Marbley-El v. State, 929 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2010). · Go Syfert
Search
Marbley-El v. State, 929 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gerald L. Doll v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (indctapp, 2017-12-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerald L. Doll v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Our supreme court has explained that “[c]ourts may now impose any sentence within the statutory range for the crime; a sentence at the high end of the range under the present scheme is not an ‘enhanced sentence’ for Blakely and Smylie purposes.” Marbley- El v. State, 929 N.E.2d 194, 195 (Ind. 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William J. Caudill v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The trial court imposed a thirty-month, or two and one-half years, sentence1 on 1 The parties refer to Caudill’s thirty-month sentence as an “enhanced sentence.” Even though it is above the advisory sentence, it is not an “enhanced sentence.” See Marbley-El v. State, 929 N.E.2d 194, 195 (Ind. 2010) (a sentence at the high end of the statutory range for a crime is not an “enhanced sentence” because a court may impose any sentence within the range under the present “advisory” sentencing scheme). 3 Caudill, which he argues is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spangler v. Bechtel
Ind. · 2011 · confidence medium
Baumgart v. DeFries, 888 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) [ (holding that mother’s MMA emotional distress claim not entitled to separate statutory damage cap) ], trans. denied; Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) [ (allowing mother’s MMA claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from miscarriage) ]; and Breece v. Lugo, 800 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) [ (permitting MMA emotional distress claim from stillbirth) ], trans. denied. 929 N.E.2d at 194.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Steven T. MARBLEY-EL, Appellant (Defendant Below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
71S03-1006-PC-329.
Indiana Supreme Court.
Jun 24, 2010.
929 N.E.2d 194
2010 Ind. LEXIS 394
2010 WL 2539525
Steven T. Marbley-El, Westville, IN, pro se., Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Shepard, Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Steven Marbley-El pleaded guilty to a robbery he committed in October 2006. The trial court advised him that he was giving up his right to a jury trial on the robbery charges, but did not advise him he was giving up any right to a jury trial with respect to sentence enhancements. Marb-ley-E1l was sentenced to six years, which is two years more than the four-year advisory sentence for a Class C felony. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2008 Repl. Vol.).

In post-conviction proceedings, Marh-ley-E1l argued the absence of a jury-trial advisement about sentence enhancements entitled him to relief. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 248, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (requiring that a defendant be aware of his right to trial by jury before a trial court accepts a guilty plea). The trial court denied relief and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision. Marbley-El v. State, No. 71A08-0907-PC-295, slip op. 2009 WL 3878061 (Ind.Ct.App. Nov. 19, 2009), reh'g denied (2010).

Marbley-El asserts he was entitled to a jury trial on any factors that enhanced his sentence beyond four years. He relies on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 408 (2004); see also Smylie v. State, 828 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005) (holding Indiana's former sentencing scheme to be unconstitutional after Blakety ).

However, Blakely's analysis does not apply here because Marbley-El committed the robbery after Indiana's legislature enacted the present "advisory" sentencing scheme. Courts may now impose any sentence within the statutory range for the crime; a sentence at the high end of the range under the present scheme is not an "enhanced sentence" for Blakely and Smylie purposes. See, eg., Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind.2007). Therefore, Marbley-El was not entitled to a jury determination of the factors that led to his six-year sentence, and the trial court correctly did not advise him that he was.

We grant Marbley-El's petition to transfer jurisdiction, and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.