Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1973). · Go Syfert
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Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Courts need not resort to other means of interpretation when statutory language is clear, unequivocal, and definite.

A political subdivision attempted to renew a certificate of deposit for interim funds, arguing that a prior agreement established a two-year term. The court must determine if the bank had the right to refuse the renewal under state law. The court holds that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court need not resort to other means of interpretation. Because the statute defines an award as a determination to place funds and allows an institution to decline an award, the bank correctly exercised its right to refuse the renewed deposit. The term of an award is limited by statute to a maximum of one year.

565 citation events (346 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hughes v. White, 388 F. Supp. 2d 805 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
36 Ohio St. 2d at 105 Interpreting statutory language regarding interim moneys30 citing cases“it is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. if that inquiry reveals the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretive effort is at an end, and the statute must be a…”5 citing courts quote it · also cited as 304 N.E.2d at 381
  • Hughes v. White, 388 F. Supp. 2d 805 (S.D. Ohio 2005).published 3 cites
    (‘Where the language itself clearly expresses legislative intent, the courts need look no further.’)
  • State v. Reed, 2026-Ohio-3423.published
    State v. Gonzales, 2017-Ohio-777 , ¶ 4; Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973).
  • State v. Green, 2026-Ohio-1835.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106 (1973). {¶14} Courts must give effect to the words used and may not add or delete language.
  • State v. Wright, 2026-Ohio-1714.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106 (1973).
  • Henry v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Saf., 2026-Ohio-1581.published
    “The principles of statutory construction require courts to first look at the specific language contained in the statute, and, if the language is unambiguous, to then apply the clear meaning of the words used.” Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v.…
  • In re K.B., 2025-Ohio-854.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973).
  • Jeremy Dean Salyer, No. 21-60026 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 15, 2021).
    “In order to determine such intent, a court must first look at the words of the statute itself.” Carnes, 821 N.E.2d at 183 (citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1973)).
  • Tracy Greer v. United States, 938 F.3d 766 (6th Cir. 2019).published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1973). “[C]ourts must give the words used in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning, unless legislative intent indicates otherwise.” Coventry Towers, Inc. v. City of Strongsville, 480 N.…
  • Black v. State, 2017-Ohio-8822.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 , 65 O.O.2d 296, 298 , 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (1973).
  • In re S.L., 2016-Ohio-5000.published
    “The principles of statutory construction require courts to first look at the specific language contained in the statute, and, if the language is unambiguous, to then apply the clear meaning of the words used.” Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v.…
Show 20 more citing cases
  • In re L.S., 2016-Ohio-4999.published
    “The principles of statutory construction require courts to first look at the specific language contained in the statute, and, if the language is unambiguous, to then apply the clear meaning of the words used.” Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v.…
  • Cullinan v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Fam. Servs., 2016-Ohio-1083.published
    No. 05AP-1318, 2006-Ohio-5745, ¶ 32 , quoting Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-06 (1973).
  • State v. Reed, 2014-Ohio-5463.published
    State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595 (1992); Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973). {¶79} The language of R.C. 2909.14 and R.C. 2909.15, as included above, reveals the General Assembly’s intent was to promote public sa…
  • M6 Motors, Inc. v. Nissan of N. Olmsted, L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-2537, 14 N.E.3d 1054.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 298 , 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973).
  • State v. Shaffer, 2014-Ohio-2461.published
    Lake No. 2012-L-102, 2013- Ohio-2824, ¶ 17, citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973).
  • State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4114.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106 (1973).
  • State v. Owen, 2013-Ohio-2824.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973).
  • In re Monae Breece v., No. 12-8018, 2013 WL 197399 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013).unpublished
    If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretive effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly." Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint…
  • In re Wengerd, 453 B.R. 243 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011).published 2 cites
    If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretative effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly.” Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378…
  • In re A.B., 852 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio 2006).published
    Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 [ 65 O.O.2d 296 ], 304 N.E.2d 378 .
  • State v. Williams, 850 N.E.2d 1277 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2006).published
    No. 13-92-1, 1993 WL 140521 , at *3, quoting Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 106 , 65 O.O.2d 296 , 304 N.E.2d 378 . “ ‘If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and defini…
  • State v. Herbert, 358 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio 1976).published
    In Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 101, 105 (the only prior decision of the court interpreting the terms of R.
  • Adm. Order Regarding Sealing & Expungement of Appellate Case Dockets & Records, 2026-Ohio-3470.published
    See State v. Gonzales, 2017-Ohio-777, ¶ 4 , citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973).
  • State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Dept. of Com. (Slip Opinion), 2021-Ohio-673, 169 N.E.3d 665.published 2 cites
    (observing that the “interpretative effort is at an end” when the text “conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite)
  • Ohio Motor Veh. Dealers Bd. v. Remlinger, 457 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1983).published 2 cites
    See Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 101, 105-106 [ 65 O.O.2d 296 ]; Crowl v. DeLuca (1972), 29 Ohio St. 2d 53, 58-59 [ 58 O.O.2d 107 ]; Revesz v. Doehler Jarvis (1968), 14 Ohio App. 2d 156, 160 [ 43 O.O.2d 344 ].
  • Montgomery Cnty. Park Dist. v. Kinney, 399 N.E.2d 556 (Ohio 1980).published
    See Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 101,105, 106 .
  • One Columbus Buldg. v. Div. of Income Tax, No. 98AP-1309 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. Nov. 30, 1999).unpublished
  • Jenisek v. City of Mentor-On-The-Lake, No. 99-L-097 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. Sept. 29, 2000).unpublished
  • State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 363 N.E.2d 737 (Ohio 1977).published
  • City of Lancaster v. Fairfield Cnty. Budget Comm'n, 699 N.E.2d 473 (Ohio 1998).published
304 N.E.2d at 388 cited at this page1 citing case
  • State v. Lett, 829 N.E.2d 1281 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2005).published
    He reports that "critics typically argue * * * that en banc review is counterproductive because it: promotes judicial inefficiency, 16 undermines the finality of panel decision-making, threatens court collegiality, and compromises judicial…
65 Ohio Op. 2d at 298 cited at this page1 citing case
  • Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins., 723 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 2000).published
    Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 , 65 O.O.2d. 296, 298, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 .
36 Ohio St. 2d at 104 “For the reasons set forth below, we find that the term, “interim deposit,” necessarily relates to the periodic offer of interim moneys by a political subdivision to a hank for deposit; that R.”1 citing casethe opinion's own words at *104
  • State v. Holliman, 2025-Ohio-1187.published
    Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 104 (1973).
36 Ohio St. 2d at 106 “the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite the interpretative effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly.”1 citing casethe opinion's own words at *106, quoted by 1 later opinions
  • In re Senders, 673 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1996).published
    Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 106 [ 65 O.O.2d 296, 298-299 , 304 N.E.2d 378, 381-382 ]; Katz v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. [229], 231 [ 2 O.O.2d 54 , 55, 141 N.E.2d 294 , 295-296].
Other citing cases3 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
The Provident Bank
v.
Wood, Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton County
No. 73-255.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Dec 5, 1973.
Published opinion
304 N.E.2d 378
1973 Ohio LEXIS 286
Messrs. Keating, MuetMng & Klehamp, Mr. Louis K. Gilligan and Mr. Gary P. Kreider, for appellant., Mr. Simon L. Leis, Jr., prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Arthur M. Ney, for appellee.
Bbowít, Brown, Celebrezze, Corrigan, Herbert, Neill, Stere.
Cited by 231 opinions  |  Published
Paul W. Bbowít, J.

In this case, the court is asked to determine whether the term of the award of interim funds was for the entire two-year designation period, or whether the term of the award was limited to the six-months term of the instrument evidencing the deposit executed subsequent to that award. Stated another way, we must decide whether the term of the award of the interim deposit must be for “not less than thirty days nor more than one year,” the minimum and maximum maturities decreed by B, C, 135,09 for deposits of interim funds,

[*104] For the reasons set forth below, we find that the term, “interim deposit,” necessarily relates to the periodic offer of interim moneys by a political subdivision to a hank for deposit; that R. C. 135.09 limits the term of an “award” of interim moneys to a minimum of thirty days and a maximum of one year; and that Provident was correct in maintaining that R. C. 135.14(C) granted it the right to refuse to renew or re-issne the certificate of deposit which matured on February 20, 1972. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must he reversed.

R. C. Chapter 135 governs the investment of public moneys held by the state and its political subdivisions. The Act designates three types of deposits which can be made. “Interim deposits,” the type involved in the instant case, are defined in R. C. 135.01(F) as deposits of:

“* * * public moneys in the treasury of the state or any subdivision after the award of inactive deposits has been made * * *, which moneys are in excess of the aggregate amount of the inactive deposits as estimated by the governing board prior to the period of designation and which the treasurer or governing board finds should not be deposited as active or inactive deposits for the reason that such moneys will not be needed for immediate use but will be needed before the end of the period of designation.”

Once it has been determined that interim moneys exist, the statutory process for the deposit of those moneys is triggered, culminating in the actual deposit pursuant to R. C. 135.09 and 135.14. The issue before us centers on the meaning of the statutory language at the final stage of the deposit process, particularly R. G. 135.14(C), as it relates to the right of an eligible institution to refuse to accept an interim deposit following an award of interim moneys.

It is the contention of Provident that such an award occurs when the treasurer or governing board of the political subdivision makes the decision to place an interim deposit with a designated depository. Provident contends that the boards’s attempt to renew the certificate of deposit[*105] which matured on February 20, 1972, was a second “award” of interim moneys for deposit, and that, at that time, it had a right to refuse to accept the deposit.

At this juncture, we turn our attention to the Agreement for the “Deposit of Interim Moneys” entered into by the parties on August 20, 1971, on which the board relies so heavily. Parenthetically, we note that such a written agreement is not required by R. C. 135.09. Following the statutory guide for the handling of interim moneys, it is to be noted that the award of moneys must be made subsequent to the designation of a depository — the award preceding the deposit. The board takes the position that the August 20, 1971, Agreement controls the present ease by reciting in its terms an award to Provident of $23,000,000-for a term of two years. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that that Agreement does no such thing. The only effect of that document, beyond detailing the collateral to be put up by the bank for the deposit, was to reduce from $35,000,000 to $23,000,000 the maximum amount of county funds which could be deposited with Provident during the two-year period beginning on August 24,1971. The board’s reliance upon the Agreement to buttress its claim of an “award” of the sum for two years is misplaced.

Turning to R. C. Chapter 135, and specifically R. C. 135.09 and 135.14(C), it becomes evident that the board made one award to Provident for six months, and that, its attempt to renew the certificate of deposit was, in effect, an attempt to make a second award of the same sum.

There is no lack of general rules to guide the court in. its effort to ascertain the meaning of the statutes before it. The principles of statutory construction are given exhaustive treatment in 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, 129 to 310, Sections 160 to 327. It is a cardinal rule that a court must, first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e. g., Katz v. Department of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229. If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretative[*106] effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly. Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312.

“Where the language itself clearly expresses the legislative intent, the courts need look no further.” Katz, supra, at 231.

Turning to the statutory language we are asked to interpret R. C. 135.14(C), which provides that:

“* * *The award of interim deposits shall be made in accordance with Section 335.09 of the Revised Code and the treasurer or the governing board shall determine the periods for which such interim deposits are to be made and shall award such interim deposits for such periods, provided, that any eligible institution receiving an interim deposit award may, upon notification that said award has been made, decline to accept said interim deposit * * *.”

The words “award” and “deposit” are central to an understanding of the statute. “Award” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4 Ed.) as: “The decision or determination rendered by arbitrators or commissioners, or other private or extrajudicial deciders, upon a controversy submitted to them * * *.” The same source defines “deposit” as “the act of placing or lodging money in the custody of a bank or banker * * *.” Thus, the word “award,” as it apears in R. C. 135.09 and 135.14(C), refers to a determination by the treasurer or governing board that interim moneys are to be placed with a particular institution and held in a particular form. The “deposit” is the physical placement of the funds, and it is that act which the recipient bank is empowered to decline pursuant to R. C. 135.14(C).

The board contends further that the period for which interim deposits are awarded is two years, pursuant to R. C. 135.12, and that the thirtv-day-to-one-year instruments evidencing such deposits are merely the form dictated by R. C. 135.09. Stated another way, we are asked by the board to find that the six-month certificate involved here does not reflect a deposit complete in itself, but rather reflects the form the “deposit” of interim funds was to[*107] assume for one-fourth, of its life. We find this a strained interpretation of the statute, which we cannot accept.

Returning to R. C. 135.14(C), quoted above, and reading it in conjunction with the first sentence of R. C. 135.09, it is clear that what is contemplated is the periodic deposit of such interim funds as they become available during a two-year period. Consequently, from time to time during this two-year period of designation the treasurer or governing board may make more than one determination to place interim funds in the designated depository for particular maturity periods. Upon notification of the award, whether it be an original or subsequent award, the designated institution is granted the right to decline the deposit. This court finds this to be the right granted the financial institution by R. C. 135.14(C), and that Provident correctly interpreted the law in exercising its statutory prerogative.

It should be noted that this right to decline a deposit exactly parallels the right given the treasurer or governing board by R. C. 135.09 to request new bids for interim deposits when it feels that prevailing market interest rates so dictate, so that neither party will find itself bound in the handling of public moneys to an unrealistic rate of return due to fluctuating market forces during the two-year period of designation.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

O’Neill, C. J., Herbert, CorrigaN, Stere and W. Brown, JJ., concur. Celebrezze, J., dissents.