United States v. Donald B. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Donald B. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“section 301 generally preempts state law claims that implicate 21 a collective-bargaining agreement, except for claims that (1) arise independently of a cba, and 22 (2) don't substantially depend on analysis of a cba.”
35 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: DiMercurio v. Equilon Enterprises LLC (cand, 2020-01-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a) cited 4× in this case · 54 total citations of statute #1 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(1) cited 2× in this case · 4 total citations of statute #1 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(4)(B) cited 1× in this case · 5 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) DiMercurio v. Equilon Enterprises LLC
N.D. Cal. · 2020 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
section 301 generally preempts state law claims that implicate 21 a collective-bargaining agreement, except for claims that (1) arise independently of a cba, and 22 (2) don't substantially depend on analysis of a cba.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service
D. Ariz. · 2024 · confidence medium
Bank of the United States, 894 20 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2018)); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emerson v. Najera
D. Nev. · 2024 · confidence medium
To satisfy the 13 exhaustion requirement, a claim must have been raised through one complete round of either 14 direct appeal or collateral proceedings to the highest state court level of review available. 15 O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844–45; Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 16 banc). 17 A properly exhausted claim “‘must include reference to a specific federal constitutional 18 guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Woods, 764 19 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 , 162–63 (1996)) and D…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Billing Associates Northwest LLC v. Addison Data Services LLC
W.D. Wash. · 2023 · confidence medium
Mont. 2022); Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 20 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) (HC) Graham v. Foss
E.D. Cal. · 2021 · confidence medium
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 17 U.S. 27 , 29 (2004); Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he petitioner 18 must . . . provide the state court with the operative facts, that is, ‘all of the facts necessary to give 19 application to the constitutional principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.’” Davis v. Silva, 511 20 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 21 1958)). 22 Where a federal habeas petitioner has failed to exhaust a claim in the state courts 23 according to these principles, he may ask the federal court t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schmuckley v. Rite Aid Corporation
E.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (“It is well settled that the United 27 States is not . . . subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights.”) (citation omitted); (citing 28 United States v. Menatos, 925 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The government is not subject to 1 the defense of laches when enforcing its rights.”) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on 2 other grounds, as recognized in United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1994)). 3 However, the law on this issue is not as clear-cut as plaintiffs contend.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Saint Martin's University v. Carmen Flores & John Doe Flores
Wash. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mark Falcon (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, as recognized in United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franklin Paulus v. US Department of Education
9th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(2) (the United States may at any time bring an action for the repayment of a loan obtained under Title IV of the Higher Education Act and assigned to the Department); United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994) (HETA retroactively abrogated all statutes of limitations on actions to collect defaulted federally guaranteed student loans).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Todd Gastaldo
9th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1006-07 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mountain Peaks Financial Services, Inc. v. Roth-Steffen
Minn. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. New Mexico Student Loan Guarantee Corp. (In Re Thompson)
Bankr. E.D. Va. · 2005 · confidence medium
Therefore, “as a necessary consequence of the express retroactivity clause, actions that had become time-barred after the enactment of COBRA. . .were revived.” United States v. McLaughlin, 7 F.Supp.2d 90, 91 (D.Mass.1998) (citing U.S. v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994)) (other citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lawrence
5th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Millard v. United Student Aid Funds, 66 F.3d 252, 252 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 897 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341, 341-42 (8th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Durbin, 64 F.Supp.2d 635, 637 (S.D.Tex.1999). 3 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Durbin
S.D. Tex. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a); United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007, n. 2 (9th Cir.1994.) B.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael J. Mastrovito (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Sec. 1091a(a) (1991)), the statute of limitations period for suits to recover on defaulted student loans was six years commencing from the date the loan was assigned to the Department of Education. 1 U.S. v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited "see" Doria v. Yelp Incorporated
D. Ariz. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 20 F.3d 1005, 1008 , 1014–20 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal pursuant to 21 an enforceable release); Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445 , 447–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). 22 Therefore, the Court will dismiss these claims, and in turn the SAC, with prejudice. 23 Further, due to this dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will not analyze potential 24 dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). 25 E.
cited Cited "see" Brown v. United States Department of Education
9th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)).
cited Cited "see" Lee v. Paige
W.D. Mo. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Sullivan
9th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Smith
M.D.N.C. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
In 1991, Congress retroactively abrogated any statute of limitations applicable to student loan collection and revived actions regarding any federally insured student loans regardless of the date on which the loans were considered in default. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a) (1991); See U.S. v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (9th Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Theodore E. Dauven, and Barbara G. Dauven, Intervenor-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Singer
D.D.C. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining the *11 effects of HETA); see also United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341, 341-42 (8th Cir.1993) (government could bring action to recover on defaulted student loan even though loan was defaulted in 1969 and loan was assigned the government in 1983 and would have been time-barred under the six-year limitations period).
discussed Cited "see" Millard v. USA Funds
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994) (Congress “eliminated all statutes of limitation on actions to recover on defaulted student loans”); United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 897 (11th Cir.1993) (“Congress intended to revive all time-barred actions to recover defaulted student loans.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Adelson
E.D. Mich. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341, 342 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Courts faced with suits to recover unpaid student loans that were defaulted on prior to April 1985 have held that these expired actions revived under the 1991 amendment . . . .”) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1994) (in eliminating the statute of limitations, Congress “also revived all actions which would have otherwise been time-barred”); United States v. Brown, 7 F. App’x 353, 354 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding government collection action filed in 1999 timely eve…
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Owen
5th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. McLaughlin
D. Mass. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341, 341-42 (8th Cir.1993); United States n Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 896-97 (11th Cir.1993). 2 It is within the power of Congress to enact such revivals because “the repeal of a statute of limitation on personal debts does not deprive a debtor of property in violation of’ constitutional due process requirements.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sibley v. United States Department of Education
N.D. Ill. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
HETA, § 3(b), (c), 105 Stat. 123 , 125; United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 897 (11th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Donald B. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant
93-16522.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 31, 1994.
20 F.3d 1005
94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2248
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5941
1994 WL 103089
Donald B. Phillips, pro se for defendant-appellant., John F. Gisla, Asst. U.S. Atty., Sacramento, CA, for plaintiff-appellee.
Fletcher, Brunetti, Trott.
Cited by 29 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Donald B. Phillips appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in favor of[*1007] the United States in the government’s action to recover on several defaulted student loans. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990), and we affirm.

Phillips contends the government’s action is barred by the statute of limitations. The United States contends that the action is not time-barred because the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 (HETA), Pub.L. No. 102-26,105 Stat. 123 (1991) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)), eliminated all statutes of limitation on actions to recover on defaulted student loans and thereby revived this action against Phillips. We agree.

Prior to HETA, the statute of limitations period for suits to recover on defaulted student loans was six years, commencing from the date the loan was assigned to the Department of Education. See Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub.L. No. 99-272 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(4)(B) & (Q) (establishing six-year statute of limitations period); United States v. Menatos, 925 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir.1991).

Under HETA, however, Congress provided that actions to collect on defaulted student loans were no longer subject to any statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a). [1] Moreover, Congress made HETA effective as if it were enacted under COBRA. See HETA § 3(c), Pub.L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, 125. [2] By doing so, Congress not only eliminated COBRA’s six-year statute of limitations period, but also revived all actions which would have otherwise been time-barred. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a); see also United States v. Hodges, 999 F.2d 341, 341-42 (8th Cir.1993) (government could bring action to recover on defaulted student loan even though loan was defaulted in 1969 and loan was assigned the government in 1983 and would have been time-barred under the six-year limitations period); United States v. Glockson, 998 F.2d 896, 897 (11th Cir.1993) (same; “Congress intended the HETA amendments to apply retroactively to all student loan collection actions”); United States v. Mastrovito, 830 F.Supp. 1281, 1282-84 (D.Ariz.1993) (same); United States v. Davis, 801 F.Supp. 581, 583-84 (M.D.Ala.1992) (same); United States v. Wall, 794 F.Supp. 350, 351-52 (D.Or.1992) (same).

Here, Phillips’s loans were assigned to the Department of Education on November 30, 1976 and August 20, 1984. Under COBRA, the statute of limitations would have expired six years from the date of assignment. See Menatos, 925 F.2d at 335. Under HETA, however, this action is not barred by any statute of limitation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(1) & (2); Hodges, 999 F.2d at 341-42; Glockson, 998 F.2d at 897; Mastrovito, 830 F.Supp. at 1282-84; Davis, 801 F.Supp. at 583-84; Wall, 794 F.Supp. at 351-52. Accordingly, the district court properly[*1008] held that this action was not time-barred. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a). [3]

AFFIRMED.

1

. Section (a) of HETA provides, in pertinent part:

(1) It is the purpose of this subsection to ensure that obligations to repay loans and grant overpayments are enforced without regard to any Federal or State statutory, regulatory, or administrative limitation on the period within which debts may be enforced.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute, regulation, or administrative limitation, no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or taken.

20 U.S.C. § 1091a(a)(1) & (2).

2

. Section 3(c) of HETA provides:

The amendments made by this section shall be effective as if enacted by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-272), and shall apply to any actions pending on or after the date of enactment of [HETA] that are brought before November 15, 1992.

Subsequently, section 3(c) of HETA has been amended to eliminate the November 15, 1992 “sunset date." Pub.L. No. 102-325, § 1551, 106 Stat. 838 (1992).

3

. On appeal, Phillips also contends HETA does not apply because the government’s action was not "pending" as of the date of enactment of HETA (April 9, 1991), as provided in section 3(c) of HETA. We reject this argument. Because HETA not only replaced but also nullified the prior statute of limitations period, the government’s right to proceed against Phillips to recover on his defaulted loans was "pending” as of the date of enactment of HETA.

Moreover, to the extent Phillips argues that the action is barred by California’s statute of limitations, we also reject this argument. See Menatos, 925 F.2d at 335 n. 2 (finding that COBRA’s six-year period revived action which otherwise would have been time-barred by state statute of limitation).