Notes of Decisions
Cited in
476
cases (
141 in the last 5 years), 1956–2026 · leading case:
State v. Knott, 2024 Ohio 2289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Knott, 2024 Ohio 2289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 14× “73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
State v. Adams (Slip Opinion), 2015 Ohio 3954 (Ohio 2015).
· cites it 3× “Because Adams was incarcerated during the time between October 4 and 29, 2007, he is entitled to triple-count the 24 days,7 see R.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024 Ohio 1996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 42× “The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Gray, 203 N.E.2d 319 (Ohio 1964).
· cites it 14× “” Section 2945.73 reads: “When application is made for the discharge of a person under Section 2945.”
State v. Clark, 2016 Ohio 2705 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 9× “041; 3) the trial court abused its discretion when it agreed with him regarding his entitlement to discharge after the State violated R.C. 2945.73, yet still refused to order a hearing; and Highland App.”
State v. Cimpaye, 2020 Ohio 2740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 6× ““Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Taylor, 781 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 2002).
· cites it 2× “Neither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Taylor, 2002 Ohio 7017 (Ohio 2002).
· cites it 2× “Neither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Taylor, 2020 Ohio 3481 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 6× “R.C. § 2945.73. See, also, State v. Coatoam (1975), 45 Ohio App.”
State v. Taylor, 2016 Ohio 5912 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 4× “” R.C. §2945.73(B). “[S]uch discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against him based on the same conduct.”
State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St. 3d 274 (Ohio 2006).
· cites it 2× “{¶ 7} Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints “shall be discharged,” and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Wells, 2021 Ohio 2585 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 2× “Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105129, 2017-Ohio-8479, ¶ 18 (a defendant has the right to counsel or the right to act pro se; however, a defendant does not have the right to both, simultaneously).”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(A) — 12 cases
State v. Clark, 2016 Ohio 2705 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
“041; 3) the trial court abused its discretion when it agreed with him regarding his entitlement to discharge after the State violated R.C. 2945.73, yet still refused to order a hearing; and Highland App.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(B) — 294 cases
State v. Adams (Slip Opinion), 2015 Ohio 3954 (Ohio 2015).
“Because Adams was incarcerated during the time between October 4 and 29, 2007, he is entitled to triple-count the 24 days,7 see R.”
State v. Taylor, 781 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 2002).
“Neither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Taylor, 2002 Ohio 7017 (Ohio 2002).
“Neither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St. 3d 274 (Ohio 2006).
“{¶ 7} Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints “shall be discharged,” and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Wells, 2021 Ohio 2585 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021).
“Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105129, 2017-Ohio-8479, ¶ 18 (a defendant has the right to counsel or the right to act pro se; however, a defendant does not have the right to both, simultaneously).”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(B)(1) — 9 cases
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(B)(2) — 4 cases
State v. Church-Green, 2024 Ohio 1996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(B)(2)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Church-Green, 2024 Ohio 1996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(B)(3) — 1 case
State v. Church-Green, 2024 Ohio 1996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(C) — 12 cases
State v. Cimpaye, 2020 Ohio 2740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
““Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Knott, 2024 Ohio 2289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024 Ohio 1996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(C)(1) — 13 cases
State v. Church-Green, 2024 Ohio 1996 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Cimpaye, 2020 Ohio 2740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
““Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Knott, 2024 Ohio 2289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(C)(2) — 15 cases
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(D) — 33 cases
State v. Taylor, 2016 Ohio 5912 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
“” R.C. §2945.73(B). “[S]uch discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against him based on the same conduct.”
State v. Knott, 2024 Ohio 2289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).
“73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(H) — 3 cases
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