Plaintiff Galactic Towing, Inc. (“Galactic”), a motor vehicle towing operator, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of certain sections of Defendant City of Miami Beach’s (“City”) Municipal Code regulating motor vehicle towing. The district court denied Galactic’s requested relief and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The principal issue in this case is whether the City’s regulations fall within the public safety exception to the preemption contained in The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). After de novo review, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the City’s challenged motor vehicle towing regulations fall within the public safety exception to ICCTA, as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002), and thus escape federal preemption. See Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, — F.Supp.2d -(S.D.Fla. Mar. 25, 2003)

Section 14501(c) of ICCTA, as amended, preempts provisions by a “State [or] political subdivision of a State ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor vehicle carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (2000). ^[1] ICCTA, however, pro[*1251] vides an exception to this general federal preemption, directing that it “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

In Ours Garage, a similar vehicle towing case, the Supreme Court recently interpreted the preemptive force of § 14501(c) of ICCTA. The Court first noted that although § 14501(c) generally preempts state regulation of the “price, route, or service of any motor carrier,” the statutory exception to this preemption for “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles” saves both state and municipal regulations falling within its reach from federal preemption. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 428, 122 S.Ct. 2226. The Court reasoned that “Congress’ clear purpose in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of States’ economic authority over motor carriers of property, § 14501(c)(1), ‘not restrict’ the preexisting and traditional state police power over safety.” Id. at 489, 122 S.Ct. 2226. As such, the Court stated that any local regulation of “prices, routes, or services of tow trucks that is not genuinely responsive to safety concerns garners no .exemption from § 14501(c)(l)’s preemption rule.” Id. at 442, 122 S.Ct. 2226. The Court expressed no opinion as to the scope of local regulations that are indeed “genuinely responsive” to public safety concerns.

Galactic makes essentially three arguments on appeal.

1. Whether the Ordinance is Genuinely Related to Safety.

Galactic argues that the district court erred by ruling that the challenged sections of the City’s vehicle towing ordinance fall within § 14501(e)(2)(A)’s public safety exception because the record fails to support a finding that the ordinance is “genuinely responsive” to safety concerns, as required by Ours Garage.

Galactic contends that certain sections of the City’s non-consensual towing ordinance, embodied in §§ 106-264 (towing permit), 106-266 (business application requirement), 106-268(a)(l) (written authorization for tow), and 106-268(a)(5) (storage within city limits) are not genuinely responsive to the City’s safety concerns. ^[2]

[*1252] The district court carefully considered the challenged sections of the City’s vehicle towing ordinance, identifying and discussing analogous towing ordinances where courts held them to fall under the purview of § 14501(c)(2)(A). See Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, — F.Supp.2d -, (S.D.Fla. Mar. 25, 2003).

The record supports the district court’s ruling that the challenged sections of the City’s ordinance are “genuinely responsive” to public safety concerns. Several analogous cases have upheld similar city ordinances. The Fifth Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court subsequent to its Ours Garage decision, recently denied a tow truck company’s preemption challenge to a similar city ordinance regulating vehicle towing, holding that the ordinance fell under the purview of § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s public safety exception. See Cole v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 730 (5th Cir.2002) (regulation requiring criminal history included within safety exception). Likewise, a Washington appellate court recently upheld a similar preemption challenge under § 14501(c). See Fife Enterprises v. Washington State Patrol, 113 Wash.App. 1011 (Wash.App.2002) (unpub.) (licensing and record keeping requirements exempt under safety exception); see also Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 765 (2d Cir.1999) (towing ordinance requiring, inter alia, licensing, display of information, reporting, record keeping, disclosure of criminal history, insurance, posting of bond by towing companies, and maintaining local storage and repair facilities, fell within the safety exception); Hott v. City of San Jose, 92 F.Supp.2d 996 (N.D.Cal.2000) (holding that regulations requiring liability insurance,[*1253] criminal background check, displaying of information, reporting, and record keeping were all within scope of safety exception).

The district court did not err in holding the challenged sections of the City’s vehicle ordinance to fall under the purview of the § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s public safety exception.

2. Proof of Legislative Intent.

Galactic argues that, because the City offered “no direct proof’ of the City’s legislative intent in the implementation of the challenged ordinances, the district court erroneously granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.

There is direct evidence of the City’s legislative intent in the implementation of the challenged ordinances to support the district court’s grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment. The text of the challenged ordinance specifically states:

The city commission finds and determines that the unauthorized parking of vehicles that cannot be removed constitutes a public nuisance and public emergency effecting the property, public safety and welfare of the citizens and residents of the city.

Miami Beach Code § 106-257. The text of the ordinance itself therefore expressly articulates a public safety purpose. Furthermore, the City offered affidavits from two City officials, the Assistant City Manager and the Assistant Chief of Police. Both affidavits contained relevant information on how the challenged sections of the City’s vehicle towing ordinance affect safety concerns. Although Galactic had the opportunity to refute those affidavits in the district court, it failed to do so. Instead, it rested on its pleadings. See Valdivieso v. Atlas Air, Inc., 305 F.3d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir.2002) (“The non-moving party, however, may not rest on mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by affidavits ....”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

3. Failure to Strike Affidavits.

Galactic argues the district court abused its discretion by denying Galactic’s motion to strike affidavits from two City officials because they consisted of “opinions, mere speculation, and fabricated claims.” There was no abuse of discretion by denying Galactic’s motion to strike these affidavits and admitting the same. See Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir.2000) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to strike affidavits).

AFFIRMED.