(A) A charge of felony shall be dismissed if the accused is not accorded a preliminary hearing within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code. Such a dismissal has the same effect as a nolle prosequi.
(B)(1) Upon motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with a misdemeanor shall be discharged if the person is not brought to trial within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code. Such a discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against the person based on the same conduct.
(2) Regardless of whether a longer time limit may be provided by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code, a person charged with misdemeanor shall be discharged if the person is held in jail in lieu of bond awaiting trial on the pending charge:
(a) For a total period equal to the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the most serious misdemeanor charged;
(b) For a total period equal to the term of imprisonment allowed in lieu of payment of the maximum fine which may be imposed for the most serious misdemeanor charged, when the offense or offenses charged constitute minor misdemeanors.
(3) A discharge under division (B)(2) of this section is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against the person based on the same conduct.
(C)(1) A person charged with a felony, who is not brought to trial within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code, is eligible for release from detention. The court may release the person from any detention in connection with the charges pending trial and may impose any terms or conditions on the release that the court considers appropriate.
(2) Upon motion made at or before the commencement of trial, but not sooner than fourteen days before the day the person would become eligible for release pursuant to division (C)(1) of this section, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice unless the person is brought to trial on those charges within fourteen days after the motion is filed and served on the prosecuting attorney. If no motion is filed, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice unless the person is brought to trial on those charges within fourteen days after it is determined by the court that the time for trial required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code has expired. If it is determined by the court that the time for trial required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code has expired, no additional charges arising from the same facts and circumstances as the original charges may be added during the fourteen-day period specified under this division. The fourteen-day period specified under this division may be extended at the request of the accused or on account of the fault or misconduct of the accused.
Last updated March 8, 2023 at 11:40 AM
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 476
cases (141 in the last 5 years), 1956–2026 · leading case: State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, 245 N.E.3d 500.
State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, 245 N.E.3d 500. · cites it 14ד73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
State v. Adams (Slip Opinion), 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127. · cites it 3דBecause Adams was incarcerated during the time between October 4 and 29, 2007, he is entitled to triple-count the 24 days,7 see R.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024-Ohio-1996. · cites it 42דThe majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Gray, 203 N.E.2d 319 (Ohio 1964). · cites it 14ד” Section 2945.73 reads: “When application is made for the discharge of a person under Section 2945.”
State v. Clark, 2016-Ohio-2705. · cites it 9ד041; 3) the trial court abused its discretion when it agreed with him regarding his entitlement to discharge after the State violated R.C. 2945.73, yet still refused to order a hearing; and Highland App.”
State v. Cimpaye, 2020-Ohio-2740, 154 N.E.3d 415. · cites it 6ד“Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Taylor, 781 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 2002). · cites it 2דNeither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Taylor, 2002-Ohio-7017, 98 Ohio St. 3d 27. · cites it 2דNeither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-3481. · cites it 6דR.C. § 2945.73. See, also, State v. Coatoam (1975), 45 Ohio App.”
State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-5912. · cites it 4ד” R.C. §2945.73(B). “[S]uch discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against him based on the same conduct.”
State v. Sanchez, 853 N.E.2d 283 (Ohio 2006). · cites it 2ד{¶ 7} Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints “shall be discharged,” and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585. · cites it 2דDavis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105129, 2017-Ohio-8479, ¶ 18 (a defendant has the right to counsel or the right to act pro se; however, a defendant does not have the right to both, simultaneously).”
Styer v. Brichta, 591 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1990).
State v. Clark, 2016-Ohio-2705. “041; 3) the trial court abused its discretion when it agreed with him regarding his entitlement to discharge after the State violated R.C. 2945.73, yet still refused to order a hearing; and Highland App.”
State v. Adams (Slip Opinion), 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127. “Because Adams was incarcerated during the time between October 4 and 29, 2007, he is entitled to triple-count the 24 days,7 see R.”
State v. Taylor, 781 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 2002). “Neither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Taylor, 2002-Ohio-7017, 98 Ohio St. 3d 27. “Neither appellant nor defense counsel moved to dismiss charges against him on speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B). Thus, the delay resulting from his counsel’s request to continue the trial in order to consider motions filed on appellant’s behalf should not be…”
State v. Sanchez, 853 N.E.2d 283 (Ohio 2006). “{¶ 7} Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints “shall be discharged,” and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585. “Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105129, 2017-Ohio-8479, ¶ 18 (a defendant has the right to counsel or the right to act pro se; however, a defendant does not have the right to both, simultaneously).”
State v. Church-Green, 2024-Ohio-1996. “The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024-Ohio-1996. “The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024-Ohio-1996. “The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.73(C): 12 cases
State v. Cimpaye, 2020-Ohio-2740, 154 N.E.3d 415. ““Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, 245 N.E.3d 500. “73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024-Ohio-1996. “The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Church-Green, 2024-Ohio-1996. “The majority concludes the municipal court erred in granting Church-Green’s motion for discharge under R.C. 2945.73(B) because Church-Green was not held in lieu of bond solely on the pending charge.”
State v. Cimpaye, 2020-Ohio-2740, 154 N.E.3d 415. ““Speedy-trial provisions are mandatory, and, pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B), a person not brought to trial within the relevant time constraints ‘shall be discharged,’ and further criminal proceedings based on the same conduct are barred.”
State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, 245 N.E.3d 500. “73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
State v. Berger, 477 N.E.2d 473 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1984).
State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-5912. “” R.C. §2945.73(B). “[S]uch discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against him based on the same conduct.”
State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, 245 N.E.3d 500. “73 in a manner that changed the procedure for handling situations where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 270-day statutory time limit.”
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