Wooldridge v. Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). · Go Syfert
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Wooldridge v. Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, 2002–2025 · …generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm. at p. 639 ✓
91 citation events (89 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: H.M. v. M.S. (massappct, 2025-02-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) H.M. v. M.S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling 5 aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Charles D. Clarke v. Donna M. Murphy.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a party claiming an insufficiency of evidence, therefore, has the burden on appeal of furnishing the court with all the evidence
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) N.M. v. B.S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Pagliarini v. Iannaco
Mass. App. Ct. · 2003 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a party claiming an insufficiency of the evidence . . . has the burden on appeal of furnishing the court with all the evidence
cited Cited as authority (rule) M.D. v. E.B.P.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
See Allen v. Allen, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 405 (2016); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998). 3 § 1." Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 739-740 (2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) A.M. v. B.G.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
Indeed, the record establishes that the proceedings were fair and that various future proceedings, see Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998), we pass over this question. 5 the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
cited Cited as authority (rule) L.L.-m. v. E.L.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
To the extent that the husband challenges the lawfulness of the Northampton Order, see Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998), we address the merits of the claims.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) H.S. v. N.S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
Court Dep't, 425 Mass. 1020, 1020 (1997) (serving lawsuits insufficient basis for 209A order); Wooldridge v. 6 Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998) (belief that 209A order "would level the field in [a] forthcoming custody and support discussion . . . [is] not an appropriate criterion for issuance of an abuse prevention order").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.S. v. G.S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
Additionally, "[g]eneralized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm." Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) L.F. v. E.K.F.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
The defendant's reliance on Dollan v. Dollan, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (2002), where "the judge appears to have based the issuance of the order of part (b) of the definition," and Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998), where the plaintiff "never speaks of having suffered physical harm," is misplaced where the order is based on actual physical abuse.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C.N. v. R.A.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
L. c. 209A . . . [and] has a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record.'" Smith v. Jones, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 (2006), quoting Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B.C. v. M.A.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
In support of his position, the defendant cites Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998), which sets forth the principle that "[g]eneralized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, . . . when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm." In Wooldridge, we vacated a 209A order applying to the parties' children because "[t]he most that [the plaintiff] said about the children, other than that they were subjected to verbal harassment by [the defendant], is that [the defendant] 'has hit m…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) E.W. v. M.W.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Additionally, "[g]eneralized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is 4 no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm." Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maureen Weeks v. Estate of Patricia Powers.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Moreover, even if we were inclined to reach the merits of Weeks's sufficiency of the evidence arguments, we are unable to do so because, again, she failed to provide us with the trial record.6 See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 641 (1998) ("A party claiming 6 Weeks's submission of excerpts of her trial testimony in this appeal does not satisfy her obligation to produce the necessary trial record.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.C. v. B.B. (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
"Generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress . . ., when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm." Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yahna Y. v. Sylvester S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
"Generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm." Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) V.M. v. R.B.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
See C.R.S. v. J.M.S., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 561, 565 (2017); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998). 5 1.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of F.C.
Mass. · 2018 · confidence medium
Although we conclude that a patient's continuing interest in removing stigma associated with an involuntary commitment is sufficient to require an appeal to be decided on its merits, we recognize that the statute itself may implicate ongoing Federal collateral consequences, providing an 3 Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (abuse prevention order).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Susan Chretien v. Russell Chretien (2×)
Me. · 2017 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614 , 277 P.3d 811, 815 (App. 2012); Putman v. Kennedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 900 A.2d 1256, 1258-59 (2006); Hamilton v. Lethem, 119 Hawai’i 1, 193 P.3d 839, 849 (2008); Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Piper v. Layman, 125 Md.App. 745 , 726 A.2d 887, 891 (1999); E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558 , 984 N.E.2d 787 , 791 n.12 (2013) (citing Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 637 , 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1998)); Smith v. Smith, 145 N.C.App. 434 , 549 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2001); Hudson v. Hudson, 328 S.W.3d 863, 865-66 (Tenn. 2010). [¶9] The…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. Allen (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mass. App. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 594 (1995); E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558 , 561 n.12 (2013); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998); Smith v. Jones, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 (2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quinn v. Gjoni
Mass. App. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Gjoni argues that the second *414 judge’s flat prohibition on cross-examination deprived him of that opportunity. 12 See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (because abuse prevention orders have important collateral consequences, even after such an order has expired, a defendant “has a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued”). 13 While the judge marked the order as having been “TERMINATED,” the docket itself refers to the order as having been “VACATED” (consistent with how Quinn phrased the relief she requested in he…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Hunt
Mass. App. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 62 (2014); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998); Smith v. Jones, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 (2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence v. Gauthier
Mass. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
L. c. 209A or in bail proceedings . . . [and] has a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record.’ Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (citation omitted).” See also Dollan v. Dollan, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 905 , 905 n.2 (2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vazquez v. Vazquez
virginislands · 2010 · confidence medium
Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Haw. 1 , 193 P.3d 839, 846-47 (2008); Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting “potentially devastating” collateral consequences for parent of expired “child in need of services” order, including impacts on future presentence investigations, in-court impeachments, and child custody determinations); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637 , 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1998) (holding appeal from abuse prevention order not moot due to order’s expiration because of collateral consequences, including effect in future proceedings and “stigma�…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Argueta
Mass. App. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
See Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592 , 594 & n.2 (1995); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brewster Wallcovering Co. v. Blue Mountain Wallcoverings, Inc.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 641 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Smith
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
L. c. 209A or in bail proceedings . . . [and] has a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record.” Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (citation omitted). 5 A plaintiff may obtain a temporary protective order in an ex parte proceeding, provided that the defendant is given an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing within ten court business days after the ex parte order is entered.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ginsberg v. Blacker
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
Ct. Dept., 425 Mass. 1020, 1020-1021 (1997) (sending notices of a future lawsuit and court proceedings insufficient); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639-641 (1998) (conclusory assertions of ex-husband’s having been “abusive” and “verbally abusive” without factual details, and with no explanation of why ex-wife felt apprehension of imminent physical harm, except unelabo-rated “[b]ecause,” insufficient); Uttaro v. Uttaro, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 874-875 (complainant’s fear of being arrested for violating an outstanding c. 209A order insufficient); Carroll v. Kartell, 5…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corrado v. Hedrick
Mass. App. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 521 (1995) (statute requires appropriate law enforcement agency to destroy record of vacated orders); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (defendant has surviving interest in establishing order not lawfully issued to remove stigma from his name and record and collateral use in future proceedings); Jones v. Gallagher, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 883, 887 (2002); Dollan v. Dollan, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 905 , 905 n.2 (2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vittone v. Clairmont
Mass. App. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
Ct. Dept., 425 Mass. 1020, 1020 (1997); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998); Uttaro v. Uttaro, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 873-874 (2002); Jones v. Gallagher, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 883, 888-889 (2002); Carroll v. Kartell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 85-87 (2002); Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 286-288 (2003); Keene v. Gangi, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 669-671 (2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keene v. Gangi
Mass. App. Ct. · 2004 · confidence medium
L. c. 209A, § 1, that she was “in fear of imminent serious physical harm.” 5 As stated in Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998): “Generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Szymkowski v. Szymkowski
Mass. App. Ct. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592 , 593-594 & n.2 (1995); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. Kartell
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 344-345 (1990); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638-639 (1998).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Dollan v. Dollan (4×) also: Cited "see"
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
“Generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm.” Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998), citing Larkin v. Ayer Div. of the Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Gallagher
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
Issuance of an order effects entry of that order in the Commonwealth’s criminal records system, and the order can have an adverse effect upon the defendant in any future c. 209A proceeding and in certain future bail proceedings. 3 Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Uttaro v. Uttaro (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638-639 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Villalobos
Mass. App. Ct. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592 , 594 & n.2 (1995) (a vacated 209A order is not moot as even vacated orders may have adverse consequences in future requests for orders and bail proceedings); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith Ex Rel. Smith v. Smith (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.C. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
The Piper court, therefore, held appeals from expired domestic violence protective orders are not moot because of the “stigma that is likely to attach to a person judicially determined to have committed [domestic] abuse.” Id. see also Wooldridge v. Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding the defendant’s appeal of expired domestic violence protective order was not moot).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pike v. Maguire
Mass. App. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
She could rationally conclude therefrom that the plaintiff (whose repeatedly expressed fear of the defendant was conceded to be genuine by his counsel, contrast Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639, 641 [1998]), continued to have the same reasonable fear of physical harm that had supported the issuance of the restraining order sought to be extended, as well as the prior orders dating back to 1991.
cited Cited "see" D.S. v. C.A.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998).
cited Cited "see" L.E. v. V.E.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldrige v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998).
discussed Cited "see" S.G. v. R.S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998). 2 v. Community Ass'n Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 470 (2012) (discussing standard of review of denials of motions for reconsideration).
examined Cited "see" T.M. v. T.M. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mass. App. Ct. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 639 (conclusory assertions of defendant having been "abusive" and "verbally abusive" without factual details).
cited Cited "see" L.L. v. D.M.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge , 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 638 .
cited Cited "see" C.R.S. v. J.M.S.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998); Dollan v. Dollan, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 905 , 905 n.2 (2002).
discussed Cited "see" C.R.S. v. J.M.S. (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge v. Hickey , 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637 , 638, 700 N.E.2d 296 (1998) ; Dollan v. Dollan , 55 Mass. App. Ct. 905 , 905 n.2, 771 N.E.2d 825 (2002).
discussed Cited "see" Gassman v. Reason
Mass. App. Ct. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (party challenging legality of abuse prevention orders has ‘a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record’)- ‘[A] wrongfully issued harassment prevention order [pursuant to G.
discussed Cited "see" Seney v. Morhy
Mass. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (party challenging legality of abuse prevention orders has “a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record”). “[A] wrongfully issued harassment prevention order [pursuant to G.
discussed Cited "see" E.C.O. v. Compton
Mass. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Jones, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 (2006), quoting Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (“Notwithstanding that both the ex parte and the extension orders have expired, the appeal is not moot.
discussed Cited "see" Tucker v. Diamond
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Woldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637 (1992); Brown v. Perkins, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 145 . (3) Anticinatorv Breach Diamond also argues that the judgment entered against him should be reversed because anticipatory breach of contract is not recognized under Massachusetts law.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Denise E. Wooldridge
v.
Steven C. Hickey
No. 97-P-0551.
Massachusetts Appeals Court.
Oct 13, 1998.
700 N.E.2d 296
1998 Mass. App. LEXIS 1112
Joanne I. DelLong for the defendant.
Kass.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published
Kass, J.

On the ground that the record is devoid of any evidence of abuse in the statutory (G. L. c. 209A) sense, Stephen Hickey appeals from abuse prevention orders issued against him by a Probate Court judge. Although the record induces concern that, notwithstanding an absence of evidence of abuse, the judge may have acceded to the use of c. 209A orders as a bargaining chip in connection with pending proceedings for modification of a divorce judgment, Hickey has left a crucial gap in the record that causes us to leave the main order undisturbed. The appeal is properly before us under Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass. 679, 682 (1996), and an order of a single justice allowing late filing of a notice of appeal.

1. Circumstances of the c. 209A orders. Under a divorce judgment that issued some years before the proceedings now[*638] under review, Wooldridge and Hickey had joint legal custody of their three children and Hickey had physical custody of them. Before she applied for an abuse prevention order, Wooldridge had filed a complaint for modification of the divorce judgment.[1] Although that judgment had placed physical custody of the children with Hickey, the children had, apparently, come to spend more time with their mother, Wooldridge, than their father, Hickey. Disputes about responsibility and financial obligations continued to roil between Wooldridge and Hickey. Following Wooldridge’s application for a c. 209A order, the judge issued three sets of orders: first, on September 4, 1996, he issued ex parte orders directing Hickey to stay away from Wooldridge and, somewhat anomalously, from the three children of whom he had physical custody and joint legal custody; second, an order issued September 12, after hearing, that extended the abuse prevention order requiring Hickey to stay away from Wooldridge until November 26; third, on that latter date, the judge extended the order for an additional six months.

2. Mootness. Although the abuse prevention orders have expired, Hickey’s appeal is not moot. Entries of the orders against Hickey have now been made in the Commonwealth’s criminal records system, and Hickey could be adversely affected by them in the event of future applications for an order under G. L. c. 209A or in bail proceedings. Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 593-594 (1995). Hickey has a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record. Section 7, third par., of G. L. c. 209A provides that whenever an abuse prevention order is vacated, the court shall direct the appropriate law enforcement agency to destroy all record of the vacated order. See Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 521 (1995). As to the limited nature of that destruction (it does not extend to expunging records from the Statewide domestic violence record-keeping system created by St. 1992, c. 188, § 7), see Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 155-159 (1997). Contrast Wotan v. Kegan, 428 Mass. 1003 (1998).

3. Evidence of abuse. For purposes of obtaining a protective order under G. L. c. 209A, abuse means: “(a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of[*639] imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress.” G. L. c. 209A, § 1, as appearing in St. 1990, c. 403, § 2. Generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm. Larkin v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dept., 425 Mass. 1020 (1997). The judge must focus on whether serious physical harm is imminent and should not issue a c. 209A order on the theory that it will do no harm, i.e., “seems to be a good idea or because it will not cause the defendant any real inconvenience.” Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. at 523 n.l.

In the transcript of the proceedings in the Probate Court, Wooldridge never speaks of having suffered physical harm; of being in fear of imminent serious physical harm; or of having been caused through force to engage in unwanted sexual relations.[2] In the main, what Wooldridge had to say to the judge was that there seemed to be no reasonable negotiating with her former husband and that she could not stand arguing with him. She thought a protective order would level the field in the forthcoming custody and support discussion — obviously not an appropriate criterion for issuance of an abuse prevention order. During the ex parte hearing, in particular, Wooldridge spoke only of Hickey having been “abusive” and “verbally abusive.” There was no questioning that explored what she meant by that. The following excerpt from the transcript of the second hearing (following the ex parte one) conveys the flavor of her testimony on that occasion:

The Court: “Right, but why does that cause you to feel that you need a restraining order to be in force? Are you getting hate mail from him or you just —”
[*640] Ms. Wooldridge: “No, (inaudible) — I couldn’t get what I needed from the divorce (inaudible) because there’s no negotiations (inaudible).”
The Court: “But does he do more than that, does he threaten you, does he —”
Ms. Wooldridge: “He wants (inaudible).”
Ms. Dulong: “I would object to that. She wrote something up, your honor. I’m not (inaudible) she’s going to testify. I haven’t had a chance to see it.”
The Court: “Is that a recitation of some prior incidents?”
Ms. Wooldridge: “Yes, just to explain to you what I had to go through the first time and letters from people that (inaudible).”
The Court: “But my question to you is why do you feel you need the additional protection of an order for abuse and to stay away from your residence and not contact you, which if you didn’t have you feel you’d be subject to some danger or imminent physical harm?”
Ms. Wooldridge: “Yes.”
The Court: “Why? Why do you feel thafl”
Ms. Wooldridge: “Because (inaudible).”
The Court: “That was when you were living with him, right? You were married?”
Ms. Wooldridge: “That was when we negotiated our divorce. Every time (inaudible).”
The Court: “Okay. And what’s happened recently? You’ve been separated for seven years?”
Ms. Wooldridge: “Yeah, and the divorce says that I do what I do, and there was just fighting about everything; it was just literally no child support payments, take care of all the important issues (inaudible), and there is no attempt, you know, at discussion, there’s just intimidation,[*641] there’s threats he’s going to take them away from me, threatens them he’s going to take them away from me. My children depend on me.”
The Court: “So you feel the ability to seek legal redress on the relative responsibilities to the children under the divorce, you feel that you have unequal abilities to negotiate with him because of his intimidating tactics, is that what you’re saying?”
Ms. Wooldridge: “Yes.”

(Emphasis supplied). The questions that the judge put to Wooldridge that we have italicized show that he had not lost sight of the central importance of the fear of imminent serious physical harm in these cases. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 348-349 (1990). The judge inquires of Wooldridge why she feels she is subject to some danger of imminent physical harm. Wooldridge merely responds, “Yes.” The judge then asks, “Why? Why do you feel that?” The transcript reads, “Because,” and then, just short of the meat in the coconut, reads “(inaudible).” The answer may have described past physical harm and fear of a repeat performance that gave the judge a basis for his order.[3] We are not prepared, as a reviewing court, to hypothesize the absence of a response that might support a finding of fear of imminent serious physical harm. It is, of course, the burden of an appellant to provide us with those portions of the record that support his claims on appeal. Arch Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Bartlett Health Enterprises, Inc., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 406 (1992). A party claiming an insufficiency of evidence, therefore, has the burden on appeal of furnishing the court with all the evidence. Gaps in an audio record of the kind that appeared here can be repaired by using the procedure set out in Mass.RA.P. 8(b)(3)(v), as amended, 388 Mass. 1110 (1983), captioned: “Unintelligible Portions of the Cassette.”

On the basis of the record, as it was allowed to stand, we[*642] shall not disturb the issuance of the protective order issued September 12, 1996, directing Hickey to stay away from Wooldridge. There was no evidence that warranted issuance of the ex parte order of September 4, but that order was subsumed by the posthearing order of September 12. There was no evidence of imminent serious physical harm to the children. The most that Wooldridge said about the children, other than that they were subjected to verbal harassment by their father, is that their father “has hit my son and grabs him when angry.” Without further explanation, that statement was not evidence of abuse within the meaning of the statute.

The orders of September 12 and November 26, 1996, directing the defendant Hickey to stay away from Wooldridge are affirmed. The order to him to stay away from his children is vacated. The Probate Court judge shall cause a direction to be sent, conformably with G. L. c. 209A, § 7, third par., for the destruction of all record of the vacated order.

So ordered.

1

record contains neither the judgment of divorce nor the complaint for modification. We know of the existence of those documents from testimony during the c. 209A hearings but know few of their details.

2

Counsel for Hickey did not include the transcript of the proceedings in the Probate Court in the record appendix. Abuse prevention orders and their review on appeal are civil in nature, not criminal. Transcript of proceedings in the trial court does not automatically come before us.. An appellate court is free to disregard argument based on transcript not furnished to the court. Kunen v. First Agric. Natl. Bank, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 684, 689 (1978). Arch Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Bartlett Health Enterprises, Inc., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 406 (1992). As matter of discretion, we sent on our own motion to the register of probate in Franklin County, who furnished us with a copy of the transcript, but under the cases cited, we were not bound so to do.

3

It did not escape our notice that, in continuing his colloquy with Wooldridge, the judge remarks, “Okay,” and then asks, “And what’s happened recently?” Wooldridge’s response describes no current conduct that amplifies her earlier claim of fear of some imminent physical harm. We do not think, however, that this exchange justifies an assumption on our part that Wooldridge’s response recorded as inaudible gave the trial judge nothing to go on to support his ultimate finding and order.