Cook v. State, 548 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). · Go Syfert
Search
Cook v. State, 548 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1 citation event across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: O'Brien v. State, 549 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
How cited ↗
Cited for
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Jerry Joe COOK
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 88-999.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jul 20, 1989.
Published opinion
548 So. 2d 257
1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4091
1989 WL 78867
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara L. Condon, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant., Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Cowart, Dauksch, Goshorn.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

Lead Opinion

GOSHORN, Judge.

The appellant, Jerry Joe Cook, was charged with four counts of lewd and lascivious assault in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen. Section 800.-04(3), Fla.Stat. (1987). The jury convicted him on two counts as charged and two counts of the lesser included offense of attempt. We affirm.

At the trial, as each child victim testified, a screen was placed between the witness and the defendant. On appeal Cook argues[*258] that this violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment, citing Coy v. Iowa, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988).

This issue has not been preserved. At trial Cook merely made a general objection to the use of the screen, without giving any basis for his objection. In order to preserve this type of challange a specific objection at trial is required. Gibson v. State, 533 So.2d 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).

The appellant’s other points on appeal are without merit.

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion.

Dissent

COWART, Judge,

dissenting.

The defendant was convicted of lewd acts in the presence of children (§ 800.-04(3), Fla.Stat.). At the trial, the defendant objected when a screen was set up between himself and the child witnesses so that while the jury could see both the defendant and the child witnesses, the witnesses did not see the defendant and the defendant could not see the witnesses as they testified. The trial judge well understood that defense counsel objected to the use of the screen but merely noted defense counsel’s objection and permitted the screen to be used.[1] This case should be reversed on the authority of Coy v. Iowa, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). The State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation of the constitutional Sixth Amendment confrontational rights of this defendant did not contribute to the verdict and it cannot be ruled as a matter of law that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) and State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

1

Portions of the trial record in this case (after a short recess), page 85:

THE COURT: Well, we've got the screen up, is there anything that you want me to say about it or just don’t mention it?
[[Image here]]
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, for the record, Your Honor, I would object to the use of it. I believe the Court's rationalization of where they used it in other trials, but I don’t know why they did.
THE COURT: ... [Y]our objection is noted. ...