State v. Mincy, 441 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 1982). · Go Syfert
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State v. Mincy, 441 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 12× by 12 distinct cases, 1988–2026 · 2 courts↑ Rising · …when sua sponte granting a continuance under r.c. 2945.72(h), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in r.c. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial. ✓
cited 10× by 8 distinct cases, last quoted 2008↓ Fading · …when sua sponte granting a continuance under r.c. 2945.72 (h), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in r.c. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial. ✓
cited 5× by 5 distinct cases · …a person against whom a charge of misdemeanor, other than a minor misdemeanor, is pending in a court of record, shall be brought to trial . . . within ninety days after the person's arrest or the service of summons, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor of the first or second … at p. 7 ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
530 citation events (401 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Craft (ohioctapp, 2026-04-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Craft
Ohio Ct. App. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limits
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Stoddard
Ohio Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
without a journal entry containing the trial court's reasons for the continuance, this continuance does not extend the speedy trial time.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Laughbaum
Ohio Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208 (1976); State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 9 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Willowick Bldg. Dept. v. Getachew (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“If we were to allow the state’s reasoning, the only burden upon the prosecution and the courts would be to assure that a trial is scheduled within the appropriate time limit as long as it could subsequently be explained why the defendant was not brought to trial within the statutory time frame.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Willowick Bldg. Dept. v. Indale (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
A reasonable continuance granted pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H) must be “reasonable in both purpose and length.” Id. {¶29} “[T]he burden to timely try a defendant rests upon the prosecution and trial courts . . . a defendant is not required to either demand a timely trial or object to a trial 6 Case No. 2024-L-006 setting outside the periods set forth in R.C. 2945.71 and is to be accorded the benefits of time limitations prescribed therein.” State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 173 , (1978). {¶30} A court may grant reasonable “sua sponte extensions beyond the time prescribed in R.C.…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Willowick Bldg. Dept. v. Getachew (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“If we were to allow the state’s reasoning, the only burden upon the prosecution and the courts would be to assure that a trial is scheduled within the appropriate time limit as long as it could subsequently be explained why the defendant was not brought to trial within the statutory time frame.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Willowick Bldg. Dept. v. Shoregate Towers NS, L.L.C. (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“If we were to allow the state’s reasoning, the only burden upon the prosecution and the courts would be to assure that a trial is scheduled within the appropriate time limit as long as it could subsequently be explained why the defendant was not brought to trial within the statutory time frame.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Willowick Bldg. Dept. v. Indale (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
A reasonable continuance granted pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H) must be “reasonable in both purpose and length.” Id. {¶29} “[T]he burden to timely try a defendant rests upon the prosecution and trial courts . . . a defendant is not required to either demand a timely trial or object to a trial 6 Case No. 2024-L-004 setting outside the periods set forth in R.C. 2945.71 and is to be accorded the benefits of time limitations prescribed therein.” State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 173 , (1978). {¶30} A court may grant reasonable “sua sponte extensions beyond the time prescribed in R.C.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Thompson
Ohio Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
CA2005-10-431 and CA2005-10-446, 2006-Ohio- 2514, ¶ 5, citing State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Flynn
Ohio Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Marion No. 9-94-61, 1996 WL 65610 , 4 (Feb. 13, 1996), citing State v. Saffell, 35 Ohio St.3d 90 , 518 N.E.2d 934 (1988). {¶9} “[T]he determination of reasonableness must be made on the existing record.” State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2012-Ohio-2904 , 971 N.E.2d 937 , ¶ 34. “[W]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limits prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 9 , 441 N.E.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brannon
Ohio Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
CA2005-10-431 and CA2005-10-446, 2006-Ohio-2514, ¶ 5 , citing State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 (1982). {¶ 40} We are unable to determine whether the trial court intended to impose court costs due to the discrepancy between the trial court's indication at sentencing that it was waiving imposition of court costs and the sentencing entry's imposition of court costs.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pooler
Ohio Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Clark No. 2010 CA 19, 2012-Ohio-6187, ¶ 12 , quoting State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 9 (1982). {¶27} This court has recently found that when the trial court fails to provide its reasoning for granting a continuance, which is not on behalf of the defendant, that time is charged against the State.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Campbell, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2005)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Such a determination renders the speedy trial law a sword against, rather than a shield for, the best societal interest." Id. at 10 (Holmes, J., dissenting). {¶ 46} As demonstrated above, the trial court substantially met the Mincy requirement that the reason for continuance be cognizable from a judgment entry prior to the expiration of the statutory period.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Dunlap, Unpublished Decision (6-18-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
In Jells , the Supreme Court cited an appellate court opinion for the proposition that a waiver of the right to a jury trial is made knowingly and voluntarily when it is a "written waiver, signed by the defendant, filed with the court, and made in open court, after arraignment and opportunity to consult with counsel." Id. at 26, citing State v. Morris (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 12 , 14 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. High
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
That position was articulated in the following portion of the dissent to Mincy : “[T]he record here affirmatively demonstrates that the defendant’s case was set for trial within the time limitation of the statute and, equally important, this record contains sufficient evidence to demonstrate both the necessity and reasonableness of the continuance.” (Emphasis original.) Mincy, supra, at 10 , 2 OBR at 285, 441 N.E.2d at 574 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Konicki
Ohio Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.) (tolling time from State’s request to continue trial until rescheduled trial date). {¶ 31} Konicki contends that the trial court’s August 18, 2021 entry was not in compliance with Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 .
examined Cited "see" State v. Wright (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ohio Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See R.C. 2945.72(H) and Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 , at syllabus.
examined Cited "see" Graham v. Warden, Pickaway Correctional Institution (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.D. Ohio · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 13, 441 N.E.2d 571 (multiplying state’s calculation of days “as to the original charges” by three), 14 (same multiplier for new charges).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Bullucks (2×)
unknown court · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), syllabus. {¶22} Each of the court’s continuance entries had an asterisk beside the signature line for defense counsel.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Watkins (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See King, 70 Ohio St.3d at -8- Warren CA2013-02-017 162-163, 637 N.E.2d 903 , and Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d at 8-9 , 441 N.E.2d 571 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Cottrell (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See by way of analogy, Blackburn, supra, at syllabus (holding that in calculating speedy trial time, “periods of delay resulting from motions filed by the defendant in a previous case also apply in a subsequent case in which there are different charges based on the same underlying facts and circumstances of the previous case”). {¶15} R.C. 2945.72(H) provides that speedy trial time tolls for “the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own motion[.]” “When Ross App. Nos. 11CA3241 & 11CA3242 7 sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H)…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Pollock (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), syllabus (“When sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.”) {¶14}Appellant relies upon the prior reasoning of this Court in State v. Wagner, 88 Ohio App.3d 398 , 623 N.E.2d 1338 (4th Dist. 1993) in support of his argument that the speedy trial clock began to run after the filing of the trial court’s December 22, 2010 e…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Adams
Ohio Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8-9 (sua sponte continuances permissible to toll statute of limitations if journalized prior to expiration of statute of limitations period); State v. Lee (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 208 ; State v. Harris, 5th Dist.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Pilgrim (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 2 OBR 282, 441 N.E.2d 571 , syllabus (holding that the trial court must journalize an order granting a sua sponte continuance prior to the expiration of the statutorily prescribed speedy-trial limit).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Allen, 90552 (10-9-2008)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , syllabus ("When sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72 (H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the *Page 7 reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial."). {¶ 14} On June 4, 2007, Allen's attorney filed a motion seeking to withdraw as counsel.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Findley, 07 Ma 53 (3-11-2008) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Baker, Unpublished Decision (5-22-2006)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See King, 70 Ohio St.3d at 162 -163 , and Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d at 8 -9 . {¶ 30} In this case, the trial court entered the order continuing the trial from September 30, 2003 to January 22, 2004 (later moved back to January 14, 2004) by journal entry prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Ross, Unpublished Decision (4-15-2005) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 ("When sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72 (H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefore by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial."); State v. Stamps (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 219 , 712 N.E.2d 762 ; State v. Garries (Dec. 19, 2003), Montgomery App. No. 19825, 2003-Ohio-6895 . {¶ 14} Ross's reliance on State v. Wagner (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 398 , 623 N.E.2d 1338 , is misplaced.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Curtis, Unpublished Decision (10-8-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
No. 9-02-03. 14 R.C. 2945.71 ; see State v. King (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 669 . 15 Mincy , 2 Ohio St.3d at 8 . 16 State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247 , 251 . 17 See Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 ; State v. Smith (June 27, 1995), Franklin App. No. 940APA12-1702. 18 Long , supra, at 94. 19 Id., paragraph 2 of the syllabus; Williford , supra, at 253; State v. Cooperrider (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 226 , 227 ; State v. Joseph , (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450 . 20 See R.C. 2901.01 . 21 State v. Riggins (1986), 35 Ohio App.3d 1 , 8 . 22 See R.C. 2923.03 ; See, also, State v. Cha…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Dunckleman, Unpublished Decision (8-30-2002) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stamps , supra, citing State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 , syllabus.
cited Cited "see" State v. Webb, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Orrill (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 259 , 261 , citing State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 and State v. Saffell (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 90 .
cited Cited "see" City of Akron v. Robinson, Unpublished Decision (4-3-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mincy , supra .
cited Cited "see" State v. Willis, Unpublished Decision (3-22-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , at the syllabus.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Carpenter, Unpublished Decision (3-6-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , syllabus, wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held "[w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72 (H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial." The sole assignment of error is denied.
cited Cited "see" State v. Taylor, Unpublished Decision (10-5-2001)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , syllabus (regarding sua sponte continuances); State v. Stamps , 127 Ohio App.3d at 224 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Barcus, Unpublished Decision (4-25-2000)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , syllabus, wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held "[w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72 (H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial." Assignment of Error III is denied.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Norris, Unpublished Decision (6-7-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , syllabus, wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held "[w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72 (H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial." Assignment of Error I is denied.
discussed Cited "see" City of Ashville v. Sleffel, Unpublished Decision (4-26-1999) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Doane (2×)
Oh. Muni. Ct., Warren · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 6 , 2 OBR 282, 441 N.E. 2d 571 ; State v. Siler (1979), 57 Ohio St. 2d 1 , 11 O.O. 3d 1, 384 N.E. 2d 710 ; State v. McRae, supra, at 153 , 9 O.O. 3d at 121, 378 N.E. 2d at 479 ; and State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 27 , 13 OBR 29, 468 N.E. 2d 328 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Reuschling (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 6, 9 , 2 OBR 282, 284, 441 N.E. 2d 571, 573 .
cited Cited "see" Graham v. Harbour
Ohio Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Miney (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 6, 8 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Graham
Ohio Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare November 14, 2017 indictment in case number 17CR-6193, counts 1, 8, 18, and 39 with id., counts 41 and 43. {¶ 27} From November 14, 2017, when the second indictment issued, to Mr. Graham's plea on July 23, 2018, Mr. Graham's discovery requests and the continuance entries he himself signed with his new counsel tolled at least all but 89 days (or 76 days by the state's count, see Appellee's Brief at 13-14, giving certain entries retroactive application to the dates they recited, as State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 9 (1982) appears to suggest is appropriate).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Ramey (2×)
Ohio · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also State v. McRae, 55 Ohio St.2d 149, 152 , 378 N.E.2d 476 (1978), fn. 3 and 4. {¶ 32} Ideally, “[w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in *315 R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), syllabus.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Holbert, Unpublished Decision (3-8-2007)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence low
In State v. Phillips , Cuyahoga App. No. 82886, 2004-Ohio-484 , this court stated that "any requests by either the state or the court itself for a continuance are infringements upon the defendant's constitutional right, and, thus, subject to scrutiny; consequently, the grounds for the request must be set forth in a journal entry." State v. Baker (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 516 , 530-531 ; see, also, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 8 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Daily, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2006) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Phillips, Unpublished Decision (2-5-2004)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
State v. Baker, supra; see, also, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 8 . {¶ 27} The trial court carefully considered appellant's motion to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Terrell, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2003) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, State v. Mootispaw , supra. 9 See R.C. 2901.22 (A). 10 See State v. Treesh , 90 Ohio St.3d 460 , 2001-Ohio-4 , 739 N.E.2d 749 , at ¶ 59. 11 State v. Scott (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 155 , 165 , 400 N.E.2d 375 , 382 , citing State v. Lockett (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 48 , 358 N.E.2d 1062 , paragraphs three and four of the syllabus. 12 See State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 227 N.E.2d 212 , paragraph one of the syllabus. 13 See State v. High, 143 Ohio App.3d 232 , 242 , 2001-Ohio-3530 , 757 N.E.2d 1176 . 14 See id. 15 See State v. Peirson , 149 Ohio App.3d 318 , 2002-Ohio-4515 , 777 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Pierson (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Mincy (198[2]), 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 [2 OBR 282], 441 N.E.2d 571 ; State v. Siler (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 1, 3 [ 11 O.O.3d 1 ], 384 N.E.2d 710 ; State v. Lee (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 209 [ 2 O.O.3d 392 ], 357 N.E.2d 1095 ; State v. Broerman (Feb. 18, 1983), Lucas App. No. L-82-284, unreported [ 1983 WL 13845 ]. * * * Periods of time otherwise tolled by a defense continuance must be counted against the state, if not so recorded as indicated above.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Hall, Unpublished Decision (4-26-2001) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
State v. Collura (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 364 , 594 N.E.2d 975 ; State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 27 , 468 N.E.2d 328 , paragraph four of the syllabus, approved in State v. Benson (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 321 , 323 , 450 , 505 N.E.2d 987 , 990;see, also, State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Baker (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 8 , 2 OBR 282, 283-284, 441 N.E.2d 571, 572 ; and State v. Siler (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 1, 3 , 11 O.O.3d 1, 2 , 384 N.E.2d 710, 711 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The State of Ohio
v.
Mincy
No. 81-1750.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Nov 10, 1982.
441 N.E.2d 571
Mr. Lee C. Falke, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Ted E. Millspaugh, for appellant., Mr. Jack H. Berger, for appellee.
Brown, Celebrezze, Holmes, Krupansky, Locher, Sweeney.
Cited by 250 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 82%
Citer courts: Ohio Court of Appeals (1)

Lead Opinion

Celebrezze, C.J.

The sole issue to be determined in this appeal is whether a trial court may wait until after the expiration of the statutory time ■within which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial to file its journal entry continuing the case and setting forth the reasons for granting the continuance.

R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) provides that a person against whom a felony charge is pending shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest. R.C. 2945.71(E) states that for purposes of computing time under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge is counted as three days. Appellee was arrested on July 28,1980 and was immediately placed in custody and remained in jail. As a consequence, appellee should have been brought to trial on or before October 27, 1980.

However, R.C. 2945.72 states:

“The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following:

l i * * *

“(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own motion.”

Thus, the time limit provisions in R.C. 2945.71 are flexible to a degree. In fact, this court has on several occasions determined that sua sponte extensions beyond the time prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 were reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Lee (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 208 [2 O.O.3d 392], and Aurora v. Patrick [*8] (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 107 [15 O.O.3d 150]. A close inspection of these cases reveals that the continuances were made by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit in R.C. 2945.71.

In State v. Montgomery (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 78 [15 O.O.3d 119], where we upheld the discharge of the defendant, it was stated:

<<* * * [A] trial court which chooses to exercise its discretion under R.C. 2945.72(H) to sua sponte continue a defendant’s cause should do so prior to the expiration of the statutory period prescribed by R.C. 2945.71. In the instant cause, it is uncontroverted that the court’s action under the authority of R.C. 2945.72(H) occurred after the expiration of the statutory period within which appellee should have been brought to trial.” Id. at 81.

In the case sub judiee, the state argues that because the trial was set within the ninety day period and the continuance was reasonable, no violation of R.C. 2945.71 occurred even though no entry had been made prior to the expiration of the ninetieth day.[1] We cannot agree. This court has previously condemned after-the-fact extension and does not find it to be a meaningful distinction that appellee’s trial was initially scheduled within the statutory time limit. The General Assembly has placed a burden upon the prosecution and the courts to try criminal defendants within a specified time after arrest. If we were to follow the state’s reasoning, the only burden upon the prosecution and the courts would be to assure that a trial is scheduled within the appropriate time limit as long as it could subsequently be explained why the defendant was not brought to trial within the statutory time frame. It is obvious such reasoning does not comport with the purposes of the speedy trial statutes. See State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 104 [73 O.O.2d 357]; State v. Siler (1979), 57 Ohio St. 2d 1 [11 O.O.3d 1].

It is undisputed that in the case sub judiee the ninety-day period within which appellee was to be brought to trial expired before the trial court filed a journal entry continuing the case. Consequently, we find that appellee, prior to the expiration of the statutory time limit, was entitled to one of the following: (1) a trial on the charges or, (2) if his case was being continued by the court or prosecutor, the reason he was not being tried. Since a court may only speak through its journal, it is necessary that such an entry be spread upon its journal prior to the expiration of the statutory time limit. See, e.g., Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1955), 164 Ohio St. 275 [58 O.O. 51]; Schenley v. Kauth (1953), 160 Ohio St. 109 [51 O.O. 30].[2]

[*9] We therefore hold that, when sua sponte granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limits prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.[3]

Judgment affirmed.

W. Brown, Sweeney and Krupansky, JJ., concur. Locher, Holmes and C. Brown, JJ., dissent.
1

Today’s decision should in no way be construed as passing on the reasonableness of the grounds for the sua sponte continuance in the case at bar. That issue is clearly not before us.

2

This provision does not place an undue burden on the trial court. The statute mandates a trial within a specified time. If it should develop that the trial cannot go forward as scheduled, it necessarily follows that the events which would force postponement of the trial would come to the attention of the trial court on or before the scheduled trial date. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that a trial court should be able to prepare and file a journal entry before the statutory time limit expires.

[*9] In the case at bar, the trial court knew on the eighty-seventh day of appellee’s confinement that the trial would not be held as scheduled. As a result, the trial court had three days to prepare and file a journal entry continuing appellee’s case before the ninety-day period elapsed. We believe the trial court had ample time to file a journal entry explaining to the appellee why his trial date was extended beyond the statutory time period.

3

We are reluctantly aware that our decision requires that appellee, convicted by a jury of a serious offense, be discharged and that another prosecution on this charge is .barred. R.C. 2945.73(D). However, we are equally mindful that we have consistently held that the speedy trial statutes are mandatory and must be strictly enforced. State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 218, 221 [18 O.O.3d 427].

Dissent

Holmes, J.,

dissenting. The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. The intent of the General Assembly in enacting, and the public purpose served by the enactment of, the so-called “speedy trial” statute, R.C. 2945.71, was to bring a criminally accused person to trial within a reasonable time frame. As to the computation of time, the section provides that an incarcerated person must be brought to trial within ninety days from date of arrest. R.C. 2945.72(H) provides that the time within which an accused may be brought to trial may be extended for certain specific reasons set forth therein. One of such reasons contained in subsection (H) is:

“The period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own motion.” (Emphasis added.)

It is clear that this court has stated that where a trial court has failed to set a trial date for one criminally accused prior to the running of the statutory time, a continuance thereafter will be held to be unreasonable. State v. Montgomery (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 78 [15 O.O.3d 119]; State v. Siler (1979), 57 Ohio St. 2d 1 [11 O.O.3d 1]; State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 104 [73 O.O.2d 357].

Conversely, this court has held that when the trial date is set within the statutory time set forth in R.C. 2945.71, and an entry, is made by the trial court prior to the running of that time, the continuance will be held to be reasonable where there are crowded docket conditions. State v. Lee (1976), 48[*10] Ohio St. 2d 208 [2 O.O.3d 392]; see, also, Aurora v. Patrick (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 107 [15 O.O.3d 150] (continuance proper for legal holiday).

The facts of the instant case should reasonably bring this court to the same conclusion as did the latter group of cases in that, unlike the facts in Siler, Pudlock and Montgomery, the record here affirmatively demonstrates that the defendant’s case was set for trial within the time limitation of the statute and, equally important, this record contains sufficient evidence to demonstrate both the necessity and reasonableness of the continuance. The record specifically shows that the trial judge became aware on the date originally set for trial that he would still be engaged in a criminal trial which had been commenced a number of days earlier. Such information was conveyed to counsel for the defendant on the date set for trial, and counsel was at such time given a scheduling conference date.

Thus, the instant case is clearly not one involving any attempt or ploy by either the prosecution or the trial court to undercut the provisions of the “speedy trial” statute, or the legislative intent behind such law. The mere mechanical failure of the trial court to record its continuance prior to the expiration of the statutory time limits should not invalidate such good faith continuance which was, in my view, within the spirit and intent of the statute.

The invalidation of the sua sponte continuance in this case by the court of appeals and the majority of this court, merely because such entry was not recorded until after the expiration of the ninety-day period constitutes a disregard for the recognized principle that R.C. 2945.72 was enacted by the General Assembly because strict time limits for trials could not be imposed in all instances. The unreasonably strict interpretation of this section of law as evidenced by the opinion of the majority unfortunately allows a convicted criminal to again roam the streets and offer a potential threat to society. Such a determination renders the speedy trial law a sword against, rather than a shield for, the best societal interest.

Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals.

Locher and C. Brown, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.