Peter Vidal v. Joseph Williams, Superintendent of Fulton Corr. Facility, 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
Peter Vidal v. Joseph Williams, Superintendent of Fulton Corr. Facility, 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“tjhe supreme court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.”
126 citation events (87 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Purvis v. State (ga, 2011-03-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Purvis v. State
Ga. · 2011 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the supreme court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Ndina (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Wis. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
tjhe supreme court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Sevencan v. Herbert (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
E.D.N.Y · 2001 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in new york city, two locations three miles apart are hardly in the same vicinity.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Andre Brown v. Robert Kuhlmann, Superintendent of Sullivan Correctional Facility (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
defense counsel requested that vidal's parents, who were present at trial, be allowed to remain in the courtroom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Zemek
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., Brimmer, supra, 983 N.W.2d at p. 265 [order closing courtroom to all spectators during COVID-19 pandemic was not “narrowly tailored” in failing to “allow[ ] at least the defendant’s family to attend if possible within the parameters of the overriding interest”]; Vidal v. Williams (2d Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 67, 68 [although excluding the general public was justified, there was insufficient reason to prohibit defendant’s parents from being present]; State v. Tucker (Ariz. Ct.App. 2012) 290 P.3d 1248, 1257 [exclusion of defendants’ families along with the rest of the general…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fraser v. City Of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2023 · confidence medium
The only cases of which this court is aware that compel the presence of a defendant’s family in the courtroom arise in connection with criminal trials, and specifically the Sixth Amendment right to a “public” trial.” See Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994); Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. Lamanna
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
See English, 164 F.3d at 109-10 (affirming grant of habeas petition and order of new trial); Vidal, 31 F.3d at 69 (reversing denial of habeas and ordering new trial); Edwards, 2011 WL 5920901 , at *7 (granting habeas petition based on violation of public trial right and ordering retrial); Collins, 2000 WL 1476664 , at *10 (same); Aguayo, 1997 WL 217589 , at *5 (same); Ip, 710 F. Supp. at 916 (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) v. Jones
Colo. · 2020 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272 (“[A]n accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.”); English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” (quoting Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ledee
2d Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
“The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.” Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir.1996). “[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 , 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (defendant is “at the very-least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ledee
2d Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
“The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendantʹs family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.” Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1996). “[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 258 , 271‐72 (1948) (defendant is “at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Urena
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Smith v. Hollins, 448 F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir.2006) (“Under Waller and its progeny, courts must undertake a more exacting inquiry when excluding family members, as distinguished from the general public[.]”) (citation omitted); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance [at trial] of family members of the accused.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. City of New York
E.D.N.Y · 2014 · confidence medium
See Brown, 142 F.3d at 537 (state’s asserted “interest in keeping the Undercover Officer’s identity secret” was not an overriding governmental interest justifying the closure of the courtroom where “the State’s only articulated ground of concern was that much of the trial’s audience lived in Brooklyn, where the officer worked.” (citations omitted)); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that without more, the fact that defendant’s parents live in a “high drug area” in the same borough where an Undercover Offi cer works does not justify their exclusion f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Marcus Deshaun Tucker, Clifton James Cuttler II and Andre Lavelle Armstrong (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Sevencan v. Herbert, 342 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir.2002) (Waller test only clearly established law for courtroom closures); see also, e.g., English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1998) (applying Waller to exclusion of defendant’s family); Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir.1996) (defendant’s friends and family); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (all members of public for portion of trial).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. David Rivera
9th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
The right to a public trial entitles a criminal defendant “at the very least ... to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 , 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); see Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir.2000); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Downs v. Lape (2×)
2d Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 108-10 (2d Cir.1998) (affirming grant of writ for petition of habeas corpus based upon par tial courtroom closure excluding defendant's family during witness testimony); Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 775-77 (2d Cir.1996) (reversing denial of writ where defendant's family and friends excluded during witness testimony); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (reversing denial of writ where courtroom closed to public, including defendant’s parents, during witness testimony); United States v. Garland, 364 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.1966) (holding e…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lormor
Wash. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Ed. 682 (1948)]; see also Braun, 227 F.3d at 917 (describing “Supreme Court’s requirement” that “friend[s] or relative[s] of the defendant” be allowed to attend trial); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. LORMOR
Wash. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
While "[d]etermining with any precision the contours of th[e] right [to a public trial] is a difficult task," Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir.2000), the Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dicta, that the right to a public trial entitles a criminal defendant "at the very least ... to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." [ In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 , 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)]; see also Braun, 227 F.3d at 917 (describing "Supreme Court's requirement" that "friend[s] or relative[s] of the defendant" be allo…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gibbons v. Savage
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , 271-72 & n. 29, 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gibbons v. Savage
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , 25 271-72 & n.29 (1948)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. Miller
2d Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Thus, despite Rodriguez’s protestations, we can rely neither on Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir.1996) (“The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.”), nor Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (noting a tradition of “a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused”), nor Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2005) (the “Court takes very seriously” the right to have family and friends present at trial), nor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. Miller
2d Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Thus, despite Rodriguez’s protestations, we can rely neither on Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir.1996) (“The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.”), nor Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (noting a tradition of “a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused”), nor Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2005) (the “Court takes very seriously” the right to have family and friends present at trial), nor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Perry, Antoine
D.C. Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
While “[determining with any precision the contours of th[e] right [to a public trial] is a difficult task,” Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir.2000), the Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dicta, that the right to a public trial entitles a criminal defendant “at the very least ... to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272 , 68 S.Ct. 499 ; see also Braun, 227 F.3d at 917 (describing “Supreme Court’s requirement” that “friend[s] or relative[s] of the defendant” be allowed to at…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoi Man Yung v. Hans Walker and Eliot L. Spitzer
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In doing so, he cited our decision in Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994), which held that an order excluding family members was not appropriate where the prosecutor failed to show that the excluded family members likely would encounter the undercover officer during his operations or that they would be inclined to harm the officer.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bryant Smith v. Melvin L. Hollins, Superintendent, Oneida Correctional Facility, and Eliot Spitzer, New York Attorney General (2×)
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Id. at 73 (“Intrinsic to the public trial right is an individual’s right to have family members and friends present at his trial, a right this Court takes very seriously.”); see also Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2005)(“[T]his -Court takes very seriously a defendant’s right to have family members present at his- trial.”); Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir.1996) (“The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.”); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jose Rodriguez v. David Miller, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility (2×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Intrinsic to the public trial right is an individual’s right to have family members and friends present at his trial, a right “this Court takes very seriously.” Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2005); see also Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir.1996) (“The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.”); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (noting the Supreme Court’s “special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the ac…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Wendell Smith
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sevencan v. Herbert, 342 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.2003); Yung v. Walker, 341 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.2003); English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.1998); Guzman, 80 F.3d at 776-77 ; Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Uniko Carson v. Brian Fischer, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Eliot L. Spitzer, New York State Attorney General (2×)
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Our heightened interest in the exclusion of family members and friends derives from In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948), where the Court “specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Oliver, 333 U.S. at 271 -72 & n. 29, 68 S.Ct. 499 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoi Man Yung v. Hans Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, and Eliot L. Spitzer, New York State Attorney General
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Third, although the court ordinarily may justify a partial closure based on a substantial reason and need not find an overriding interest, id. (citing Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir.1996)), a more rigorous standard applies to family members, id. (citing Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCarthy v. Portuondo
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
For example, in Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1102 , 115 S.Ct. 778 , 130 L.Ed.2d 672 (1995), we rejected the State’s claim that an undercover witness’s safety might be threatened if the defendant’s parents learned the witness’s identity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoi Man Yung v. Hans Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, and Eliot L. Spitzer, New York State Attorney General
2d Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Third, although the court ordinarily may justify a partial closure based on a substantial reason and need not find an overriding interest, id. (citing Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir.1996)), a more rigorous standard applies to family members, id. (citing Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Brown v. Christopher Artuz, Superintendent
2d Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
We have also recognized “a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that a trial court is not permitted to deny a defendant’s family access to his trial simply because the family lives in the same borough in which the undercover officer seeking closure works).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yung v. Walker (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 2001 · confidence medium
The “Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , 271-72 *270 & n. 29, 68 S.Ct. 499 , 506-07 & n. 29, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Braun, Kathleen A. v. Powell, Barbara
7th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
We have shown that, even if it is the same claim, the fact that it was identical to the earlier claim would not preclude its inclusion in the later sec. 974.06 motion. /6 See Bell v. Jarvis, 198 F.3d 432, 437-42 (4th Cir. 2000) (habeas relief necessary when courtroom was closed to all but "family members and friends of the prosecutrix" during "empaneling of the jury, the court’s introductory statements to the jury, the attorneys’ opening statements, and the testimony of the prosecutrix"); Brown v. Andrews, 180 F.3d 403, 404-09 (2d Cir. 1999) (granting habeas relief because trial court clos…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kathleen A. Braun v. Barbara Powell
7th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Bell v. Jarvis, 198 F.3d 432, 437-42 (4th Cir.1999) (habeas relief necessary when courtroom was closed to all but “family members and friends of the prosecutrix” during “empaneling of the jury, the court's introductory statements to the jury, the attorneys’ opening statements, and the testimony of the prosecutrix”); Brown v. Andrews, 180 F.3d 403, 404-09 (2d Cir.1999) (granting habeas relief because trial court closed courtroom for testimony of police officer); Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 773-77 (2d Cir.1996) (habeas relief necessary when court excluded four spectators from cr…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rose Ann Brown v. Anginell Andrews, Superintendent of Albion Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d at 537 ; Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mason v. Schriver (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.D.N.Y. · 1998 · confidence medium
See also, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 510 , 104 S.Ct. 819, 824 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir.1994), ce rt. denied, 513 U.S. 1102 , 115 S.Ct. 778 , 130 L.Ed.2d 672 (1995); Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir .1992); Ip v. Henderson, 710 F.Supp. 915, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 888 F.2d 1376 (2d Cir.1989). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Craig Martin v. Lynn Bissonette
1st Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
The short, entirely dispositive answer to this plaint is that the Supreme Court opinion on which the petitioner relies, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948), does not contain any such requirement. 5 Nothing in Oliver or, for that matter, in Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994) (noting “a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused”), suggests that a trial court need go beyond the already stringent requirements of Waller before removing a defendant’s family members from the courtroom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nieves
NY · 1997 · confidence medium
Where, by contrast, the trial court is aware that the defendant’s relatives have been attending the proceedings or that the defendant would like to have certain family members present, exclusion of those individuals must be necessary to protect the interest advanced by the People in support of closure (see, Vidal v Williams, 31 F3d 67, 69 [2d Cir 1994], cert denied 513 US 1102 ; People v Gutierez, 86 NY2d 817 ; People v Kin Kan, 78 NY2d 54 , supra; see also, In re Oliver, 333 US 257, 271-272 [acknowledging a special concern for guaranteeing the attendance of the accused’s family members]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. Bissonete
1st Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
The short, entirely dispositive answer to this plaint is that the Supreme Court opinion on which the petitioner relies, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), does not 10 contain any such requirement.5 Nothing in Oliver or, for that matter, in Vidal v. Willi ams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting "a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused"), suggests that a trial court need go beyond the already stringent requirements of Waller before removing a defendant's family members from the courtroom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. Bissonete
1st Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
The short, entirely dispositive answer to this plaint is that the Supreme Court opinion on which the petitioner relies, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), does not 10 contain any such requirement.5 Nothing in Oliver or, for that matter, in Vidal v. Willi ams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting "a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused"), suggests that a trial court need go beyond the already stringent requirements of Waller before removing a defendant's family members from the courtroom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. Meachum
D. Conn. · 1996 · confidence medium
However, “it is well-settled that a defendant whose right to a public trial has been violated need not show that he suffered any prejudice, and the doctrine of harmless error does not apply.” Guzman, 80 F.3d at 776 (citing, inter alia, Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 -50 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2217 & n. 9; Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nieves
N.Y. App. Div. · 1996 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
It could hardly be considered prudent to permit the extensive viewing of a detective who is actively engaged in undercover operations in the very neighborhood where the observers reside (see, People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 443 ; cf., Vidal v Williams, 31 F3d 67, 69 [2d Cir 1994], cert denied 513 US 1102 ).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Steven Ayala v. Hubert Speckard, Superintendent of Groveland Correctional Facility (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Guzman, 80 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added); Vidal, 31 F.3d at 69 (emphasis added); Woods, 977 F.2d at 76 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cosentino v. Kelly (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 -50 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2217 & n. 9; Guzman, 80 F.3d at 776-77 ; *395 Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 778 , 130 L.Ed.2d 672 (1995); Ip v. Henderson, 710 F.Supp. 915, 919 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d mem., 888 F.2d 1376 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. John Doe, James Roe
2d Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
To be sure, where closure motions *130 are at issue, the record must support an inference of a substantial probability of danger, see Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 778 , 130 L.Ed.2d 672 (1995), and the stringent “substantial probability” test must be met, see Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14 ,106 S.Ct. at 2743 (comparing test to a less rigorous “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice” standard applied under California state law).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Hassen
Colo. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67 , 69 (2d Cir.1994) (the need to protect an undercover officer's safety did not justify excluding the defendant's parents during his testimony, and doing so violated the defendant's public trial right); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , 272, 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) ("an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives[,] and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged"). ¶ 17 Under the third Waller factor, the trial court was required to consider other reasonable alternatives to closure.
cited Cited "see" Salih Sevencan v. Victor Herbert, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.1994).
examined Cited "see" Salih Sevencan v. Victor Herbert, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Id. at 50 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210 . 31 In Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.1994), we reversed a District Court's denial of a habeas petition on the ground that the closure of a courtroom to a defendant's parents was improper.
cited Cited "see" State v. Washington
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vidal v. Williams (C.A.2, 1994) 31 F.3d 67 (the trial court committed reversible error when it excluded the defendant's parents).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Washington (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vidal v. Williams (C.A.2, 1994) 31 F.3d 67 (the trial court committed reversible error when it excluded the defendant’s parents).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Peter VIDAL, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Joseph WILLIAMS, Superintendent of Fulton Correctional Facility, Respondent-Appellee
1750, Docket 93-2548.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jul 29, 1994.
31 F.3d 67
Diane E. Courselle, Staff Atty., New York City (Office of the Appellate Defender, New York City, Ira Mickenberg, for petitioner, Joseph M. Nursey, Supervising Atty., counsel), for petitioner-appellant., Alan S. Raffcerman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bronx, NY (Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty., Bronx County, Allen H. Saperstein, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for respondent-appel-lee.
Newman, Lumbard, Oakes.
Cited by 76 opinions  |  Published
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

Peter Vidal appeals from a judgment of the District Court for the Southern District[*68] of New York, Preska, </., dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that Vidal’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated when his criminal trial in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, was closed to the public — including Vidal’s parents — during the testimony of an undercover police officer. As we conclude that the exclusion of Vidal’s parents was improper, we reverse and remand.

I.

The trial testimony showed the following. On January 5,1988, undercover police officer Irvin Noak, police officer James O’Connell, and a backup team conducted a “buy and bust” operation at a small grocery store at 866 Union Avenue in the Bronx. Noak entered the store and offered to purchase crack cocaine from Vidal who was working behind the counter. Vidal offered to sell a $20 vial of crack, which Noak purchased with prerecorded buy money. Noak then left the store and radioed Vidal’s description to O’Connell, who was waiting a few blocks away. O’Connell and the backup unit arrested Vidal and three other individuals, and seized twenty-nine vials of crack cocaine and $10 of the prerecorded buy money. Noak then drove by the front of the store and identified Vidal as the seller.

Vidal was charged with sale of a controlled substance, possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. At trial, the state called Officers O’Connell and Noak. Prior to Noak’s testimony, the prosecution made an application to close the courtroom during Noak’s testimony in order to protect his identity as an undercover officer.

At an in camera hearing, Noak testified that he was still working undercover in an anti-crack unit that operated in the vicinity of 866 Union Avenue. He feared that his life would be in danger if his identity became known, as other undercover officers had been threatened or harmed after their identities had been disclosed.

Defense counsel requested that Vidal’s parents, who were present at trial, be allowed to remain in the courtroom during Noak’s testimony. Vidal’s parents lived near the courthouse on Gerard Avenue, and to counsel’s knowledge they did not frequent the vicinity of 866 Union Avenue.

The court granted the prosecution’s application and closed the courtroom during Noak’s testimony. The court found that Noak feared for his life and safety, that Noak was still involved in undercover activities in the same area, and that other undercover officers had been threatened and even wounded. The court closed the courtroom to Vidal’s parents because Noak worked in a Bronx-wide unit, there were many high-drug areas near the courthouse, and “it’s conceivable and entirely possible that the officer may be recognized by them while he’s involved in another undercover operation, and if the defendant is convicted, ... [his parents] may not have a fondness for the officer.”

Vidal was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance and one count of sale of a controlled substance, and was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of five to fifteen years. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, People v. Vidal, 172 A.D.2d 228, 667 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1st Dept.1991), and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, People v. Vidal, 78 N.Y.2d 927, 577 N.E.2d 1072, 573 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1991).

On January 11, 1993, Vidal filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District, claiming that the state had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. On July 20, 1993, the court denied the application without a hearing, finding that the closure was justified under the circumstances. Vidal appeals, arguing that the trial court was required to keep the courtroom open to the general public, or at least to his parents.

II.

A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial “may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). A court may close a criminal trial over the defendant’s objection if the following requirements are met:

[*69] the party seeking to close the [trial] must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.

Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216. At issue is whether the exclusion of Vidal’s parents was “necessary to protect” the state’s interest in assuring Noak’s safety. [1] We conclude that it was not.

The state argues that it was necessary to exclude Vidal’s parents to prevent them from recognizing Noak during an undercover operation and disclosing his identity as retribution for their son’s conviction. We disagree. There was no evidence that Vidal’s parents were inclined to harm a police officer. In fact, the prosecutor stated that to the best of his knowledge Vidal’s parents were “very decent individuals.”

More importantly, there was little chance that Vidal’s parents would have encountered Noak during an undercover operation. The trial court found that an encounter was likely because Vidal’s parents lived in the Bronx and Noak’s unit operated throughout the Bronx. However, the Bronx covers 41 square miles and has 1.2 million residents. See People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 443, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (1993). A chance meeting somewhere in the Bronx was unlikely. The exclusion was not justified.

The state argues that two facts made an encounter likely. First, Gerard Avenue, where Vidal’s parents lived, is in the vicinity of 866 Union Avenue, where the arrest occurred and where Noak still worked undercover. In support of this argument, the state asks us to take judicial notice that the two locations are less than three miles apart. The argument is not persuasive. In New York City, two locations three miles apart are hardly in the same vicinity. Almost seventy percent of the Bronx (and 830,000 people) could fit within three miles of 866 Union Avenue.

Second, the state argues that an encounter would be likely because the parents lived in a “high drug area.” Again, we are not persuaded. Despite the state’s assertions, the trial judge did not find that Vidal’s parents lived in a high drug area. The trial judge merely noted that the parents lived on Gerard Avenue (which is near the courthouse), and that “there are areas not far from the courthouse that are known as high drug areas.” Thus, the record only indicates that Vidal’s parents lived mar a high drug area. Given the scope of the drug problem in the Bronx, there is minimal risk that two people who happen to live near a high drug area will have a chance meeting with a specific undercover officer working throughout the borough.

In sum, the state is asking this court to hold that a courtroom can be closed to a defendant’s relatives as long as the relatives live (or, presumably, work) in the county where the undercover officer operates. Such a holding would violate the rule that closure is reserved for rare circumstances in which “the balance of interests [are] struck with special care.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215. Moreover, the Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 & n. 29, 68 S.Ct. 499, 506-07 & n. 29, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Finally, we observe that the trial court gave no consideration to less restrictive alternatives such as screening devices to conceal the witness’s identity. See United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991).

As the petitioner need not show prejudice, Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50, 104 S.Ct. at 2217, we reverse the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus, and remand for entry of an order granting the petitioner’s release unless the state affords him a new trial within a reasonable time.

Reversed and remanded.

1

. Vidal also contests the exclusion of the general public. Because we reverse on the ground that the exclusion of his parents was improper, we do not decide that issue.