green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
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“as an amendment to the scope of the judicial power under article iii, state immunity is jurisdictional in the same sense as the complete diversity requirement, or the well-pleaded 63 complaint rule.”
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Kimel v. State of FL Bd. of Regents
(2×)
But cf. Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that the court will not “regard” a legislation that does not affect a judicially-recognized “specially protected” class, as an enactment “to enforce the Equal Protection Clause” unless Congress explicitly stated that it is enforcing that clause), amended on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
In Re Fennelly
as an amendment to the scope of the judicial power under article iii, state immunity is jurisdictional in the same sense as the complete diversity requirement, or the well-pleaded 63 complaint rule.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Neal El v. Valasek
Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 1992); Wilson- Jones v. Caviness, 107 F.3d 358, 358 (6th Cir. 1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph M. Popovich, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee, Cuyahoga County
Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1996), as amended by 107 F.3d 358, 358-59 (6th Cir. 1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division
Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996), as amended by 107 F.3d 358, 358-59 (6th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Royal Geropsychiatric Services, Inc. v. Tompkins
See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996), amended by 107 F.3d 358 (1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Royal Geropsychiatric Services, Inc. v. Tompkins
See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996), amended by 107 F.3d 358 (1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Kimel v. State of FL Bd. of Regents
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470-71 . 52 explicitly stated that it is enforcing that clause), amended on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Hou Hawaiians v. Cayetano
See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 , 206 n. 1 (6th Cir.1996), amended on denial of r’hrg, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997). 11 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Velasquez v. Frapwell
See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir.1996) (Fair Labor Standards Act held not an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power, despite references to “discrimination” in legislative history), mod. on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited "see"
MacKlin v. Huffman
See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996) (relying in part on Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 , *1093 104 S.Ct. 900, 919 , 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), opinion amended on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Davis v. Jackson County Municipal Court
The FLSA, however, did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, and, therefore, “the Eleventh Amendment bars suit under the FLSA by private citizens against the state.” Kohus v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, No. 1:09-cv-658, 2011 WL 1234021 , at *16 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 15, 2011); see also Wilson —Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 205-06 (6th Cir.1996), modified, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997) (“[W]e hold that the part of the FLSA that purports to give federal courts jurisdiction over an action against a state for violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hour provisions is unconstitu…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bryant v. New Jersey Department of Transportation
See Wheeling, 141 F.3d 88 at 93-94 (finding that the immunity abrogation provision of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. § 11501 , was Fourteenth Amendment legislation under Seminole Tribe based upon “evidence in section 11501’s legislative history and judicially-recognized anti-discrimination purpose”); see also id. (interpreting Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir.1996), amended by 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997), to permit courts to uphold such legislation where “Congress made findings that a particular group needed legal protection to r…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Middlebrooks v. University of Maryland at College Park
See also Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s language in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) supersedes Patsy and requires federal courts to raise Eleventh Amendment claims), reh'g denied and amended by 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997). 2 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Clark v. State of California
See, e.g., Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a clear indication from Congress is the simplest way to show that a statute is enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment), amended on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997). 16 Also, in our holding with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, we follow past decisions of our court as well as those of the Supreme Court.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Clark v. California
See, e.g., Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a clear indication from Congress is the simplest way to show that a statute is enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment), amended on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Moad v. Arkansas State Police Department
See also Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1996), modified on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Moad v. Arkansas State Police Department
See also Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1996), modified on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997) (per curiam ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Palotai v. University of Maryland College Park
See, e.g., Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.Bd 203 (6th Cir.1996), amended by 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997); Bergemann v. Rhode Island, 958 F.Supp. 61 (D.R.I.1997); Taylor v. Virginia, 951 F.Supp. 591 (E.D.Va.1996); Rehberg v. Department of Pub.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bergemann v. Rhode Island
See, e.g., Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir.1996), modified, 107 F.3d 358 (1997), Taylor v. Virginia, 951 F.Supp. 591 (E.D.Va.1996); Rehberg v. Department of Public Safety, 946 F.Supp. 741 (S.D.Iowa 1996); Chauvin v. Louisiana, 937 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.La.1996); Mills v. Maine, Civ.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robin M. WILSON-JONES, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
Rev. E. Theophilus CAVINESS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees
v.
Rev. E. Theophilus CAVINESS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees
95-3086/95-3143.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Jan 16, 1997.
107 F.3d 358
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1075
ORDER
The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en bane, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the original panel.
The panel wishes to amend the second and third sentences of the second paragraph of Section II (pages 2-3 of the slip opinion, 99 F.3d at 206).
As an amendment to the scope of the judicial power under Article III, state immunity is jurisdictional in the same sense as the complete diversity requirement, Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806), or the well-pleaded complaint rule, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Although both of the[*-1217] latter two doctrines are based only on statutory interpretation, state immunity is similar to them in that neither the litigants’ consent, nor oversight, nor convenience can justify a court’s exercise of illegal power.
The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.