ex post facto clause in Illinois

2016See Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 387-89 (the duty to register under SORA did not constitute punishment as the law had the non-penal purpose of protecting children from sexual crimes and aiding law enforcement in monitoring sexual offenders); Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 23 1-15-3047 at 419-24 (rejecting the defendant's ex post facto challenge to SORA and the Notification Law and finding that their intent was protection of the public, not punishment); Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 207-09 (holding that the amendment to the Notification Law providing for dissemination of sex offender information on the Internet did

2014App. 3d 405, 409 (2008) (citing People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 207 (2004)). "[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of 'disadvantage,' *** but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 506 n. 3 (1995).

2002The fact that Public Act 89-637 may work to Toia's "disadvantage" does not necessarily implicate ex post facto principles. "[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' * * * but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 506 n 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 , 595 n. 3 (1995); Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill.2d 225, 229 , 227 Ill.Dec. 942 , 688 N.E.2d 6

2002The fact that Public Act 89-637 may work to Toia's "disadvantage" does not necessarily implicate ex post facto principles. "[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' * * * but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 506 n 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 , 595 n. 3 (1995); Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill.2d 225, 229 , 227 Ill.Dec. 942 , 688 N.E.2d 6

2000Moreover, the ex post facto clause is aimed at laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , Ill L.

2000Moreover, the ex post facto clause is aimed at laws that "retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts." Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 111 L.

2011To establish an ex post facto violation, the defendant must show that the law in question was applied to events that occurred before its enactment and disadvantaged the defendant “by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997).

2011To establish an ex post facto violation, the defendant must show that the law in question was applied to events that occurred before its enactment and disadvantaged the defendant “by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997).

2012See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104-05 (2003) (holding a retroactive Alaska law requiring sex offenders and child kidnappers to register as such did not violate the ex post facto doctrine because the purpose of the registration requirement was to protect the public). ¶ 24 In support of its argument, the State cites Neville, 376 Ill.

2012App. 3d at 1119-20 , 878 N.E.2d at 834-35 , where this court held the imposition of electronic monitoring by the Parole Review Board (Board) as a condition of MSR did not violate the ex post facto doctrine.

2014(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 421 (2000). ¶ 55 The United States and Illinois Supreme Courts have consistently held that the retroactive application of sex offender registration is not “punishment” prohibited by the ex post facto clause.

2014(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 421 (2000). ¶ 55 The United States and Illinois Supreme Courts have consistently held that the retroactive application of sex offender registration is not "punishment" prohibited by the ex post facto clause.

2002The fact that Public Act 89-637 may work to Toia's "disadvantage" does not necessarily implicate ex post facto principles. "[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' * * * but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 506 n 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 , 595 n. 3 (1995); Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill.2d 225, 229 , 227 Ill.Dec. 942 , 688 N.E.2d 6

2002The fact that Public Act 89-637 may work to Toia's "disadvantage" does not necessarily implicate ex post facto principles. "[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' * * * but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 506 n 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 , 595 n. 3 (1995); Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill.2d 225, 229 , 227 Ill.Dec. 942 , 688 N.E.2d 6

2023This long- standing rule is consistent with the decision in Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632 (2003), where the Supreme Court declared a California statute that allowed for the prosecution of time- barred cases to be an ex post facto violation, but “to hold that such a law is ex post facto does not prevent the State from extending time limits for the prosecution of future offenses, or for prosecutions not yet time barred.” ¶ 28 Here, defendant committed this offense on April 26, 2008, and under the general statute of limitations in effect at that time, the limitation period for his pros

2022See Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 (stating that laws extending the statute of limitations after it has expired violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution but, conversely, the ex post facto clause does not prevent the State from extending the statute of limitations for crimes that are not time-barred); see also Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d at 440 ; see also People v. Stone, 374 Ill.

2014"Our supreme court has interpreted the ex post facto clause of the Illinois Constitution in accord with the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court." Hadley v. Montes, 379 Ill.

2014To establish an ex post facto violation, a " 'plaintiff must show the following: (1) a legislative change; (2) the change imposed a punishment; and (3) the punishment is greater than the punishment that existed at the time the crime was committed.' " Hadley, 379 Ill.

1998See, e.g. , Virgin Islands v. D.W. , 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3rd Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government's argument that "because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause"); Commonwealth v. Kelley , 411 Mass. 212, 215-16 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (Mass. 1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile's commitment, despite acknowledging that "the juvenile justice system is not a penal system"); United Stat

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998Medley , 134 U.S. at 171 , 10 S.Ct. at 387 (suggesting that, to rise to the level of an ex post facto violation, a change in conditions of confinement--unlike an alteration in the length of confinement-- must be imposed for a punitive purpose).

1998Ed. at 840 , 10 S. Ct. at 387 (suggesting that, to rise to the level of an ex post facto violation, a change in conditions of confinement — unlike an alteration in the length of confinement — must be imposed for a punitive purpose).

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998See Knox , 895 F.Supp. at 756-58 (change of policy requiring transfer of inmates from minimum security or work release to medium security facility, when combined with unwritten requirement of work release for parole eligibility, constitutes a violation of the ex post facto clause).

1998See Knox, 895 F. Supp. at 756-58 (change of policy requiring transfer of inmates from minimum security or work release to medium security facility, when combined with unwritten requirement of work release for parole eligibility, constitutes a violation of the ex post facto clause).

1998See, e.g. , Virgin Islands v. D.W. , 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3rd Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government's argument that "because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause"); Commonwealth v. Kelley , 411 Mass. 212, 215-16 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (Mass. 1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile's commitment, despite acknowledging that "the juvenile justice system is not a penal system"); United Stat

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

1998See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 701 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding retroactive imposition of fine on juvenile violated ex post facto principles, rejecting government’s argument that “because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause”); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 411 Mass. 212, 216 , 581 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (1991) (striking down retroactive extension of juvenile’s commitment, despite acknowledging that “the juvenile justice system is not a penal system”); United States v. Juvenil

2020Id. at 1011 .

2009Kotecki, 279 Ill.

1999This court recently rejected an ex post facto challenge to the Registration Act in People v. Logan, 302 Ill.

1999In Logan, we analyzed the punitive effect of the Registration Act in the context of an ex post facto challenge and concluded that “the purpose of the registration and notification provisions is to protect the public and not to punish sex offenders and that their effect is not punitive.” Logan, 302 Ill.

1999People v. Granados , 172 Ill. 2d 358, 367 , 666 N.E.2d 1191 (1996).

1999People v. Granados , 172 Ill. 2d 358, 367 , 666 N.E.2d 1191 (1996).

2001In Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n, 594 F.2d 170, 175 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit held that the “deprivation of all opportunity to be released on parole also comes within the scope of [the ex post facto] clause.” Like the accrual of CGCs, being paroled is not a certainty.

1980Appellant also contends that the cases of Rodriguez v. United States Parole Com. (7th Cir. 1979), 594 F.2d 170 , and Geraghty v. United States Parole Com. (3d Cir. 1978), 579 F.2d 238 , mandate a finding that the rules of the Prisoner Review Board and section 3—3—5(c)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections worked to his substantial disadvantage and were applied retroactively in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Federal Constitution.