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13 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Silvia v. Duartegreen2 sentences2011See C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. 648, 657 (2004) (“[W]hile a judge may limit cross-examination for ‘good cause’ in certain situations, see Silvia v. Duarte, 421 Mass. 1007, 1008 [1995]; Fritado v. Fritado, [420 Mass.] at 597-598, judicial discretion is not ‘unlimited,’ and ‘each side must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge each other’s evidence.’ Fritado v. Fritado, supra at 598 n.5”). 2004While a defendant’s right to present evidence is not absolute, and while a judge may limit cross-examination for “good cause” in certain situations, see Silvia v. Duarte, 421 Mass. 1007, 1008 (1995); Frizado v. Frizado, supra at 597-598 , judicial discretion is not “unlimited,” and “each side must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge each other’s evidence.” Frizado v. Frizado, supra at 598 n.5. | 2 | 2 |
Frizado v. Frizadogreen2 sentences2016However, a judge must in any event provide each side “a meaningful opportunity to challenge the other’s evidence.” Frizado v. Frizado, supra at 598 n.5, quoting from District Court’s Draft Standards of Judicial Practice, Abuse Prevention Proceedings § 5:01 (Dec., 1994). 2005Each side must have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the other’s evidence, but “the mies of evidence need not be followed, provided that there is fairness in what evidence is admitted and relied on.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597-598 (1995). | 1 | 3 |
IDRIS I. v. HAZEL H.green2 sentences2026"While a judge surely may exclude irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, or even interrupt an argument or a witness examination that has become repetitious, [s]he should not terminate a hearing without ensuring that [s]he has heard all the relevant and admissible evidence once." Id. at 790 , quoting S.T., 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 430-431 . 5 Although the judge declined to allow the defendant's request "to submit one more piece of evidence," the record demonstrates that the judge afforded the defendant a meaningful opportunity to challenge the plaintiff's evidence and to present his defense. 2025See Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 788 (2022) (defendant has right to opportunity to be heard at hearing on application for 209A order); Massachusetts Trial Court, Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings § 1:02 (Oct. 2021) ("Each party must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the other party's evidence in any contested hearing"). 8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority. 7 | 1 | 2 |
Myers v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851-852 (1973) (“primary function of the probable cause hearing of screening out ‘an erroneous or improper prosecution,’ .. . can only be effectuated by an adversary hearing where the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and to raise *490 any affirmative defenses he may have” [citation omitted]). 2002The centrality of the screening function, moreover, “can only be effectuated by an adversary hearing where the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and to raise any affirmative defenses he may have.” Id. at 852 . | 1 | 2 |
Wooldridge v. Hickeygreen1 sentence2016Gjoni argues that the second *414 judge’s flat prohibition on cross-examination deprived him of that opportunity. 12 See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (because abuse prevention orders have important collateral consequences, even after such an order has expired, a defendant “has a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued”). 13 While the judge marked the order as having been “TERMINATED,” the docket itself refers to the order as having been “VACATED” (consistent with how Quinn phrased the relief she requested in her motion). | 1 | 1 |
C.O. v. M.M.green1 sentence2011See C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. 648, 657 (2004) (“[W]hile a judge may limit cross-examination for ‘good cause’ in certain situations, see Silvia v. Duarte, 421 Mass. 1007, 1008 [1995]; Fritado v. Fritado, [420 Mass.] at 597-598, judicial discretion is not ‘unlimited,’ and ‘each side must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge each other’s evidence.’ Fritado v. Fritado, supra at 598 n.5”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Yeshulasgreen1 sentence2002Compare Commonwealth v. Nawn, supra at 6-9 ; Commonwealth v. Yeshulas, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 492-493 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Nawngreen1 sentence2002Compare Commonwealth v. Nawn, supra at 6-9 ; Commonwealth v. Yeshulas, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 492-493 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
S.T. v. E.M.
green
2 sentences2026"While a judge surely may exclude irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, or even interrupt an argument or a witness examination that has become repetitious, [s]he should not terminate a hearing without ensuring that [s]he has heard all the relevant and admissible evidence once." Id. at 790 , quoting S.T., 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 430-431 . 5 Although the judge declined to allow the defendant's request "to submit one more piece of evidence," the record demonstrates that the judge afforded the defendant a meaningful opportunity to challenge the plaintiff's evidence and to present his defense. 2022S.T., supra at 431 . | 2 | 2022–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Christian
green
2 sentences2018Christian, 430 Mass. at 563 . 2017Christian , 430 Mass. at 563 , 722 N.E.2d 416 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Goldstein
neutral
2 sentences1973As Chief Justice Holmes noted in Commonwealth v. Goldstein, 180 Mass. 374, 376 , "It certainly might be thought likely that if a plain man ... were charged with such a crime and knew that several persons could prove that he was at home at the time, he would say so and would make some effort to produce them. 1973As Chief Justice Holmes noted in Commonwealth v. Goldstein, 180 Mass. 374, 376 , “It certainly might be thought likely that if a plain man . . . were charged with such a crime and knew that several persons could prove that he was at home at the time, he would say so and would make some effort to produce them. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.