49 California opinions name it 4 courts 1931–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2016The employee caused a safety infraction which he or she knew was contra to the Employer’s safety requirement.’ ” (Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1239 (Davey); see Gaehwiler v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1044-1045 ; In re Sacramento Bag Mfg. 2016The employee caused a safety infraction which he or she knew was contra to the Employer’s safety requirement.’ ” (Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1239 (Davey); see Gaehwiler v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1044-1045 ; In re Sacramento Bag Mfg. | 3 | 4 |
Gaehwiler v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2016The employee caused a safety infraction which he or she knew was contra to the Employer’s safety requirement.’ ” (Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1239 (Davey); see Gaehwiler v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1044-1045 ; In re Sacramento Bag Mfg. 2016The employee caused a safety infraction which he or she knew was contra to the Employer’s safety requirement.’ ” (Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1239 (Davey); see Gaehwiler v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1044-1045 ; In re Sacramento Bag Mfg. | 3 | 3 |
Allen Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.green2 sentences2025In that case, the plaintiff was seriously injured in a collision with a tractor trailer that was transporting goods for a warehouse club. ( Miller, supra, at p. 1020 .) He sued the freight broker that arranged for the transportation, alleging the broker “negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier.” (Ibid.) The federal district court found the plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the FAAAA and did not “fall within the exception for ‘the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.’ ” (Miller, at p. 1020.) While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed the claim was su 2025In that case, the plaintiff was seriously injured in a collision with a tractor trailer that was transporting goods for a warehouse club. ( Miller, supra, at p. 1020 .) He sued the freight broker that arranged for the transportation, alleging the broker “negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier.” (Ibid.) The federal district court found the plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the FAAAA and did not “fall within the exception for ‘the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.’ ” (Miller, at p. 1020.) While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed the claim was su | 2 | 2 |
Aspen American Insurance Company v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.green2 sentences2025Gen. (11th Cir. 2021) 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 ; accord, Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger (11th Cir. 2023) 65 F.4th 1261, 1271 (Aspen).) Thus, “[j]ust as the phrase ‘with respect to the transportation of property’ ‘massively limits’ the preemption provision, we read the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ to impose a meaningful limit on the [safety] exception to the preemption provision.” (Aspen, supra, 65 F.4th at p. 1271 .)6 Miller’s expansive interpretation of “with respect to motor vehicles” encompasses both direct and indirect connections with motor vehicles (see Miller, sup 2025Gen. (11th Cir. 2021) 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 ; accord, Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger (11th Cir. 2023) 65 F.4th 1261, 1271 (Aspen).) Thus, “[j]ust as the phrase ‘with respect to the transportation of property’ ‘massively limits’ the preemption provision, we read the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ to impose a meaningful limit on the [safety] exception to the preemption provision.” (Aspen, supra, 65 F.4th at p. 1271 .)6 Miller’s expansive interpretation of “with respect to motor vehicles” encompasses both direct and indirect connections with motor vehicles (see Miller, sup | 2 | 2 |
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2025(See ante, at p. 9.) Tellingly, “with respect to” is utilized in the safety exception ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)), which immediately follows the preemption clause. “[I]t is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law.” (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123 ; see IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez (2005) 546 U.S. 21, 34 [“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the 2025(See ante, at p. 9.) Tellingly, “with respect to” is utilized in the safety exception ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)), which immediately follows the preemption clause. “[I]t is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law.” (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123 ; see IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez (2005) 546 U.S. 21, 34 [“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the | 2 | 2 |
Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industriesgreen2 sentences2025(Cox, at p. 858.) In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit—akin to the Ninth Circuit in Miller—“read the ordinary meaning of ‘with respect to’ as synonymous with . . . ‘relating to.’ ” (Id. at p. 857.) 14. exception, then Congress’s inclusion of a separate exception to allow states to impose highway route controls and cargo limits would almost certainly be redundant because such controls and limits are indirectly related to motor vehicle safety, too.” (Id. at p. 1272, italics omitted; see 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)(A).) “ ‘An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be 2025(Cox, at p. 858.) In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit—akin to the Ninth Circuit in Miller—“read the ordinary meaning of ‘with respect to’ as synonymous with . . . ‘relating to.’ ” (Id. at p. 857.) 14. exception, then Congress’s inclusion of a separate exception to allow states to impose highway route controls and cargo limits would almost certainly be redundant because such controls and limits are indirectly related to motor vehicle safety, too.” (Id. at p. 1272, italics omitted; see 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)(A).) “ ‘An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be | 2 | 2 |
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.green2 sentences2005(See City of Columbus, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 431 [noting split among courts of appeals on the issue].) The Ninth Circuit has since reconsidered Tocher and further abrogated that decision, at least as to subdivision (l) of section 22658, based in part on the high court’s construction of the safety exception in City of Columbus . 2005Under the circumstances, we cannot say the Legislature considered subdivision (i) of section 22658 “genuinely responsive to [public] safety concerns” (City of Columbus, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 442 ) so as to fall within the safety exception of the FAAAA. | 2 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Renne v. Servantesgreen2 sentences2005The Safety Exception ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)(A)) In Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 1081 , the First Appellate District, Division Five of the Court of Appeal addressed the FAAAA’s preemption over section 22658’s regulatory scheme for removal of vehicles from private property by towing services and concluded certain regulations fell within the FAAAA’s safety exception. 2005(Id. at pp. 1091-1092.) In reaching its conclusion, the Servantes court disagreed with a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 219 F.3d 1040 (Tocher), which held certain provisions of section 22658, including subdivisions (k) and (l) (pertaining to written authorization by the property owner to tow the vehicle) did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception because they were “ ‘based on consumer protection rather than safety. . . .’ ” (Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090 , citing Tocher, at pp. 1044, 1052.) The Servantes court reasoned: “ | 2 | 2 |
Independent Towers Of Washington v. State Of Washingtongreen2 sentences2005That exception, as stated ante, permits the state to enact laws or regulations “relating to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation is performed without the prior written consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.” The term “transportation” is defined in the FAAAA as including “(A) a motor vehicle ... or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both . . . ; and [f] (B) services related to that movement, including . . . storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passe 2005That exception, as stated ante, permits the state to enact laws or regulations “relating to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation is performed without the prior written consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.” The term “transportation” is defined in the FAAAA as including “(A) a motor vehicle ... or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both . . . ; and [f] (B) services related to that movement, including . . . storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passe | 2 | 2 |
No. 03-55939green2 sentences2005(Tillison, supra, 406 F.3d at p. 1130 .) The court also found helpful to its analysis Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 1081 , Berry v. Hannigan, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 587 , and other circuit court authority addressing the safety exception. 2005(Tillison, supra, 406 F.3d at p. 1130 .) The court also found helpful to its analysis Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 1081 , Berry v. Hannigan, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 587 , and other circuit court authority addressing the safety exception. | 2 | 2 |
Newbery Electric Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1989(Newbery Electric Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 641, 649 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 734 ].) The “independent employee action test” provides the employer an affirmative defense only if it shows the following: (1) the employee was experienced in the job being performed; (2) the employer had a well-devised safety program which includes training employees in matters of safety respective to their particular job assignments; (3) the employer effectively enforced the safety program; (4) the employer had and enforced a policy of sanctions against employees who violate th 1989(Newbery Electric Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 641, 649 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 734 ].) The “independent employee action test” provides the employer an affirmative defense only if it shows the following: (1) the employee was experienced in the job being performed; (2) the employer had a well-devised safety program which includes training employees in matters of safety respective to their particular job assignments; (3) the employer effectively enforced the safety program; (4) the employer had and enforced a policy of sanctions against employees who violate th | 2 | 2 |
Powell v. Pacific Electric Railway Co.green2 sentences2023Diamond’s Written Safety Procedures Generally, “all relevant evidence is admissible.” (§ 351.) “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (§ 210.) It is a long-standing rule that safety procedures are admissible “on the ground that an employee’s failure to follow a safety rule promulgated by his employer, regardless of its substance, serves as evidence of negligence.” (Dillenbeck v. City of L 1968Co., supra, 35 Cal.2d 40, 46 .) This limitation allows ample opportunity for the employer to explain that he established a given rule, not as a reflection of his opinion as to what specific conduct comports with due care, but solely from an excess of caution. 4 Alternatively, because due care is a highly fact-oriented standard, the employer might well argue that, because of the exigencies of the occasion, a safety rule is simply inapplicable. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Medinagreen2 sentences2003Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1.)” (People v. Medina (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 647-648 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 ].) It is clear from this source that before it was made a separate offense, carjacking was prosecuted as a form of robbery. 2003Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1.)” (People v. Medina (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 647-648 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 ].) It is clear from this source that before it was made a separate offense, carjacking was prosecuted as a form of robbery. | 1 | 2 |
| Vasilenko v. Grace Family Churchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Bondsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacColl v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beal v. Blumenfeld Theatres, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Barnes v. Chamberlaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Simpsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York v. Quarlesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kunert v. MISSION FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Reynolds v. Natural Gas Equipment, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lucas v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Welsh v. Mercy Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eads v. Marksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Simon v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Porterfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 769593
green
2 sentences2005(Id. at pp. 1091-1092.) In reaching its conclusion, the Servantes court disagreed with a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 219 F.3d 1040 (Tocher), which held certain provisions of section 22658, including subdivisions (k) and (l) (pertaining to written authorization by the property owner to tow the vehicle) did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception because they were “ ‘based on consumer protection rather than safety. . . .’ ” (Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090 , citing Tocher, at pp. 1044, 1052.) The Servantes court reasoned: “ 2005(Id. at pp. 1091-1092.) In reaching its conclusion, the Servantes court disagreed with a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Tocher v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 219 F.3d 1040 (Tocher), which held certain provisions of section 22658, including subdivisions (k) and (l) (pertaining to written authorization by the property owner to tow the vehicle) did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception because they were “ ‘based on consumer protection rather than safety. . . .’ ” (Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090 , citing Tocher, at pp. 1044, 1052.) The Servantes court reasoned: “ | 3 | 2001–2005 |
Matthew John Hylton v. U.S. Attorney General
green
2 sentences2025Gen. (11th Cir. 2021) 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 ; accord, Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger (11th Cir. 2023) 65 F.4th 1261, 1271 (Aspen).) Thus, “[j]ust as the phrase ‘with respect to the transportation of property’ ‘massively limits’ the preemption provision, we read the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ to impose a meaningful limit on the [safety] exception to the preemption provision.” (Aspen, supra, 65 F.4th at p. 1271 .)6 Miller’s expansive interpretation of “with respect to motor vehicles” encompasses both direct and indirect connections with motor vehicles (see Miller, sup 2025Gen. (11th Cir. 2021) 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 ; accord, Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger (11th Cir. 2023) 65 F.4th 1261, 1271 (Aspen).) Thus, “[j]ust as the phrase ‘with respect to the transportation of property’ ‘massively limits’ the preemption provision, we read the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ to impose a meaningful limit on the [safety] exception to the preemption provision.” (Aspen, supra, 65 F.4th at p. 1271 .)6 Miller’s expansive interpretation of “with respect to motor vehicles” encompasses both direct and indirect connections with motor vehicles (see Miller, sup | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Robert Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025(See ante, at p. 11.) “Of course, every state law that relates to the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier, broker who contracts with a motor carrier, or freight forwarder who ‘uses . . . a [motor] carrier’ [citation], will have at least an indirect relationship to motor vehicles—motor vehicles are how motor carriers move property from one place to another. [Citation.] Accordingly, if an indirect connection between a state law and a motor vehicle satisfied the safety exception, then the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ would have no meaningful operative effect.” (Aspen, supra, 2025(See ante, at p. 11.) “Of course, every state law that relates to the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier, broker who contracts with a motor carrier, or freight forwarder who ‘uses . . . a [motor] carrier’ [citation], will have at least an indirect relationship to motor vehicles—motor vehicles are how motor carriers move property from one place to another. [Citation.] Accordingly, if an indirect connection between a state law and a motor vehicle satisfied the safety exception, then the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ would have no meaningful operative effect.” (Aspen, supra, | 2 | 2025–2025 |
City of Sacramento v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2025(See Brummett v. County of Sacramento, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 886.) Where the driver of an emergency vehicle fails to activate his red light, and where necessary his siren, he is not exempt from the rules of the road even though he may be engaged in a proper emergency function, and negligence may be based upon the violation of the rules of the road.” (City of Sacramento, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 402–403.) “The purpose of Vehicle Code section 21055 is to avoid the presumption of negligence that arises from the violation of a safety rule or regulation. 2022The purposes of section 21055, as noted by other courts, are to “provide a ‘clear and speedy pathway’ ” (Peerless Laundry Services v. City of Los Angeles (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 703, 707 ) for the emergency vehicle, and to “avoid the presumption of negligence that arises from the violation of a safety rule or regulation.” (City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, 403 .) Of course, the existence of a separate statute designed to warn drivers and pedestrians that authorized vehicles are traveling in response to an emergency does not resolve the issue before us since it is po | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Stillwell v. State Bar
green
2 sentences2025(See ante, at p. 9.) Tellingly, “with respect to” is utilized in the safety exception ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)), which immediately follows the preemption clause. “[I]t is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law.” (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123 ; see IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez (2005) 546 U.S. 21, 34 [“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the 2025(See ante, at p. 9.) Tellingly, “with respect to” is utilized in the safety exception ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2)), which immediately follows the preemption clause. “[I]t is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope and meaning in other parts or portions of the law.” (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 123 ; see IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez (2005) 546 U.S. 21, 34 [“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2017In Geier , the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a claim for tort liability for the failure to equip a vehicle with airbags was preempted by a safety standard, promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which provided for a general phasing-in of airbags and specifically permitted other restraints to be used instead. ( Id . at pp. 864-865, 874-875, 879, 120 S.Ct. 1913 .) The court concluded that the tort action was preempted, because it would have stood as an obstacle to the federal intent that multiple different types of restraints be used at that time and that 2017In Geier , the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a claim for tort liability for the failure to equip a vehicle with airbags was preempted by a safety standard, promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which provided for a general phasing-in of airbags and specifically permitted other restraints to be used instead. ( Id . at pp. 864-865, 874-875, 879, 120 S.Ct. 1913 .) The court concluded that the tort action was preempted, because it would have stood as an obstacle to the federal intent that multiple different types of restraints be used at that time and that | 2 | 2002–2017 |
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Our Supreme Court in Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93 (Cotran) explained that " 'good cause' in the context of implied employment contracts [means] . . . fair and honest reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual." (Cotran, at pp. 107-108.) Cotran explained that "[t]he proper inquiry . . . is not, 'Did the employee in fact commit the act leading to dismissal?' It is, 'Was the 16 Ingrande cites the deposition testimony of Ms. Jorgenson (a human r 2016Our Supreme Court in Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93 (Cotran) explained that " 'good cause' in the context of implied employment contracts [means] . . . fair and honest reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual." (Cotran, at pp. 107-108.) Cotran explained that "[t]he proper inquiry . . . is not, 'Did the employee in fact commit the act leading to dismissal?' It is, 'Was the 16 Ingrande cites the deposition testimony of Ms. Jorgenson (a human r | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Under these circumstances, the burden then shifted to Ingrande to produce 46 evidence this articulated reason was a pretext to mask the real, age-based reason for his employment termination. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354-356.) The court in King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 426 , explaining the element of the employer's burden to make a sufficient showing of a legitimate reason for discharge in the context of a summary judgment motion, reasoned that when the employer has shown it conducted an investigation that led "the decision makers [to] entertain[] an honest belief that plaintiff had eithe 2016Under these circumstances, the burden then shifted to Ingrande to produce 46 evidence this articulated reason was a pretext to mask the real, age-based reason for his employment termination. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354-356.) The court in King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 426 , explaining the element of the employer's burden to make a sufficient showing of a legitimate reason for discharge in the context of a summary judgment motion, reasoned that when the employer has shown it conducted an investigation that led "the decision makers [to] entertain[] an honest belief that plaintiff had eithe | 2 | 2016–2016 |
King v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016(Cf. King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 435-437.) Even assuming Ingrande showed he was otherwise competently performing his job apart from the trash compactor incident, Employer produced evidence that its articulated reason for discharging Ingrande was unrelated to his age (i.e. was based on his violation of a safety standard Employer's internal policies expressly caution are so serious as to warrant immediate termination of employment) and was reached after an investigation that provided it a good faith reason for believing Ingrande had in fact violated those policies. 2016(Cf. King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 435-437.) Even assuming Ingrande showed he was otherwise competently performing his job apart from the trash compactor incident, Employer produced evidence that its articulated reason for discharging Ingrande was unrelated to his age (i.e. was based on his violation of a safety standard Employer's internal policies expressly caution are so serious as to warrant immediate termination of employment) and was reached after an investigation that provided it a good faith reason for believing Ingrande had in fact violated those policies. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
King v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015We agree with the King court's rationale that "[c]ourts cannot tolerate misconduct by a defendant that seeks to delay or disrupt judicial proceedings" (King, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 943 ) and that a defendant's serious misconduct that "endangers the safety of defense counsel [is] [e]ven less tolerable." (Ibid.) This is one of those "rare cases where the misconduct [was] so serious" (id. at p. 934) that the accused─Macias─forfeited his right to counsel without the trial court's use of lesser measures, such as a warning. 2015We agree with the King court's rationale that "[c]ourts cannot tolerate misconduct by a defendant that seeks to delay or disrupt judicial proceedings" (King, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 943 ) and that a defendant's serious misconduct that "endangers the safety of defense counsel [is] [e]ven less tolerable." (Ibid.) This is one of those "rare cases where the misconduct [was] so serious" (id. at p. 934) that the accused─Macias─forfeited his right to counsel without the trial court's use of lesser measures, such as a warning. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Ingersoll v. Palmer
green
2 sentences2011Rationale of Checkpoint Location Ingersoll stated: “The sites chosen [for sobriety checkpoints] should be those which will be most effective in achieving the governmental interest; i.e., on roads having a high incidence of alcohol related accidents and/or arrests. [Citation.] Safety factors must also be considered in choosing an appropriate location.” (Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1343 .) “[A] sobriety checkpoint would be improper at a location without any significant traffic or incidence of drunk driving . . . .” (Id. at p. 1344.) This factor is significant, because without it the essent 2010Ingersoll explains that the “sites chosen should be those which will be most effective in achieving the governmental interest; i.e., on roads having a high incidence of alcohol related accidents and/or arrests. [Citation.] Safety factors must also be considered in choosing an appropriate location.” (Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1343 .) Arthur points to no evidence suggesting the location was inappropriate per se. | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Cole v. City of Dallas
green
2 sentences2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (l) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the 2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (/) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach
green
2 sentences2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (l) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the 2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (/) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Harris County Wrecker Owners for Equal Opportunity v. City of Houston
green
2 sentences2005Wrecker Owners v. City of Houston (S.D.Tex. 1996) 943 F.Supp. 711, 720-724 .) However, relying in part on a decision by another division of its court, Berry v. Hannigan (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 587 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 ], Servantes found “the protections Vehicle Code section 22658 offers to the owner of a vehicle” had a public safety purpose and thus fell within the safety exception of the FAAAA. ( Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090, fn. 10, 1092.) In upholding the constitutionality of the provision requiring towing operators to accept credit cards (§ 22658, subd. (k)), Berry had reasoned 2005Wrecker Owners v. City of Houston (S.D.Tex. 1996) 943 F.Supp. 711, 720-724 .) However, relying in part on a decision by another division of its court, Berry v. Hannigan (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 587 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 ], Servantes found “the protections Vehicle Code section 22658 offers to the owner of a vehicle” had a public safety purpose and thus fell within the safety exception of the FAAAA. ( Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090, fn. 10, 1092.) In upholding the constitutionality of the provision requiring towing operators to accept credit cards (§ 22658, subd. (k)), Berry had reasoned | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Berry v. Hannigan
green
2 sentences2005Wrecker Owners v. City of Houston (S.D.Tex. 1996) 943 F.Supp. 711, 720-724 .) However, relying in part on a decision by another division of its court, Berry v. Hannigan (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 587 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 ], Servantes found “the protections Vehicle Code section 22658 offers to the owner of a vehicle” had a public safety purpose and thus fell within the safety exception of the FAAAA. ( Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090, fn. 10, 1092.) In upholding the constitutionality of the provision requiring towing operators to accept credit cards (§ 22658, subd. (k)), Berry had reasoned 2005Wrecker Owners v. City of Houston (S.D.Tex. 1996) 943 F.Supp. 711, 720-724 .) However, relying in part on a decision by another division of its court, Berry v. Hannigan (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 587 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 ], Servantes found “the protections Vehicle Code section 22658 offers to the owner of a vehicle” had a public safety purpose and thus fell within the safety exception of the FAAAA. ( Servantes, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1090, fn. 10, 1092.) In upholding the constitutionality of the provision requiring towing operators to accept credit cards (§ 22658, subd. (k)), Berry had reasoned | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. The City Of New York
green
2 sentences2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (/) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the 2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (/) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Tow Operators Working to Protect Their Right to Operate on the Streets of Kansas City v. City of Kansas City, Missouri
green
2 sentences2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (l) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the 2005(Tillison, at p. 1130, citing Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1249, 1253 ; Cole v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 730 ; Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, supra, 171 F.3d 765 ; Tow Operators v. City of Kansas City, Mo. (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 873, 876 .) The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Galactic Towing involving a Miami Beach ordinance similar to subdivision (/) of section 22658; that court held the ordinance was safety related because “ ‘the ordinance protects both the vehicle owner and the | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| Moore v. Regents of University of California green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Grudt v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Peerless Laundry Service, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Love v. Wolf green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Rucker v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| CRESSE S. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Richard Carrillo, United States of America v. Ernest Benavidez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Elizalde green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit District green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Banks green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ketchum v. Hyundai Motor Co. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Patricia M. Wood v. General Motors Corporation green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Olgaard green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| United States v. Larry Neil Maxwell green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Coccomo green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Department green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Torres v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and Bill Echols Trucking Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. Chicago Bridge and Iron Company and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Budd v. Erie Lackawanna RR Co. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.