direct impact test in Indiana

2020However, the supreme court also concluded that because Ronald had not suffered a direct impact as a result of Healthcare Provider’s alleged negligence, at most he was a relative bystander, a classification of potential victims the supreme court had recently adopted in Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 572-73 (Ind. 2000).5 The supreme court concluded that whether Ronald could prevail on his claim for emotional 5 “‘[W]here the direct impact test is not met, a bystander may nevertheless establish “direct involvement” by proving that the plaintiff actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after

2020However, the supreme court also concluded that because Ronald had not suffered a direct impact as a result of Healthcare Provider’s alleged negligence, at most he was a relative bystander, a classification of potential victims the supreme court had recently adopted in Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 572-73 (Ind. 2000).5 The supreme court concluded that whether Ronald could prevail on his claim for emotional 5 “‘[W]here the direct impact test is not met, a bystander may nevertheless establish “direct involvement” by proving that the plaintiff actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after

2010Id. (citing Bader v. Johnson, 782 N.E.2d 1212 , 1221 (Ind.2000) (finding that moth *392 er's continued pregnancy and the physical transformation that her body underwent satisfied the direct impact requirement) (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 288-284 (Ind.2000) (holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physician's failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (concluding that restaurant patron's ingestion of a portion of vege

2006Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ind.2000) (finding that mother's continued pregnancy and the physical transformation that her body underwent satisfied the direct impact requirement) (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 283-84 (Ind.2000) (holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physician's failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trams. not sought (concluding that restaurant patron's ingestion of a portion of veget

2010Id. (citing Bader v. Johnson, 782 N.E.2d 1212 , 1221 (Ind.2000) (finding that moth *392 er's continued pregnancy and the physical transformation that her body underwent satisfied the direct impact requirement) (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 288-284 (Ind.2000) (holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physician's failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (concluding that restaurant patron's ingestion of a portion of vege

2006Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ind.2000) (finding that mother's continued pregnancy and the physical transformation that her body underwent satisfied the direct impact requirement) (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 283-84 (Ind.2000) (holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physician's failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trams. not sought (concluding that restaurant patron's ingestion of a portion of veget

2020In addition, the impact need only “‘arise[] from the plaintiff’s direct involvement in the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct.’” Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1222 (quoting Conder v. Wood, 716 N.E.2d 432 , 435 n.3 (Ind. 1999)). [35] Applying the modified impact rule to the facts in Bader, the supreme court concluded that “Connie’s continued pregnancy and the physical transformation her body underwent as a result, satisf[ied] the direct impact requirement of our modified impact rule.” Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1222 .

2020In addition, the impact need only “‘arise[] from the plaintiff’s direct involvement in the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct.’” Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1222 (quoting Conder v. Wood, 716 N.E.2d 432 , 435 n.3 (Ind. 1999)). [35] Applying the modified impact rule to the facts in Bader, the supreme court concluded that “Connie’s continued pregnancy and the physical transformation her body underwent as a result, satisf[ied] the direct impact requirement of our modified impact rule.” Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1222 .

2010See Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1222 (holding that mother's "pregnancy and the physical transformation her body underwent as a result, satisfy the direct impact requirement of our modified impact rule" for negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from child born with severe birth defects); Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112, 119, 121 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that mother suffering miscarriage satisfies modified impact rule because the "emotional damages are directly related to her miscarriage" in which mother "was directly involved"); Breece v. Lugo, 800 N.E.2d 224, 225, 229-2830 (Ind.Ct.App.2

2007See Brief of Appellant at 18 (Darrin and Lori “may certainly seek emotional damages because they satisfy the direct impact test and the bystander rule.”); see also Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind.1991) (holding that when a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and sustains emotional trauma as a result thereof, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma regardless of physical injury); Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind.2000) (holding that when there is no direct impact, a bystander who actually witnessed

2010Id. (citing Bader v. Johnson, 782 N.E.2d 1212 , 1221 (Ind.2000) (finding that moth *392 er's continued pregnancy and the physical transformation that her body underwent satisfied the direct impact requirement) (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 288-284 (Ind.2000) (holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physician's failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (concluding that restaurant patron's ingestion of a portion of vege

2006Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ind.2000) (finding that mother's continued pregnancy and the physical transformation that her body underwent satisfied the direct impact requirement) (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 283-84 (Ind.2000) (holding that patient suffering from the destruction of healthy lung tissue due to physician's failure to diagnose cancer was sufficient for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trams. not sought (concluding that restaurant patron's ingestion of a portion of veget

2007See Brief of Appellant at 18 (Darrin and Lori “may certainly seek emotional damages because they satisfy the direct impact test and the bystander rule.”); see also Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind.1991) (holding that when a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and sustains emotional trauma as a result thereof, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma regardless of physical injury); Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind.2000) (holding that when there is no direct impact, a bystander who actually witnessed

2005Hoosier's first argument muddles these two situations. 2 *157 The direct impact test was recognized by Shuamber v. Henderson: When ... a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person, we hold that such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the plaintiff. 579 N.E.2d

2011Baumgart v. DeFries, 888 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) [ (holding that mother’s MMA emotional distress claim not entitled to separate statutory damage cap) ], trans. denied; Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) [ (allowing mother’s MMA claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from miscarriage) ]; and Breece v. Lugo, 800 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) [ (permitting MMA emotional distress claim from stillbirth) ], trans. denied. 929 N.E.2d at 194.

2010See Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1222 (holding that mother's "pregnancy and the physical transformation her body underwent as a result, satisfy the direct impact requirement of our modified impact rule" for negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from child born with severe birth defects); Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112, 119, 121 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that mother suffering miscarriage satisfies modified impact rule because the "emotional damages are directly related to her miscarriage" in which mother "was directly involved"); Breece v. Lugo, 800 N.E.2d 224, 225, 229-2830 (Ind.Ct.App.2

2014Id. at 573.

2011Baumgart v. DeFries, 888 N.E.2d 199 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) [ (holding that mother’s MMA emotional distress claim not entitled to separate statutory damage cap) ], trans. denied; Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) [ (allowing mother’s MMA claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from miscarriage) ]; and Breece v. Lugo, 800 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) [ (permitting MMA emotional distress claim from stillbirth) ], trans. denied. 929 N.E.2d at 194.

2011This application of the direct impact requirement, consistent with Conder , serves to sift legitimate claims of emotional harm from the spurious. 716 N.E.2d at 435; see also Groves, 729 N.E.2d at 572 (“The value of requiring ‘direct impact’ is that it provides clear and unambiguous evidence that the plaintiff was so directly involved in the incident giving rise to the emotional trauma that it is unlikely that the claim is merely spurious.”).

2000See, e.g., Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Ind.1999); Cahoon, 715 N.E.2d at 10 . . "[W]here the direct impact test is not met, a bystander may nevertheless establish 'direct involvement' by proving that the plaintiff actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling caused by the defendant’s negligent or otherwise tortuous conduct.” Groves, 729 N.E.2d at 573 .

2000See, e.g., Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Ind.1999); Cahoon, 715 N.E.2d at 10 . [9] "[W]here the direct impact test is not met, a bystander may nevertheless establish `direct involvement' by proving that the plaintiff actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling caused by the defendant's negligent or otherwise tortuous conduct." Groves, 729 N.E.2d at 573 .