At page 1027 cited at this page1 citing case
- Benitez Jr. v. Leal, 272 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).publishedThe initial order granting a lien was indeed a final order, see Trontz v. Winig, 905 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and the Client’s motion for rehearing suspended rendition until a successor judge denied it (and, for the eliminati…
v.
Steven L. WINIG, Esquire
Appellant challenges a summary final judgment foreclosing his attorney’s charging lien on his homestead property. Because appellant failed to challenge, and in fact agreed to, the earlier final order that specifically applied the charging lien to appellant’s homestead, we affirm. The order granting the lien was an appealable final order, and appellant did not appeal it. See, e.g., Shawzin v. Donald J. Sasser, P.A., 658 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Albert v. Goldman-Link, P.A., 661 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Moreover, unlike Sherbill v. Miller Manufacturing Co., 89 So.2d 28 (Fla.1956), on which appellant relies, here appellant specifically agreed to a charging lien on his homestead property, described in the order as an agreed disposition of his attorney’s claim. He also specifically waived his homestead protection as to the property. This specific agreed waiver in settlement of the claim distinguishes this case from Sherbill.
KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.