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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2003 ·
…a district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in the psr that are not specifically objected to by the parties
at p. 959
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Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996
2011
2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#11
18 U.S.C. § 1158
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Johnson
See United States v. Willie, 253 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.2001); United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Frankie Lee Chappell
United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 702-03 (8th Cir.2003) (standard of review); see also United States v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir.2003) (care or custody); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir.1999) (obstruction of justice enhancement); United States v. La-Roche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (district court does not err in finding use of force in relying on unobjeeted factual matters contained in the PSR).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Flores
United States v. Bougie, 279 F.3d 648, 650-51 (8th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Joshua, 40 F.3d 948 (8th Cir.1994)); see, e.g., United States v. Young, 272 F.3d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir.2001) (“[Ujnless a defendant objects to specific factual allegations contained in the PSR, a district court may accept the facts as true for purposes of sentencing.”) (citing United States v. Moser, 168 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir.1999)); United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per cu-riam) (“A district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in the PSR that are not spe…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Julio Oviedo
We reject these arguments: (1) because Oviedo’s criminal history category would be the same without the two challenged criminal history points, any error would be harmless, see United States v. Tiger, 223 F.3d 811, 812-13 (8th Cir.2000), and in any event his challenge is completely unfounded; (2) the district court did not, in fact, assess any gun-possession enhancement; and (3) not only did Oviedo stipulate to the drug quantity he now challenges, see United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.1995) (defendant who voluntarily exposes himself to specific sentence may not challenge tha…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Stanley Harris
See United States v. Howard, 169 F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1999) (standard of review); United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in PSR not specifically objected to by parties); see also United States v. Payne, 81 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1996) (temporal and spatial nexus between drugs and weapon existed where weapon was found in same location as drugs or where part of conspiracy took place).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Tyrone P. Douglas
See United States v. Snoddy, 139 F.3d 1224, 1231 (8th Cir. 1998) (defendant convicted of “sole-participant” offense may be entitled to mitigating role reduction if relevant conduct for which defendant would otherwise be accountable involved more than one participant, and defendant’s culpability for such conduct was relatively minor compared to that of other participant or participants); United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in PSR that are not specifically objected to by parties).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jeffrey Paul Moser
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 132 F.3d 440 , 441 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1821 , 119 S. Ct. 116 (1998); United States v. McFarland, 116 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 394 (1997); and United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jeffrey Paul Moser, A/K/A Harry N. Moser
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 132 F.3d 440 , 441 (8th Cir.1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -— , 118 S.Ct. 1821 , 140 L.Ed.2d 958 and — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 116 , 142 L.Ed.2d 93 (1998); United States v. McFarland, 116 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 394 , 139 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997); and United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Samson Jegede
Jegede failed to object to any factual matter in the presentence report (PSR), which described the various drugs involved in the offense including 13.5 ounces of “crack cocaine.” See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in PSR that are not specifically objected to by parties).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Brent Loy
Loy waived at sentencing his objection to the PSR&s attribution to him of the 200 pounds of marijuana, which was based upon a statement Loy gave to an investigator; hence, he cannot now challenge that fact, see United States v. Hipolito-Sanchez, 998 F.2d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), and the district court did not clearly err in its drug quantity determination, see United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Brent Loy
Loy appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in including in his drug quantity 200 pounds of marijuana attributed to him in his presentence report (PSR), in denying him an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, and in denying him a downward departure based upon his health problems. 2 Loy waived at sentencing his objection to the PSR's attribution to him of the 200 pounds of marijuana, which was based upon a statement Loy gave to an investigator; hence, he cannot now challenge that fact, see United States v. Hipolito-Sanchez, 998 F.2d 594, 596 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam), a…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Keith J. Gatlin
See United States v. Hill, 91 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir.1996) (defining plain error); United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (district court entitled to accept as true factual statements in PSR to which defendant does not object). 3 We requested Gatlin's counsel to submit a supplemental brief in this case addressing whether Gatlin's prior Eastern District of Missouri conviction barred a part of the instant prosecution based on double jeopardy.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Keith J. Gatlin
See United States v. Hill, 91 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir. 1996) (defining plain error); United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court entitled to accept as true factual statements in PSR to which defendant does not object).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Donny Lamer Canady
Among other things, the presentence report's uncontested account of Canady's offense conduct characterized the substance that he distributed to a confidential informant and that the informant saw in Canady's residence as "crack cocaine." See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Donny Lamer Canady
Among other things, the presentence report's uncontested account of Canady's offense conduct characterized the substance that he distributed to a confidential informant and that the informant saw in Canady's residence as "crack cocaine." See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam). 5 Finally, Canady challenges a criminal history point he received based on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for which he had been fined and sentenced to one year of probation.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Frenklyn Piggie
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[a] district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in the PSR that are not specifically objected to by the parties") (citing United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190, 192-93 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 938 (1996)).
examined
Cited "see"
United States v. Frenklyn Piggie
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that "[a] district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in the PSR that are not specifically objected to by the parties") (citing United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190, 192-93 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 938 , 117 S.Ct. 318 , 136 L.Ed.2d 233 (1996)). 10 Piggie and the dissent also argue that a specific objection to the base offense level was lodged during sentencing because counsel for Piggie and the government informed the District Court that it had to make a factual determinati…
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Michael Clauff
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
Lawrence F. LaRoche v. United States
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Kenyun Robinson
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam ) (district court may accept as true the factual allegations contained in PSR not specifically objected to by parties).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. John McFarland Also Known as Buggy, United States of America v. Darryl Warren, Also Known as Monk
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. John McFarland
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Vickie Sue Clause
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam). 4 Clause's argument as to withdrawal of her guilty plea also fails.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Vickie Sue Clause
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Allie Harper
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (district court entitled to accept as true factual statements in PSR to which defendant does not object).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Allie Harper
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court entitled to accept as true factual statements in PSR to which defendant does not object).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Fred S. McCaslin
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court entitled to accept as true factual statements in PSR to which defendant does not object); United States v. Tauil- Hernandez, 88 F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1996) (in conspiracy case, sufficient nexus for § 2D1.1(b)(1) increase established if weapons found in same location as drugs or where part of conspiracy occurred); United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d -2- 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (proof of connection between firearms and criminal activity does not require showing defendant used or touched g…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Fred Stephen McCaslin
See United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (district court entitled to accept as true factual statements in PSR to which defendant does not object); United States v. Tauil-Hernandez, 88 F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir.1996) (in conspiracy case, sufficient nexus for § 2D1.1(b)(1) increase established if weapons found in same location as drugs or where part of conspiracy occurred); United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (proof of connection between firearms and criminal activity does not require showing defendant used or touched gun; cons…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Lawrence Fay LaROCHE, Appellant
v.
Lawrence Fay LaROCHE, Appellant
95-3415.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
May 13, 1996.
Stanley E. Whiting, Winner, SD, argued, for appellant., Michelle Tapken, Sioux Falls, SD, argued, for Appellee.
Fagg, Bowman, Hansen.
Cited by 29 opinions | Published
[*959] PER CURIAM.
Lawrence Fay LaRoche appeals the sentence imposed by the district court [1] after he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 2241(c). For reversal, LaRoche argues the district court erred by relying on “contested” facts in the presentence report (PSR) as the basis for assessing the use-of-foree enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(l). We affirm.
LaRoehe’s PSR recommended a four-level increase under section 2A3.1(b)(l) because he used force and threats to commit the instant offense. LaRoche objected to the recommended enhancement, and to the factual statements contained in paragraphs four and five of the PSR. At sentencing, the district, relying on the unchallenged factual allegations contained in paragraphs six, seven, and ten of LaRoehe’s PSR, found that LaRoche had used force and threats to commit the instant offense, and overruled LaRoehe’s objection. [2] The district court sentenced La-Roehe to 235 months imprisonment and five years supervised release.
Section 2A3.1(b)(l) states that “[i]f the offense was committed by the means set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b) ... increase by 4 levels.” Section 2241(a) includes the act of causing another person to engage in a sexual act by using force against that person, see 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1), or by threatening or placing the other person in fear that any person will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, see 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(2).
A district court may accept as true all factual allegations contained in the PSR that are not specifically objected to by the parties. United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190, 192-93 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc). Because LaRoche did not specifically object to the factual allegations contained in paragraphs six, seven, and ten of the PSR, we conclude the district court did not err by relying on those paragraphs in assessing the challenged enhancement. See United States v. Beatty, 9 F.3d 686, 690-91 (8th Cir.1993). Moreover, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in assessing the use-of-force enhancement. See United States v. Saknikent, 30 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir.1994) (standard of review). The uncontested facts show that LaRoche forced the victim to perform various sexual acts, that he threatened her with retaliation if she told anyone about the abuse, and that the victim feared retaliation by LaRoche. Cf. United States v. Knife, 9 F.3d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1993) (evidence that defendant weighing 210 pounds lay on victim, held her down during contact, and told her not to tell or “ ‘he would do more’ that victim felt defendant’s presence physically threatening; that victim continued to fear defendant after leaving his home; and that defendant struck victim, though not during sexual conduct, was more than sufficient to show offense was committed by use of force or threat).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.