James E. Wilson, Judge.

Respondent Neil E. Schultz acquired a promissory note from the nonparty promisee, George Soetje, in 2018. The promissory note, executed in 2003, was secured by a deed of trust to a parcel of land at 2355 Columbia Way, Carson City ("the property"). Appellant Thomas L. Cornwell had acquired title to the property in 2017 via a quitclaim deed granted to him by nonparty Karen Lynn Clarke, the promisor to the 2003 promissory note. Cornwell lives in a mobile home classified as personal property, to which he does not retain title, that sits on the property. Schultz initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure of the property following his acquisition and recordation of the assignment of the deed of trust. The Neil E. Schultz Trust, of which Schultz is a trustee, purchased the property at the trustee's sale. Schultz filed this quiet title action after Cornwell refused to leave the property. After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Schultz acquired superior title to the property pursuant to a valid nonjudicial foreclosure because the promissory note, secured by the deed of trust to the property, was in default. This appeal followed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting hearsay testimony, and substantial evidence otherwise supports the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law Cornwell argues that Schultz relied exclusively on inadmissible hearsay evidence to prove the default of the promissory note: (1) a sworn declaration by Soetje that Clarke failed to make any payments on the note since June 2010;1 (2) testimony by Schultz that Soetje told him that the last payment made on the note occurred in 2010; (3) Cornwell's testimony, which Schultz characterizes as corroborative of his own testimony, that Soetje told Cornwell "that no payments had been made on the [promissory] note since May 2010," but that Cornwell "ignored these statements," instead believing that Clarke "was making at least some paymente; and (4) a handwritten note from Soetje to a title company in which Soetje listed the principal balance, interest, and fees outstanding on the promissory note at the time Schultz acquired it. Cornwell contends that because Schultz failed to offer admissible evidence, the "district court improperly relied on" these pieces of inadmissible hearsay to conclude that Schultz acquired superior title, and Schultz failed to prove his quiet-title claim without these pieces of evidence.^[2] We disagree.

1We do not consider whether the declaration was inadmissible hearsay because the district court never admitted it into evidence.

We defer to the district court's findings of fact so long as substantial evidence supports them. Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev. 99, 105, 294 P.3d 427, 432 (2013). We define "substantial evidence as that which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Bacher v. Office of State Ener of Nev., 122 Nev. 1110, 1121, 146 P.3d 793, 800 (2006) (quoting State Enip't Sec. Dep't v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986)). Additionally, we review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hansen v. Universal Health Servs. of Nev., Inc., 115 Nev. 24, 27, 974 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1999). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Skender v. Brunsonbuilt Constr. & Dev. Co., 122 Nev. 1430, 1435, 148 P.3d 710, 714 (2006).

Even if Cornwell's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, and the district court improperly admitted it, the error did not affect the outcome because Schultz's trustee's deed provided evidence for a reasonable mind to accept as sufficient to support the finding of fact that a default occurred.^[3] Indeed, the district court's findings of fact do not even reference the law does not "protect him from the consequences of failing to comply with" evidentiary rules and appellate procedure. See Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, L.L.C., 134 Nev. 654, 659, 428 P.3d 255, 259 (2018), modified on other grounds, Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 471 n.6, 469 P.3d 176, 180 n.6 (2020).

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the challenged portion of Cornwell's testimony. Instead, the district court referred repeatedly to the recitals contained in the trustee's deed, which stated, in relevant part, that a missed payment in June 2010, and continued missed payments thereafter, formed the basis to declare the note in default. Cornwell did not and does not challenge the authenticity of the deed, the admission of the deed into evidence, or the district court's reliance on the deed. See Back Streets, Inc. v. Campbell, 95 Nev. 651, 653, 601 P.2d 54, 55 (1979) (concluding that the "right to object to the evidence" on appeal was "waive& for failure to object to the evidence at its admission). Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the district court's factual and legal conclusions on the status of the note, regardless of whether Cornwell's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.1 The district court did not shift the burden of proof to Cornwell to prove superior title Cornwell contends that the district court's consideration of Cornwell's failure to provide admissible documentation to support his list of purported payments made towards the promissory note to conclude Schultz held superior title "improperly shift[ed] the burden of proof to" Cornwell. We disagree.

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We review de novo the district court's application of the legal principles of burdens of production and persuasion. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 (2014). We conclude that the district court did not shift the burden to Cornwell to prove the quiet-title claim, see W. Sunset 2050 Tr. v. Nationstar Mortg., 134 Nev. 352, 354, 420 P.3d 1032, 1034-35 (2018) (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden to prove "good title (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918 P.2d 314, 318 (1996))), because the court merely permitted Cornwell to come forward with rebuttal evidence to show that payments were made, cf. Weaver v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 501, 117 P.3d 193, 198 (2005) (concluding that the decision to allow a party to present evidence to rebut the administrative law judge's conclusion "did not shift the burden of proof'). Contrary to Cornwell's argument, the district court referenced Cornwell's general failure to provide any documentation or proof to substantiate his testimony that Clarke made the payments, despite that he did not make the payments and that he did not know whether Clarke missed payments. As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the fact of default. Without any rebuttal evidence from Cornwell, that evidence supported the foreclosure. Thus, the district court did not improperly shift the burden to Cornwell to prove that he held superior title.5 Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

(0) I947A ciajrc, cc: Ron. James E. Wilson, District Judge

Garman Turner Gordon John Bartlett, Attorney at Law Carson City Clerk Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Barbara E. Buckley, Executive Director Anne R. Traurn, Coordinator, Appellate Litigation Section, I ro Bono Committee, State Bar of Nevada 101 I947A 4E4m,