¹ Stephanie ultimately consented to adoption and is not a party to this appeal. 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 et seq.) (West 2018)). The State alleged H.B. was neglected based on an injurious environment (id. § 2-3(1)(b)). ¶5 In August 2018, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order, finding H.B. was neglected as alleged in the State’s petition. In November 2018, the court entered a dispositional order (1) finding respondent was unfit and unable, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline H.B. and (2) granting the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) custody, guardianship, and the right to place H.B. ¶6 B. Termination Phase ¶7 In July 2019, the State petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights. It alleged respondent was unfit due to his failures to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to H.B.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)); (2) protect H.B. from the conditions that were injurious to his welfare (id. § 1(D)(g)); (3) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of H.B. (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (4) make reasonable progress toward the return of H.B. in the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). ¶8 Trial commenced on January 15, 2020. The court heard testimony on that day, as well as on January 16, February 20, February 21, and March 9, 2020. All 20 witnesses who testified on those dates did so in person. On March 9, the State called Stephanie as a witness, and, when the proceedings broke for the day, cross-examination of her had not yet been completed. The trial was continued to March 26, 2020. ¶9 In the meantime, on March 16, 2020, the chief judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit entered General Order No. 20-07, effective March 17 (Kane County Cir. Ct. G.O. 20-07, (Mar. 17, 2020)), in response to the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. The order continued all matters, subject - 10 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 counsel, in the event he elected to file an amended Anders motion, to “full[y] analy[ze] the issue and explain*** why he believe[d] such an argument would be frivolous.” ¶ 38 On November 23, 2021, respondent’s counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw under Anders. This time, counsel provided little more analysis but cited two additional cases, In re R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, and In re Aa. C., 2021 IL App (1st) 210639, that came to similar conclusions as did P.S. 2 He again asserted the recent case law, which involved similar scenarios and discussed many of respondent’s concerns, was persuasive. He noted that those decisions had analyzed due-process claims under the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), but he failed to offer any analysis of those factors under the facts of this case. On December 1, 2021, we denied counsel’s amended Anders motion with prejudice and directed respondent to file a brief no later than December 15, 2021. See Austin C., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 948 (explaining the appellate court has three discretionary options when appointed counsel does not comply with Anders). The parties thereafter complied with shorter briefing deadlines, and the case was submitted for decision on January 7, 2021. ¶ 39 In light of the foregoing, we find we have good cause to excuse our failure to issue our decision within the timeframe set forth in Rule 311(a)(5). See In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 26. ¶ 40 B. Forfeiture and Respondent’s Noncompliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341

² Both R.D. and Aa. C. were decided before counsel’s initial Anders motion, but counsel neither cited nor discussed them. - 11 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 ¶ 41 We first address the State’s contention that respondent has forfeited his contention on appeal by failing to adequately argue it under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(7) requires a party’s brief to present argument, which must contain the contentions of the party and be supported by citation to the authority and the pages of the record relied on. Id. A party must clearly define the issues to be decided and set forth cogent arguments in support of his or her position. Maday v. Township High School District 211, 2018 IL App (1st) 180294, ¶ 50. Indeed, it is well settled this court “is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.” Ramos v. Kewanee Hospital, 2013 IL App (3d) 120001, ¶ 37. A party forfeits an argument when he or she fails to adequately develop it. Maday, 2018 IL App (1st) 180294, ¶ 50. ¶ 42 Respondent’s brief fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7). Respondent states the issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in conducting the termination trial in a hybrid manner and, in doing so, violated his constitutional rights to due process and to confront the witnesses against him. However, the argument portion of respondent’s brief is devoid of any reference to the court’s discretion and any discussion of how the court’s decision was an abuse of that discretion. Nor has respondent provided any true due-process or confrontation-clause analysis based on the specific facts of this case. Instead, after setting forth some relevant boilerplate law, pointing us to some of the recent case law on the issue, and directing us specifically to Justice Wharton’s dissent in P.S., respondent argues as follows: “In relation to the instant appeal, [Justice Wharton’s] dissent at [paragraph] 105 essentially echoes [respondent’s] concern which his [trial] counsel adopted *** from [the ASA’s] concerns *** about observation of a witness during testimony, ‘Although video conferencing platforms like Zoom do not eliminate a judge’s opportunity to observe a - 12 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 parent’s demeanor throughout the hearing[,] they do impose limitations.[’] [Citation.] In the instant case, the testimony of *** Diaz *** was taken via Zoom on September 23, 2021, and September 24, 2021. Although it was the only witness testimony relative to [respondent’s] case taken via Zoom[,] it was vital testimony that [respondent] believes had a high likelihood to be misinterpreted by the court due to the witness not appearing in person.” Respondent does not explain how Diaz’s testimony was vital to the court’s findings in relation to him. Nor could he. Diaz’s testimony concerned Stephanie’s engagement with domestic-violence counseling. (Respondent does not raise any argument regarding Timoti’s rebuttal testimony, which was also taken remotely. Her testimony bore directly on respondent’s fitness, as it concerned his efforts to engage with services after he was released from IDOC, and contradicted respondent’s testimony that he attempted to engage in services.) Moreover, respondent does not explain how the safeguards employed by the trial court in this case were not adequate to protect his interest in maintaining a parental relationship with H.B. ¶ 43 Additionally, we must call attention to other shortcomings in respondent’s brief. For instance, his statement of facts does not fully set forth all the facts necessary to understanding the single issue raised on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). While respondent includes an in-depth discussion of the procedural history of the case, more than half of his statement of facts discusses matters that have no relevance to the issue raised on appeal. And he has not set forth any of the in-court discussion regarding the hybrid format used here. He also states the standard of review is abuse of discretion but does not cite any authority in support of his assertion. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We could strike respondent’s brief and dismiss the appeal in light of these deficiencies (In re Marriage of Reicher, 2021 IL App (2d) - 13 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 200454, ¶ 30), but we decline to do so. Forfeiture is a rule of administrative convenience and does not preclude us from considering an otherwise forfeited contention. See Coley v. Bradshaw & Range Funeral Home, P.C., 2020 IL App (2d) 190627, ¶ 31. Indeed, forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not this court. CB Construction & Design, LLC v. Atlas Brookview, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200924, ¶ 19. Considering the nature of the interests involved here, i.e., respondent’s fundamental right to maintain a parental relationship with his child (see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)), we choose to excuse respondent’s forfeiture and consider the merits of his claims. ¶ 44 C. The Merits ¶ 45 Respondent contends the trial court abused its discretion in conducting the termination trial in a hybrid in-person/remote manner and, in doing so, violated his rights to procedural due process and to confront the witnesses against him. He asserts Diaz’s testimony was vital, and, because it was given on Zoom, it was highly likely to be misinterpreted. Respondent does not raise any issue with the court permitting Timoti to testify in rebuttal via Zoom. ¶ 46 The State argues the hybrid nature of the proceedings did not violate respondent’s rights to due process or to confront the witnesses against him. It argues that, even assuming the confrontation clause applies in proceedings under the Act, the right to be present and cross- examine witnesses, in person or otherwise, is not absolute. It asserts respondent “is unable to show any ‘gross’ deviation from fair due process procedures” or that the procedure used impinged upon the truth-seeking function of cross-examination. Further, the State contends the trial court struck an appropriate balance between respondent’s rights and the government’s interests in providing permanency for H.B. and protecting the public from a novel, deadly virus, and that it established adequate safeguards to protect those interests. Moreover, the State notes only 2 out of 25 witnesses - 14 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 testified remotely, and respondent has taken issue with only one of those witnesses, Diaz, whose testimony concerned Stephanie’s fitness. Thus, the State maintains, respondent cannot establish he was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to allow her to testify remotely. ¶ 47 As will be discussed more fully below, we first conclude the hybrid procedure did not violate respondent’s right to procedural due process. Second, to the extent confrontation rights may be an aspect of due process in these civil proceedings, we find the procedure adequately protected respondent’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Finally, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in employing the hybrid procedure under both Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 (eff. May 22, 2020) and its own local administrative orders. ¶ 48 Before beginning our discussion, we find it useful to set forth the backdrop against which we are analyzing the issue. The fitness portion of this trial commenced in January 2020 and concluded almost 1½ years later, in June 2021. In the midst of the proceedings, the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which can cause severe illness and death, upended our daily lives. The disease caused by the virus, COVID-19, was later declared a pandemic. Our supreme court has guided the lower courts of this state through the pandemic and has encouraged and promoted the use of technology to allow remote proceedings in all matters, where feasible and constitutionally sufficient. See generally Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Mar. 17, 2020). To that end, the court directed lower courts to establish temporary procedures to minimize the impact of COVID-19 on the court system and its participants, while expanding access to the courts. With this in mind, we turn to the merits. ¶ 49 1. Procedural Due Process ¶ 50 At its core, procedural due process requires a party to be given the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 19. The - 15 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 concept “ ‘is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). When determining whether a procedure is constitutionally sufficient, a court must consider and balance (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest by using the procedure and the probable value of any additional or substitute safeguards, and (3) the governmental interests involved. Id. at 335. ¶ 51 After balancing the three Mathews factors, we conclude the trial court’s use of a hybrid format did not deprive respondent of his right to due process. As to the first Mathews factor, a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a parental relationship with his or her child. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310-11 (2005). Indeed, that interest is among the most “ ‘basic civil rights.’ ” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). And it “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” recognized by the Supreme Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion). ¶ 52 As to the second factor, respondent argues only that Diaz’s testimony was “high[ly] likel[y] to be misinterpreted by the court due to the witness not appearing in person.” He does not offer any argument as to how Diaz’s testimony was susceptible to misinterpretation under the circumstances of this case or how any potential misinterpretation of her testimony would prejudice him. Instead, respondent points generally to Justice Wharton’s dissent in P.S., asserting the concerns raised by Justice Wharton “essentially echo” his position. ¶ 53 We note P.S. is distinguishable from this case. In P.S., the parents’ termination trial was conducted entirely on Zoom, over the respondent’s requests for a continuance and for an immediate in-person hearing. P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 7. Here, the trial was conducted - 16 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 in a hybrid manner. The court required respondent and Stephanie to be physically present while allowing two of the State’s witnesses—the only witnesses who were called after the court implemented the hybrid procedure—to participate remotely, and respondent never requested a continuance until all witnesses could appear in person without a substantial risk to their health. All the recent case law on this issue is likewise distinguishable. R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411 (fully remote proceeding; administrative order required remote hearing, except for good cause); Aa. C., 2021 IL App (1st) 210639 (same); In re Es. C., 2021 IL App (1st) 210197 (same). But respondent does not recognize this distinction. ¶ 54 This distinction aside, in his dissent in P.S., Justice Wharton emphasized the seriousness of the State action at issue, likening the termination of parental rights to a “parental death sentence.” P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 95 (Wharton, J., dissenting). He noted, “[a] judge can only see what takes place within the video frame, and it is harder to watch parties’ real time reactions to testimony when the parties and the witnesses appear in separate boxes.” Id. ¶ 105. Accordingly, he argued, a court receiving remote testimony risked missing subtle but important clues that any given witness gives during his or her testimony and “[a] better opportunity to observe [the respondent’s] temperament could have helped inform the court’s decision.” Id. ¶¶ 105- 06, 108. He also noted there were particular challenges in that case, as one witness appeared to be using notes during her testimony. Id. ¶ 105. Thus, Justice Wharton concluded, the second Mathews factor—the risk of erroneous deprivation—“weigh[ed] at least slightly in favor of finding that due process required an in-person hearing.” Id. ¶ 108. ¶ 55 We do not necessarily disagree with Justice Wharton that certain illuminating subtleties could in some circumstances be lost when a witness testifies remotely as opposed to in person. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990); see R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 15 (noting - 17 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 in-person testimony and cross-examination are preferred over remote testimony); People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 56 (2000) (citing Craig and noting preference for in-person confrontation); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (adopted May 22, 2020) (noting “the relative importance of live testimony in court”). But, under the facts of this case, we do not agree with respondent’s suggestion that the procedure used here risked erroneously depriving respondent of his right to maintain a parental relationship with H.B. Indeed, nothing in the record supports respondent’s suggestion and respondent can do nothing more than speculate as to how allowing the two witnesses to testify remotely affected the truth-seeking function of the trial. ¶ 56 The record shows the trial court established adequate safeguards to protect the integrity of the judicial process and allow respondent to confront the witnesses against him. Respondent was physically present in the courtroom, with his attorney, when both remote witnesses testified and was never prohibited from communicating with his attorney during the testimony. The court reminded all participants that the proceedings were confidential. Both remote witnesses were sworn, and they were visible on a screen in the courtroom. Respondent’s attorney was permitted to fully cross-examine both witnesses, raised timely objections, and received rulings on those objections. Before Diaz’s testimony, which concerned only Stephanie’s fitness, the court instructed her to conduct herself as if she were physically present in the courtroom and reminded her that the proceedings were confidential, that all nonparties in her location should leave, and that she could not refer to any documents without permission. Before Timoti’s testimony, to which respondent does not object, the court instructed her to not communicate with anyone during her testimony and to not refer to any documents without the court’s permission. Thus, the procedure used was as close to in-person proceedings as the circumstances permitted. In light of the safeguards established in this case, we cannot conclude that whatever nuances may have been lost - 18 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 by way of the witnesses’ virtual appearances risked erroneously depriving respondent of his right to maintain a parental relationship with H.B. ¶ 57 As to the third Mathews factor, there is no dispute the government has significant interests in protecting minors’ well-being and in expeditiously finding permanency for abused and neglected minors. See R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 21 (noting “[c]hildren have an interest in a stable home life free from the uncertain and fluctuating world of foster care” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Es. C., 2021 IL App (1st) 210197, ¶ 24; In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 365 (2004); In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000); see also Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (noting “child-custody litigation must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with fairness”). Nor is there any dispute that the government has a significant interest in preserving public health and limiting the spread of a novel, deadly disease caused by a highly transmissible virus. See JL Properties Group B, LLC v. Pritzker, 2021 IL App (3d) 200305, ¶ 59 (noting both the government and the public have a strong interest in preserving public health). ¶ 58 Simply put, the trial court here carefully advanced the government’s interests while establishing appropriate safeguards to decrease the risk of erroneously depriving respondent of his fundamental right to maintain his parental relationship with H.B. Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court’s use of hybrid proceedings for the trial did not violate respondent’s right to procedural due process. ¶ 59 2. Confrontation Clause ¶ 60 Defendant also argues the hybrid proceedings violated his sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. We disagree. ¶ 61 The sixth amendment explicitly limits its application to criminal proceedings. U.S. Const., amend. VI. Termination proceedings under the Act are civil in nature. In re E.S., 246 Ill. App. 3d - 19 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 330, 335 (1993). However, termination proceedings involve fundamental liberty interests and invoke some of the constitutional concerns implicated in criminal cases. In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316 (2003). The confrontation clause may well be one of these concerns, but it need not be strictly applied in termination proceedings. In re R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 13 (citing In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489, 495 (1986)). In the civil context, courts generally look to whether there has “been a ‘gross’ deviation from fair procedure.” Id. ¶ 62 Even in the criminal context, however, the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute. Id. ¶ 14. “When evaluating whether the alternate procedure complied with the confrontation clause [(in the criminal context)], courts consider whether the procedure (1) impinged upon the truth-seeking purpose of the clause and (2) was necessary to further an important state interest.” Id. ¶ 63 Respondent does not make any distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, and he has not pointed to any authority establishing that termination proceedings are subject to the more rigorous confrontation standard used in criminal proceedings. However, even if we were to apply the more rigorous standard, we find the proceedings here did not violate respondent’s confrontation rights. ¶ 64 First, the hybrid procedure used in this case did not impinge upon the truth-seeking purpose of the confrontation clause. Admittedly, as noted, in-person testimony and cross-examination are preferred over remote testimony. See Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d at 56. However, as discussed in our analysis of respondent’s due-process claim, the record shows the trial court took steps to ensure the remote witnesses’ appearances were functionally equivalent to in-person appearances. Further, nothing in the record suggests the court, the parties, or the parties’ attorneys were unable to view the witnesses as they testified, observe their demeanor, or evaluate their credibility. Under these - 20 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 circumstances, we conclude the hybrid procedure used in this case “adequately ensure[d] that the testimony [was] both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony” (Craig, 497 U.S. at 851) and did not impinge on the truth-seeking purpose of the confrontation clause (R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 14). ¶ 65 Second, the hybrid procedure used here was necessary to further two important government interests: (1) the welfare of minors, including their interests in their own well-being and living in a stable environment and (2) the protection of the public from a deadly virus that spreads easily through in-person interaction. See R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 16. The trial court employed the hybrid procedure beginning in September 2020, at a time when this state was in the grips of the COVID-19 pandemic and when there were few authorized treatments and no vaccines. See Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/emergency- preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use- authorization#coviddrugs (last visited Feb. 16, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9FVL-TP3R]. The hybrid procedure allowed the proceedings to move forward, facilitating permanency for H.B., while at the same time protecting the participants from the risk of illness. As our colleagues in the First District recognized, “[k]eeping children in limbo, particularly when they have already spent years in the system, would not further the [government’s] interest in their welfare.” R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 16. ¶ 66 For these reasons, we conclude that, to the extent respondent has confrontation rights in these civil termination proceedings, the hybrid procedure employed here did not violate that right. ¶ 67 3. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 and Local Administrative Orders ¶ 68 Respondent also contends the trial court abused its discretion by conducting his termination trial in a hybrid manner. Though respondent does not mention either the trial court’s local - 21 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 administrative orders or Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 (eff. May 22, 2020), we find his argument implicates both the orders and the rule. ¶ 69 On May 1, 2020, the presiding judge of the juvenile division entered an administrative order setting forth temporary procedures to be used in pending juvenile cases. In re COVID-19 Temporary Procedures for Juvenile Division Matters, Kane County Cir. Ct. Family Div. Admin. Order (May 4, 2020). The order provided the judge assigned to a matter could, in his or her discretion, initiate remote proceedings. Id. The order directed the assigned judge to consider “such factors as the need for parties to appear, the evidentiary or non-evidentiary nature of the proceeding, [and] the need to involve a court reporter.” Id. Additionally, the order provided as follows: “Eligibility for a contested remote hearing (remote hearing) is limited to cases wherein all parties are represented by attorneys, have access to the Zoom platform or telephonic conferencing, and in which the parties consent to the remote hearing. However, if all parties do not consent to the remote hearing[,] then the court may, in the exercise of its discretion and after affording the objecting party the opportunity to show why they would be prejudiced by a remote hearing, order the matter to proceed via a remote hearing or in a hybrid manner. These limits will be frequently reviewed and modified, when possible, in an ongoing effort to expand access to justice.” Id. The order also stated that remote proceedings were to “be conducted to the same standards as hearings in a courtroom” and in accord with the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the supreme court rules, and the court’s local rules, but the precise method of hearing was reserved to the assigned judge’s discretion. Id. Finally, the administrative order set forth certain safeguards, including that each witness was to (1) be alone in a secure room with closed doors, (2) wear - 22 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 appropriate attire and conduct themselves as if they were appearing in a physical courtroom, and (3) ensure there would be no interruptions or distractions for the duration of their appearance. Id. ¶ 70 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 (eff. May 22, 2020) provides the court may, upon request or its own order, for good cause shown and upon appropriate safeguards, allow a witness to testify in a civil proceeding by videoconferencing from a remote location. The Committee Comments to Rule 241 explain “good cause” must be shown because of the importance of live in-person testimony. Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (adopted May 22, 2020). “Good cause is likely to arise when a witness is unable to attend trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident, illness, or limited court operations, but also in foreseeable circumstances such as residing out of state.” Id. When allowing remote testimony, the court must impose adequate safeguards to ensure accurate identification of the participant and to avoid improper influences by any individual who may be present with the participant during their testimony. Id. Moreover, “[a] court has broad discretion to determine if video testimony is appropriate for a particular case,” and it must balance all relevant considerations, including (1) any due-process concerns, (2) the ability to question witnesses, (3) hardships that may prevent the witnesses from appearing in person, (4) the type of case, (5) any prejudice to the parties if testimony is to occur by video conference, and (6) any other issues of fairness. Id. ¶ 71 Because both the local administrative order and Rule 241 invoke the trial court’s discretion, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision to proceed in a hybrid manner was an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is unreasonable. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009). ¶ 72 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting the trial in a hybrid manner and permitting certain witnesses to testify remotely. Here, all parties were represented by - 23 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 attorneys and, although respondent did not consent, the administrative order permitted the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to order the matter to proceed in a hybrid manner. The court, in accordance with the administrative order, afforded respondent the opportunity to explain his position. Respondent generally objected to the hybrid proceedings, noting he had the “right to face the witnesses in person” and he would not be able to fully observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of the witnesses appearing remotely. But the only specific concern respondent raised at any time in the proceedings was the presence of a glare on the screen in the courtroom in which the witness appeared, which was remediated when the court closed the blinds in the courtroom. Further, the trial court left open the possibility that it could reconsider its order if the hybrid proceedings proved to be problematic, but respondent never identified any specific problems with the format. Moreover, respondent has not established how the hybrid proceedings prejudiced him, and, given the fact Diaz’s testimony had no bearing on the State’s allegations concerning respondent, we fail to see how he could do so. ¶ 73 In addition, we note the trial court found there was good cause to allow Diaz to testify remotely, in accordance with Rule 241. Given Diaz’s representation that she had a family member who was particularly vulnerable to severe illness if the family member contracted COVID-19, we do not disagree with that finding, particularly where respondent has not identified any instance in which he was unable to question Diaz or specified how he was prejudiced. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (adopted May 22, 2020). ¶ 74 We acknowledge the trial court made no finding of good cause with respect to Timoti, who also testified remotely. However, respondent has not raised any issue on appeal concerning Timoti’s remote testimony, and we will not advocate on his behalf. - 24 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 ¶ 75 In sum, the record shows the trial court carefully considered the competing interests, the rights at issue, respondent’s arguments, and the fact that proceeding fully in person would cause additional delay, which was not in H.B.’s or any other party’s best interests, and found it was proper to proceed in a hybrid manner. Under the facts of this case, we cannot say the trial court’s decision was unreasonable. ¶ 76 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 77 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County. ¶ 78 Affirmed. - 25 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 No. 2-21-0404 Cite as: In re H.B., 2022 IL App (2d) 210404 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 18-JA-21; the Hon. Kathryn Karayannis, Judge, presiding. Attorneys Ronald L. Haskell, of St. Charles, for appellant. for Appellant: Attorneys Jamie L. Mosser, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick for Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Adam Trejo, of State’s Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People. - 26 -