Petitioners Clara Ines Lenis, her husband Orlando Herrera, and their two children Tatiana Herrera and Marlon Herrera[*1292] (collectively, “Lenis”), petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) decision denying their motion for a sua sponte reopening of their case, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ^[1] On appeal, Lenis claims that the BIA abused its discretion in denying a request to use its sua sponte powers to reopen the underlying proceedings essentially because the agency had issued a precedential decision changing the meaning of the term “particular social group” under the asylum laws. After thorough review, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The dispositive issue is whether we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen the underlying immigration proceedings based on its sua sponte authority. We are, of course, always required to address whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction. Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir.2005).

This kind of challenge — asking whether the BIA abused its discretion by refusing to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) — has previously been before this Court in Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.1999). However, Anin did not squarely address whether we have jurisdiction in this situation, and in fact, the parties here agree that Anin does not resolve the matter. ^[2] Today, however, the government contends that we are without jurisdiction. It is, therefore, an issue of first impression that we must resolve. ^[3]

Ten courts of appeals have held that they have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority. See Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir.1999); Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir.2003); D oh v. Gonzales, 193 Fed.Appx. 245, 246 (4th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (un[*1293] published); Emiquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 246, 248-50 (5th Cir.2004); Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410-11 (6th Cir.2004); Pilch v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 585, 586 (7th Cir.2003); Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir.2008) (en banc) (per curiam); Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002); Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (10th Cir.2003). ^[4] We agree with our sister circuits and join them in holding that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this kind of appeal.

It is undisputed that under the Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review is not available when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The “committed to agency discretion” exception is a “very narrow exception” that “is applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (quoting S.Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 5.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). The Supreme Court has since explained that “review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).

Neither the statute nor the regulation at issue today provides any “meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Indeed, no statute expressly authorizes the BIA to reopen cases sua sponte-, rather, the regulation at issue derives from a statute that grants general authority over immigration and nationalization matters to the Attorney General, and sets no standard for the Attorney General’s decision-making in this context. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2). ^[5] Likewise, while the regulation itself, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), expressly gives the BIA discretion to sua sponte reopen cases, it provides absolutely no standard to govern the BIA’s exercise of its discretion. ^[6] As we observed in Anin:

[*1294] The provision reposes very broad discretion in the BIA “to reopen or reconsider” any motion it has rendered at any time or, on the other hand, “[to] deny a motion to reopen.” [8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).] The discretion accorded in this provision is so wide that “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief,” the BIA can deny a motion to reopen a deportation order. Id. No language in the provision requires the BIA to reopen a deportation proceeding under any set of particular circumstances. Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings as it sees fit.

188 F.3d at 1279; see also Tamenut, 521 F.3d at 1004 (“The use of permissive and discretionary language in the first sentence of § 1003.2(a) further supports the inference that the agency action is unre-viewable.”); Enriquez-Alvarado, 371 F.3d at 249-50 (“The permissive, ‘may,’ indicates that reopening the case is not mandatory, but rather within the discretion of the IJ. That is, it implies that the IJ is under no obligation to reopen a case. Were the presence of any circumstance sufficient to compel an IJ to reopen the case, then the plain meaning of ‘may would be contravened.”) (citation omitted). Thus, as the Eighth Circuit has recently concluded, “[t]he regulation itself, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), provides no guidance as to the BIA’s appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors for the BIA to consider in deciding whether to reopen sua sponte, places no constraints on the BIA’s discretion, and specifies no standards for a court to use to cabin the BIA’s discretion.” Tamenut, 521 F.3d 1000,1004.

For these reasons, we hold that the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion by law. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision in this case. ^[7]

Accordingly, the petition for review must be and is DISMISSED.