In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 560 A.2d 382 (Vt. 1989). · Go Syfert
In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 560 A.2d 382 (Vt. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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560 A.2d at 383 cited at this page6 citing cases
  • In re Investigation Pursuant to 30 V.S.A. §§ 30 & 209 into whether the Initiated Site Preparation at Apple Hill in Bennington, Vermont (Allco Renewable Energy Ltd., Appellant), 2021 VT 92, 274 A.3d 823.published 2 cites
    Section 815(a) provides that “a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately appealable [to the Supreme Court] . . . if review of the final decision would not provide an adequate remedy, and the filing of…
  • In re J.G., 627 A.2d 362 (Vt. 1993).published
    This narrow reading was confirmed in In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 151 Vt. 331, 332-33 , 560 A.2d 382, 383 (1989), where we stated: [W]e are concerned that the limited nature of our holding in Lafayette may have been misunderstood.
  • Lamb v. Bloom, 622 A.2d 505 (Vt. 1993).published
    In In re Maple Tree Place As socs., 151 Vt. 331, 333 , 560 A.2d 382, 383 (1989), we emphasized that there is no entitlement to an appeal even if the three prerequisites for collateral order jurisdiction are met.
  • In Re Fef, 594 A.2d 897 (Vt. 1991).published
    It "offers appellate redress in the small number of extraordinary cases where the normal appellate route will almost surely work injustice, irrespective of this Court's final decision." In re Maple Tree Place Associates, 151 Vt. 331, 333 ,…
  • F.E.F. v. Cameron, 594 A.2d 897 (Vt. 1991).published
    It “offers appellate redress in the small number of extraordinary cases where the normal appellate route will almost surely work injustice, irrespective of this Court’s final decision.” In re Maple Tree Place Associates, 151 Vt. 331, 333 ,…
  • In re C.K., 591 A.2d 57 (Vt. 1991).published
    In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 151 Vt. 331, 333 , 560 A.2d 382, 383 (1989); see Reporter’s Notes — 1990 Amendment, V.R.A.P. 5.1 (Rule was amended in 1990 by replacing “shall” with “may” to. conform with the holding in Maple Tree).
151 Vt. at 333 “offers appellate redress in the small number of extraordinary cases where the normal appellate route will almost surely work injustice, irrespective of this court's final decision.”2 citing cases3 citing courts quote it
  • Wilson v. Pecor, No. 9 (Vt. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2014).published 2 cites
    “It ‘offers appellate redress in the small number of extraordinary cases where the normal appellate route will almost surely work injustice, irrespective of [the court’s] final decision.’” Id. (citing In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 151 Vt…
  • Blair v. Frank W. Whitcomb Constr. Corp., No. 498 (Vt. Super. Ct. July 26, 2005).published
    Such an interlocutory appeal “is available only ‘in the small number of extraordinary cases where the normal appellate route will almost surely work injustice.’” V.R.A.P. 5.1, Reporter’s Notes—1990 Amendment (quoting In re Maple Tree Place…
151 Vt. at 332 appeal in this case under the Adminstrative Procedure Act (APA), 3 V.S.A. § 815(a). That statute permits an appeal to this Court from “a final decision in any…2 citing casesopening of page *332 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Scott Farm Act 250, No. 48-4-17 Vtec (Vt. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2017).published
    Once the District Commission renders a final decision, there is no reason known to this court that an adequate remedy would not be available through the normal appellate process.1 See In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 151 Vt. 331, 332 (1989)…
  • Snyder Grp., Inc. Act 250 - Decision on Motions, No. 107-10-18 Vtec (Vt. Super. Ct. May 21, 2019).published
    See Scott Farm, No. 48-4-17 Vtec at 2 (Aug. 22, 2017) (citing In re Maple Tree Place Assocs., 151 Vt. 331, 332 (1989); Beaupre v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 168 Vt. 596, 597 (1998)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re Maple Tree Place Associates
No. 89-064.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
Apr 7, 1989.
Published opinion
560 A.2d 382
1989 Vt. LEXIS 49
Harvey Carter, Burlington, and William E. Wargo, Winooski, for Appellants., Fred I. Parker and Alison J. Bell of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Burlington, for Appellee.
Allen, Dooley, Ket, Keyser, Morse, Peck.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

Williston Citizens for Responsible Growth (CRG) and the City of Winooski appeal from an order of the Environmental Board denying their request for full participation in hearings on the application of Maple Tree Place Associates (MTPA) for an Act 250 permit to build a shopping mall at Tafts Corner in Williston. Appellants also seek a stay of Board proceedings pending appeal. We dismiss the appeal.

On October 26, 1988, the District #4 Environmental Commission issued a Revised Preliminary Hearing Report and Party Status Order reaffirming an earlier denial of both CRG’s and Winooski’s participation in the Act 250 proceeding under 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(10), commonly called criterion 10. Both were granted party status under Board Rule 14(B), but without the right to participate in the proceeding on criterion 10. Both parties sought, interlocutory review before the Environmental Board, and on December 22, 1988, the Board denied the motions. The present appeal followed, and shortly thereafter petitions for stays. MTPA moved to dismiss the appeal.

CRG and Winooski rely on In re Lunde Construction Co., 139 Vt. 376, 378, 428 A.2d 1140, 1141 (1981), as conferring a right of[*332] appeal in this case under the Adminstrative Procedure Act (APA), 3 V.S.A. § 815(a). That statute permits an appeal to this Court from “a final decision in any contested case” and from “a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling . . . if review of the final decision would not provide an adequate remedy . ...” Id. Lunde relies on In re Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 347, 292 A.2d 832, 834-35 (1972), for the proposition that one denied party status by the Enviromental Board has standing to appeal to this Court under the APA. 139 Vt. at 378, 428 A.2d at 1141. Preseault, however, was an appeal from a final order. 130 Vt. at 345, 292 A.2d at 834.

We view the- order here as falling into the latter category of APA appeals. Since the order is interlocutory in nature, we must decide whether a review of the final order would provide “an adequate remedy.” Our decision in State v. Lafayette, 148 Vt. 288, 290-91, 532 A.2d 560, 561-62 (1987), is instructive. A collateral order (like the one here) is appealable only if three elements are satisfied:

“the order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue competely separate frrom the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”

Id. at 291, 532 A.2d at 561 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). This test is not met.

First, the present order does not conclusively determine the disputed question. The order of the district commission limiting participation under criterion 10 is reviewable de novo before the Board. 10 V.S.A. § 6089(a). Appellants will have a full and unfettered opportunity to persuade the Board that their participation under criterion 10 is essential and that the district commission erred in limiting their participation. Second, at the conclusion of Board review of the application, the Board’s decision on party status may be reviewed here. See In re Great Eastern Building Co., 132 Vt. 610, 326 A.2d 152 (1974).

Moreover, we are concerned that the limited nature of our holding in Lafayette may have been misunderstood. While we set forth specific criteria without which a collateral order will not be reviewed by this Court, overriding these threshold criteria is our need to balance the possible loss of important rights “against this Court’s policy of avoiding piecemeal review.” 148 Vt. at 292, 532[*333] A.2d at 562. Lafayette should not be read as an addendum to the Vermont Rules of Appellate Procedure, creating a virtual entitlement to review of collateral orders. Lafayette offers appellate redress in the small number of extraordinary cases where the normal appellate route will almost surely work injustice, irrespective of this Court’s final decision. Petitions like those at bar would convert the extraordinary into the ordinary and hamper not only the work of this Court, but the orderly processes of trial courts and administrative bodies as well. Lafayette announced a procedure that will be available when strong need is demonstrated. But it must not be seen as a commonplace alternative to normal appellate review under our rules.

Appeal dismissed.