At page 931 Defining persecution for asylum purposes and past persecution standard9 citing casesholding that petitioner established persecution based on a political opinion where he was harassed and beaten
- Matepa v. Mukasey, 283 F. App'x 453 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublishedMontoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir.1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A).
- Ghazaryan v. Gonzales, 215 F. App'x 585 (9th Cir. 2006).unpublishedIn particular, he was persecuted due to his membership in the NDU, see Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir.1996), and his ongoing efforts to expose government corruption at senior levels, see Mamouzian, 390 F.3d at 1134 ; Grava…
- Galina Ivanovna Smolniakova v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., 422 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).published (holding that persecution for asylum purposes means “infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as offensive)
- Zoghbi v. Gonzales, 148 F. App'x 596 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublishedTo demonstrate past persecution, a petitioner “must show that he was harmed on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social group, or political opinion.” Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir.1996).
- Vassil Nikolov Vassilev Tzvetanka Gantchev Vassilev Nikolay Vassilev Nikolov Ganka Vassilev Nikolov v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 110 F.3d 72 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublishedBecause "[i]t is not possible to characterize [the Bulgarian government's actions] as an inoffensive infliction of suffering or harm," Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir.1996), Vassil established that he had suffered past pers…
- Leonardo Jose Molina-Morena v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 91 F.3d 153 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished Past Persecution 4 "An alien seeking asylum based on past persecution must show that he was harmed on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d…
- William Locadio Espinoza-Rivera v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 86 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublishedId 2 But see Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d 930, 931 (1996)
- Singh v. Gonzales, 182 F. App'x 676 (9th Cir. 2006).unpublished(holding that petitioner established persecution based on a political opinion where he was harassed and beaten)
At page 932 [D]ue to the nature of the violence and threats directed at [the petitioner], i.e. his being placed on a ‘blacklist,’ we find that [he] has established a clear probability of persecutionf.]1 citing case
- Abaya v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 2 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished([D]ue to the nature of the violence and threats directed at [the petitioner], i.e. his being placed on a ‘blacklist,’ we find that [he] has established a clear probability of persecutionf.])
Other citing cases
- Carlos Flores-Yeffel v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- Alberto Alexander Mora-Artola v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 86 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Luis Alberto Montoya-Ulloa, a Nicaraguan national, appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. Montoya argues, inter alia, that the evidence compels the eon-elusion that the Sandinistas persecuted him on account of his political opinion.
An alien seeking asylum based on past persecution must show that he was harmed on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See, e.g., Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.1988); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). We review the decision of the BIA for substantial evidence. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). The substantial evidence standard “requires that the BIA’s conclusion, based on the evidence presented, be substantially reasonable.” De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1990).
The record establishes that Montoya was harassed, threatened and beaten by the Sandinista Youth, a group that was recognized and sponsored by the Sandinista government, for his political opinion as expressed through his activities with the Independent Liberal Youth, a group openly opposed to the Sandinistas. [1] Although Montoya was the victim of violence on account of his political opinion, the immigration judge and the BIA concluded that he was not persecuted within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This conclusion is not consistent with this Court’s prior interpretations of persecution. See, e.g., Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir.1985)(defining persecution as the “infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as offensive.”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986). It is not possible to characterize Montoya’s beating as an inoffensive infliction of suffering or harm. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the BIA and remand for further proceedings. The attorney general should determine in the exercise of discretion, whether to grant asylum to Montoya. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
[*932] In addition, due to the nature of the violence and threats directed at Montoya, i.e. his being placed on a “blacklist”, we find that Montoya has established a clear probability of persecution on account of his political opinion. Therefore, Montoya is entitled to withholding of deportation. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-430, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Petitioner is entitled to his costs on appeal.
. For the purpose of defining persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act, there is no distinction between the direct actions of the government and the actions of a group that is recognized and sponsored by the government.