Pretrial incarceration does not constitute grounds for reversal if the defendant is represented by counsel and no prejudice to the defense is demonstrated.
An appellant convicted of possessing stolen property challenges his conviction on several grounds. He argues that his pretrial incarceration prejudiced his defense, that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence of stolen furs observed in his vehicle during a traffic stop, and that certain voluntary admissions were improperly admitted. The court finds that pretrial detention does not warrant reversal if the defendant was represented by counsel and no prejudice is shown. Furthermore, the court holds that the evidence obtained from the vehicle was properly admitted and the voluntary admissions were admissible. The judgment is affirmed.
No citing cases on record.
v.
The STATE of Florida
The appellant was informed against, tried and convicted of the crime of buying, receiving or concealing stolen property, and sentenced to confinement for a period of five years. The contentions presented on his appeal have been considered in the light of the record, briefs and argument and are found to be without merit.
The incarceration of the defendant on this and other charges for a considerable period before trial furnishes no basis for reversal of the judgment. The defendant was represented by counsel, and there is no showing that the period of his incarceration before trial operated to prejudice his defense of the cause. Loy v. Grayson, Fla.1957, 99 So.2d 555; Kemp v. State, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 58. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of stolen property, obtained by police at the time of and following the arrest. When the defendant was stopped by police and placed under arrest for observed traffic violations, the arresting officer directed his flashlight into the automobile which defendant had been driv[*762]ing and observed furs on tlie rear seat. .The items were found to be stolen property and the defendant was charged as above stated. • Joyner v. State, 157 Fla. 874, 27 So.2d 349; State v. Simmons, Fla.1956, 85 So.2d 879.
We have considered, and rej ected as lacking in merit, the further contention of the appellant that certain admissions voluntarily made by him to the police were improperly received in evidence. See Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882.
Affirmed.