Donald Eslick v. Charles Traughber Rose Hill Dawn Chase, 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
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Donald Eslick v. Charles Traughber Rose Hill Dawn Chase, 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “A major purpose of compromise is to avoid the expenses, burdens, and uncertainty associated with litigation.”
93 citation events (52 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Brown v. Madison District Public Schools (mied, 2023-05-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Brown v. Madison District Public Schools
E.D. Mich. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
entry into the constitutional orbit requires more than a mere relationship.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Boyd v. Engman
W.D. Mich. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a major purpose of compromise is to avoid the expenses, burdens, and uncertainty associated with litigation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prime Financial, Inc. v. Mark Shapiro (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
6th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
Notably, however, “[a] bankruptcy judge need not hold a mini-trial or write an extensive opinion every time he approves or disapproves a settlement.” Id. at 313 (alteration in original) (quoting Fishell v. Soltow (In re Fishell), 47 F.3d 1168, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (table)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jobe v. General Motors, LLC
N.D. Ohio · 2023 · confidence medium
Inc., 47 F.3d 1168, at *3 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (concluding “the single incident of [defendant] calling plaintiff or another female a slut on one occasion is insufficient evidence from which a jury might infer the existence of a sexually hostile work environment.”); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that “under the totality of the circumstances, a single battery coupled with two merely offensive remarks over a six-month period does not create an issue of material fact . . .”); Williams v. CSX Transp.
discussed Cited "see" Barrett v. Andre Chreky, Inc. (In Re Andre Chreky, Inc.)
D.D.C. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Advantage Healthplan, 891 B.R. at 554 (“[A] bankruptcy judge ‘need not hold a mini-trial or write an extensive opinion every time he approves or disapproves a settlement.’” (quoting In re Fishell, 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir.1995))).
discussed Cited "see" In Re: Andre Chreky, Inc.
D.D.C. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Advantage Healthplan, 391 B.R. at 554 (“[A] bankruptcy judge ‘need not hold a mini-trial or write an extensive opinion every time he approves or disapproves a settlement.’” (quoting In re Fishell, 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir. 1995))).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Nicole Energy Services, Inc. (2×)
Bankr. S.D. Ohio · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fishell v. Soltow (In re Fishell), 47 F.3d 1168 (talplé), 1995 WL 66622 at *3 (6th Cir. 1995).
cited Cited "see" In Re Novak
Bankr. W.D. Mich. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See, n. 7, supra. 21 . 196 Fed.Appx. 383 (6th Cir.2006). 22 . 49 Fed.Appx. 528 (6th Cir.2002). 23 . 47 F.3d 1168 , 1995 WL 66622 (6th Cir.1995). 24 .
discussed Cited "see" in re: Elva M. Cook v.
6th Cir. BAP · 2006 · signal: accord · confidence high
Bard, 49 F. App’x at 530 (quoting TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424 , and citing Drexel v. Loomis, 35 F.2d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 1929)) (additional citations omitted); accord, e.g., Fishell v. Soltow (In re Fishell), 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (unreported table opinion), available at 1995 WL 66622 , 5 at **3 (quoting Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Props.), 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Haven, Inc. v. (2×)
6th Cir. BAP · 2005 · signal: accord · confidence high
Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 , 88 S. Ct. 1157 (1968), and citing Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Props.), 784 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986))); accord, e.g., Fishell v. Soltow (In re Fishell), 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (unreported table decision) (quoting TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424-25 ); Reynolds v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Am.
cited Cited "see" Luper v. United Bank, Inc. (In Re Owens)
Bankr. S.D. Ohio · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See, In re Nasr, 191 B.R. at 692 (citing In re Edney, 47 F.3d 1168 (full text not published) (6th Cir.1995)).
cited Cited "see" Field v. Lebanon Citizens National Bank (In Re Knee)
Bankr. S.D. Ohio · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Whittaker v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Edney), 47 F.3d 1168 , 1995 WL 16883 (6th Cir.1995) (construing Ohio law).
discussed Cited "see" Patricia J. Butler v. Ohio Power Company
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gray v. Preform Sealants, Inc., 47 F.3d 1168 (6th Cir.1995) (unpublished disposition); see also Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083-86 (affirming directed verdict where plaintiff established prima facie case but failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext).
cited Cited "see" Milton Lee Holt v. Charles Traughber Tennessee Board of Paroles, Unknown Members
6th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Eslick v. Traughber, No. 94-5696, 1995 WL 33885, at * 1 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 1995), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-8573 (Mar. 22, 1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation
E.D. Mich. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
The plaintiff in that action, after listing the substantive elements of the alleged antitrust violation, *666 “pleaded that even though it had used all due diligence it could not have discovered its cause of action any earlier than 1973, when the government filed a complaint against these defendants.” The Sixth Circuit found that the “mere allegation of due diligence without asserting what steps were taken is insufficient.” Id,.; see also Gumbus v. United Food and Comm. Workers Int’l Union, 47 F.3d 1168 , 1995 WL 5935 (6th Cir.1995) (“[T]o overcome a 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiffs…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Seiler v. Charter Township of Northville
E.D. Mich. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Vu, Inc. v. City of Dearborn, 47 F.3d 1168 (Table), 1995 WL 63253, at 3 (6th Cir.(Mich.)) (unpublished decision); Milne v. Township of Oregon, 777 F.Supp. 536, 539 (E.D.Mich.1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Goldsmith v. City of Canton, 47 F.3d 1168 (unpub.) (6th Cir.1995); Gebers v. Commercial Data Ctr., Inc., 47 F.3d 1168 (unpub.) (6th Cir.1995); Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir.1993); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir.1993); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.1986).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Donald Eslick
v.
Charles Traughber Rose Hill Dawn Chase
94-5696.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Jan 27, 1995.
47 F.3d 1168
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Unpublished
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 85%
Citer courts: W.D. Michigan (1)

47 F.3d 1168

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
Donald ESLICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Charles TRAUGHBER; Rose Hill; Dawn Chase, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-5696.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Jan. 27, 1995.

Before: JONES, CONTIE and MILBURN, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

1

Donald Eslick, a pro se Tennessee prisoner, appeals a district court order dismissing his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

2

Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, Eslick sued multiple Tennessee parole board members challenging the process the board members used to deny Eslick's parole. The defendants were sued in their individual and official capacities. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Although the district court subsequently modified its opinion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Eslick's complaint was still dismissed pursuant to Sec. 1915(d).

3

In his timely appeal, Eslick continues to argue the merits of his complaint. He also contends that the district court erred in construing the complaint as a habeas petition and in dismissing the complaint as frivolous. Appellees have informed the court that they will not be filing a brief.

4

The dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992). A district court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). Claims that lack an arguable basis in law include claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1198-99.

5

Eslick admits that he is not entitled to parole in Tennessee. However, despite the fact that he may not be entitled to parole, Eslick argues that he has a constitutional right as to the due process used to conduct the hearing and deny his parole. Eslick's argument was rejected by this court in Banner v. Bradley, No. 93-5329, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18125, at * 7-10 (6th Cir. July 15, 1994) (per curiam). In Banner, this court stated that absent a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in parole, an inmate does not have a right to receive "due process" before the state may deny his request for parole. Id.

6

Eslick argues that the parole board's decision to deny him another hearing until 2003 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Eslick argues that he was sentenced in 1982 when he had a liberty interest in parole under Tennessee law. Although Tennessee law has subsequently changed so as to eliminate the liberty interest in parole, Eslick contends that the elimination of the liberty interest would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, this very argument was rejected by this court in Robinson v. Board of Paroles, No. 88-6400, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9161, at * 1-2 (6th Cir. June 23, 1989).

7

Eslick contends that the district court should not have sua sponte dismissed his complaint. However, because the district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to Sec. 1915(d), the complaint could be dismissed sua sponte. See Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1986).

8

Eslick argues that the district court erred in construing his complaint as a petition for habeas relief. However, in its modified judgment entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), the district court amended its judgment and construed Eslick's complaint as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Thus, Eslick's argument is rendered moot by the modified judgment.

9

Finally, Eslick contends that the district court should not have dismissed his complaint as frivolous. However, the arguments raised by Eslick were addressed by this court in Banner and Robinson. In both Banner and Robinson, the court found the arguments to be frivolous under Sec. 1915(d). Eslick's argument is therefore meritless.

10

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. Rule 9(b)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.