Lotysz v. Montgomery, 309 A.D.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Lotysz v. Montgomery, 309 A.D.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases · …elicited through routine administrative questioning that is not designed to elicit an incriminating response at p. 629 ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Perez (David) (nyappterm, 2017-10-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Perez (David)
N.Y. App. Term. · 2017 · confidence medium
Defendant's argument that he was denied a fair trial due to the People's failure to give him CPL 710.30 notice of their intention to offer a statement made by him during the physical coordination test is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant failed to raise any objection about the statement he now challenges ( see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628, 629 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 582 [2003]; People v Muneton , 302 AD2d 246 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 541 [2003]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Slade
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
When the officer asked defendant where he resided, defendant responded, “here.” Generally, a defendant’s answer concerning his address, when “elicited through routine administrative questioning that [is] not designed to elicit an incriminating response” (People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628, 629 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 582 [2003]; see generally People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292-293 [1995]), will be considered pedigree information not subject to CPL 710.30 notice requirements even if the statement later proves to be inculpatory (see People v Perez, 198 AD2d 540, 542 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Slade
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
When the officer asked defendant where he resided, defendant responded, “here.” Generally, a defendant’s answer concerning his address, when “elicited through routine administrative questioning that [is] not designed to elicit an incriminating response” (People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628, 629 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 582 [2003]; see generally People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292-293 [1995]), will be considered pedigree information not subject to CPL 710.30 notice requirements even if the statement later proves to be inculpatory (see People v Perez, 198 AD2d 540, 542 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Harris (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Further, a period of postrelease supervision is not authorized in connection with an indeterminate sentence (see Penal Law § 70.45; People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628, 629 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Murdaugh
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
In addition, as the People correctly concede, the County Court erred in imposing a period of post-release supervision, as “post-release supervision is only authorized for determinate sentences” (People v Rowlett, 29 AD3d 922, 923 [2006]; see Penal Law § 70.45 [1]; People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628, 629 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gates
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
No CPL 710.30 notice is required with respect to mere pedigree information elicited through routine administrative questioning upon arrest that is not designed to elicit an incriminating response (see People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628, 629 [2003]; People v Rosa, 294 AD2d 159, 160 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 732 [2002]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Greg Lotysz
v.
Kenneth O. Montgomery, M.D.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 21, 2003.
309 A.D.2d 628
2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10807
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Sklar, J.), entered April 3, 2003, which, upon the prior grant of defendants-respondents’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint in this medical malpractice action as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff Greg Lotysz was injured while performing his duties as an employee of the New York Jets. He was treated for his injuries by defendant-respondent doctors, whom he now sues for medical malpractice. The record, however, establishes that defendant-respondent doctors were salaried Jets employees retained to provide medical services for fellow Jets employees, such as plaintiff, and fully compensated for those services by the Jets organization, and that plaintiff obtained treatment from defendant-respondent doctors solely by reason of his employment with the Jets, and not as a member of the general public. Accordingly, plaintiff’s action against defendants-respondents is barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (6) (see Feliciano- Delgado v New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Assn. of N.Y. City Health Ctr., 281 AD2d 312, 313 [2001]; Marange v Slivinski, 257 AD2d 427 [1999]).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Ellerin, Friedman and Gonzalez, JJ.