by the storm in progress doctrine, inasmuch as 0.02 of an inch of total daily precipitation does not present a situation where such precipitation is "re-covering [walking surfaces] as fast as they are cleaned, thus rendering the effort fruitless" ( Anson v Monticello Raceway Mgt., Inc. , 217 at 1231, quoting Powell v MLG Hillside Assoc. , 290 AD2d at 345 ; see Scheuer v State of New York , 198 AD3d at 1227 ).

2026Although defendant correctly asserts that there is no need for a major weather event to trigger the application of the storm in progress doctrine, the proof must "establish the existence of an ongoing hazardous [*4]weather condition" that amounts to more than trace accumulations ( Anson v Monticello Raceway Mgt., Inc. , 217 AD3d at 1231 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Edmund-Hunter v Toussie , 190 AD3d 946, 947 [2d Dept 2021]; Haraburda v City of New York , 168 AD3d 485 , 486 [1st Dept 2019]).

2023Although there does not need to be a major weather event to trigger the application of the storm in progress doctrine, the proof must "establish the existence of an ongoing hazardous weather condition" that amounts to more than trace accumulations ( Anson v Monticello Raceway Mgt., Inc. , 217 AD3d at 1231 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Gill v Bk Bryant Ave.

2021It is well settled that "[a] landowner is not responsible for a failure to remove snow and ice until a reasonable time has elapsed after cessation of the storm" ( Cerra v Perk Dev. , 197 AD2d 851, 851 [4th Dept 1993]; see Brierley v Great Lakes Motor Corp., 41 AD3d 1159, 1160 [4th Dept 2007]; Baia v Allright Parking Buffalo, Inc., 27 AD3d 1153, 1154 [4th Dept 2006]), and evidence that it was not precipitating or only lightly precipitating at the time of an accident does not render the storm in progress doctrine inapplicable ( see generally Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. , 134 AD3d 1440, 1

2019A defendant seeking to avail itself of the storm in progress doctrine meets its prima facie burden by establishing as a matter of law that there was a storm in progress at the time of the accident ( see Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc ., 134 AD3d 1440, 1440 [4th Dept 2015]; Glover v Botsford , 109 AD3d 1182, 1183 [4th Dept 2013]).

2015This Court has not previously addressed whether the storm in progress doctrine may be applied to hazards created solely by wind, nor whether it may be invoked by defendant to modify its “nondelegable duty to maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition” (Harjes v State of New York, 71 AD3d 1278, 1279 [2010]).

2015This Court has not previously addressed whether the storm in progress doctrine may be applied to hazards created solely by wind, nor whether it may be invoked by defendant to modify its “nondelegable duty to maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition” (Harjes v State of New York, 71 AD3d 1278, 1279 [2010]).

2025Auth. , 201 AD3d 867, 868 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Johnson v Pawling Cent.

2025Auth. , 201 AD3d 867, 868 ).

2023School Dist. , 225 AD2d 993, 994 [3d Dept 1996]; see Camacho v Garcia , 273 AD2d 835, 835 [4th Dept 2000]).

2015The “ ‘doctrine is not limited to situations where blizzard conditions exist; it also applies in situations where there is some type of less severe, yet still inclement, winter weather* ” (Camacho v Garcia, 273 AD2d 835, 835 [2000]).

2017The Supreme Court granted the motion and the plaintiff appeals. “ 'Under the so-called storm in progress rule, a property owner will not be held responsible for accidents occurring as a result of the accumulation of snow and ice on its premises until an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm’ ” (Koh Chong Wong v Kontonis, 128 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2015], quoting Marchese v Skenderi, 51 AD3d 642, 642 [2008]; see Fernandez v City of New York, 125 AD3d 800, 801 [2015]; Yassa v Awad, 117 AD3

2016That evidence demonstrated that the roof of the shed partially collapsed due to the weight of the snow which had accumulated thereon, and that it was snowing at the time of the occurrence and, accordingly, that the storm in progress rule applies (see Ryan v Taconic Realty Assoc., 122 AD3d 708, 709 [2014]; Marchese v Skenderi, 51 AD3d at 642 ).