MEMORANDUM OPINION

John D. Ferrara, acting pro se, filed this appeal from the trial court’s denial of relief on his “Application for Pre-Indictment Habeas Corpus Relief Motion to Di[s]miss Prosecution.” 1 For the following reasons, we will dismiss this appeal as moot.

On April 23, 2020, a Hays County magistrate issued a warrant commanding Ferrara’s arrest for the felony offense of stalking. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.072. The probable- cause affidavit accompanying the warrant alleged that Ferrara committed the offense on or about April 15, 2020. Ferrara was arrested and booked on May 27, 2020, in Bexar County. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.06 (providing that arrest warrant extends to any part of Texas and misdemeanor arraignment. The harassment charge against Ferrara was later dismissed on the State’s motion, as shown by the district court’s January 28, 2022 order. Thus, the harassment charge in cause number 21-2259-CR-1 is no longer pending against Ferrara, and he has no bond obligations concerning this dismissed charge. See Apodaca Bail Bonds v. State, 720 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, no pet.) (reversing judgment against bail-bond company because “[o]nce the defendant was discharged, the obligation of [the surety] was terminated,” even though defendant was later indicted on different charge); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.08(5) (providing that sureties on bail bond are not bound after defendant is “dismissed from the charge”).

Ferrara then filed an “emergency motion to release unlawful restraint” in this appeal, arguing that he must still report to a bail bondsman under the original bail bond on his arrest for stalking. There is no evidence that the surety has asserted any such continuing duty under the original bail bond. But even if the original bail bond had not been changed to a personal bond, the State acknowledged that it was considering only misdemeanor charges and that it had two years to bring them against Ferrara for the conduct leading to his arrest. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.02. The two-year limitations period expired on April 15, 2022, without the filing of any charge besides the one for harassment that was ultimately dismissed. Thus, Ferrara has no remaining obligation to report to a bondsman under the original bail bond.

“The longstanding rule in Texas regarding habeas corpus is that ‘where the premise of a habeas corpus application is destroyed by subsequent developments, the legal issues raised thereunder are moot.’” Ex parte Guerrero, 99 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (quoting Bennet v. State, 818 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.)). Here, because Ferrara has been relieved of the requirement that he report to a bail bondsman, which was the basis for his habeas application, his appeal complaining of the trial court’s ruling on that application is moot. See Ex parte Sutherland, 451 S.W.2d 913, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (dismissing habeas appeal as moot because State dismissed criminal charges); Ex parte Shapiro, 233 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950) (dismissing habeas appeal as moot because “the very thing he was complaining of in the habeas corpus hearing has been removed”). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Smith Dismissed as Moot Filed: May 17, 2022 Do Not Publish