Trontz v. Winig, 905 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). · Go Syfert
Trontz v. Winig, 905 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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  • Benitez Jr. v. Leal, 272 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).published
    The initial order granting a lien was indeed a final order, see Trontz v. Winig, 905 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and the Client’s motion for rehearing suspended rendition until a successor judge denied it (and, for the eliminati…
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Roger S. TRONTZ
v.
Steven L. WINIG, Esquire
No. 4D04-226.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jul 6, 2005.
Published opinion
905 So. 2d 1026
2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 10482
2005 WL 1554033
Randall W. Henley, West Palm Beach, for appellant., Lynn G. Waxman of Lynn G. Waxman, P.A. and Steven L. Winig of Brody, Cohen & Winig, P.A., West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.
Klein, Taylor, Warner.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
WARNER, J.

Appellant challenges a summary final judgment foreclosing his attorney’s charging lien on his homestead property. Because appellant failed to challenge, and in fact agreed to, the earlier final order that specifically applied the charging lien to appellant’s homestead, we affirm. The order granting the lien was an appealable final order, and appellant did not appeal it. See, e.g., Shawzin v. Donald J. Sasser, P.A., 658 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Albert v. Goldman-Link, P.A., 661 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Moreover, unlike Sherbill v. Miller Manufacturing Co., 89 So.2d 28 (Fla.1956), on which appellant relies, here appellant specifically agreed to a charging lien on his homestead property, described in the order as an agreed disposition of his attorney’s claim. He also specifically waived his homestead protection as to the property. This specific agreed waiver in settlement of the claim distinguishes this case from Sherbill.

KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.