Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80 (1879). · Go Syfert
Search
Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80 (1879). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

A supplementary action that is a mere incident or continuation of an original state action is not removable to federal court.

A party seeks to determine whether a proceeding to annul a state court judgment constitutes an independent suit or a supplementary proceeding connected to the original action. The court examines whether the proceeding is a mere revision of errors and irregularities or an investigation of a new case arising from new facts. Because the action in this case relates to the form of the proceeding rather than the merits, it is a supplementary proceeding that is an incident to the original suit and a continuation of it. Consequently, the federal circuit court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a proceeding.

247 citation events (68 in the last 25 years) across 64 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Czymmek v. Fenstermaker, No. 1:23-cv-08124 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2024)
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900 1963 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 82 Removability of supplementary state court actions7 citing casesexplaining that ______ ______ federal courts may not exercise control over state proceedings by entertaining supplementary actions which are but incidents of state suits1 citing court put it this way
  • Atl. Wave Holdings, LLC v. Cyberlux Corp., No. 3:24-cv-00482 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2025).
    Tr. 7 Corp. v. Bayside Devs., 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Jan. 20, 1995) 8 (quoting Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 82 (1879)).
  • State of Ohio v. John Doe, 433 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006).published
    Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 82 (1879); Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 190, 193 (1873); see also 29A Fed.
  • Armistead v. C & M Transp., Inc., 49 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1995).published 4 cites
    (explaining that ______ ______ federal courts may not exercise control over state proceedings by entertaining supplementary actions which are but incidents of state suits)
  • Ledgedale of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Carroll, 478 F. Supp. 711 (M.D. Pa. 1979).published
    Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 82, 83, 85 .
  • Nelson v. Bailey, 22 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1939).published
    Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 82, 83 .
  • Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891).published
    Ts it true that a Circuit Court of the United States, in the exercise of its equity powers, and where diverse citizenship gives jurisdiction over the parties, may not, in any case, deprive a party of the benefit of a judgment fraudulently…
  • Deaton v. Johnson, No. 1:20-cv-00078 (D.R.I. Aug. 12, 2020).
    (petition was “substantially a continuation” of the original state court suit and not removable to federal court)
At page 83 Distinguishing between revision and independent federal jurisdiction6 citing cases[T]he supplementary superior court proceeding does not independently qualify as a removable ‘civil action’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a).1 citing court put it this way
  • Czymmek v. Fenstermaker, No. 1:23-cv-08124 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2024).
    ([T]he supplementary superior court proceeding does not independently qualify as a removable ‘civil action’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a).)
  • Application of financialright claims GmbH v., No. 24-3171 (3d Cir. Oct. 22, 2025).unpublished
    (distinguishing, in light of Turnbull, between ancillary proceedings and independent suits)
  • Jimenez v. Kiefer, 622 F. Supp. 3d 720 (N.D. Ill. 2022).published
    Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1969) and Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 83 (1878)).
  • Jones v. Sheppard, No. 4:22-cv-00490 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2022).
    Wuxi Taihu Tractor Co. v. York Grp., Inc., 460 F. App’x 357, 359 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 83 (1878)).
  • Wuxi Taihu Tractor Co. v. York Grp., Inc., 460 F. App'x 357 (5th Cir. 2012).unpublished
    The district court reasoned that Barrow did not apply because removal of York’s enforcement action made the 2007 state-court judgment the equivalent of a judgment 4 99 U.S. 80 (1878). 5 Id. at 82-83 . 6 Id. at 83, 85 . 7 Id. at 83 . 8 868…
  • Mach v. Triple D Supply, LLC, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2011).published
    Co., 121 U.S. at 637, 7 S.Ct. 1013 (remanding suit to enjoin sale of land pending in state court); Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U.S. at 287 (affirming removal where the case “could not be called incidental or auxiliary to the original case[;]…
At page 80 “is a supplementary proceeding so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a continuance of it.”2 citing cases2 citing courts quote it
explaining that a .supplementary action so connected with an original action as to form a mere incident or continuation of it is not removable as a separate suitno pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Armistead v. C & M Transp., Inc., 49 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1995).published 4 cites
    (explaining that a .supplementary action so connected with an original action as to form a mere incident or continuation of it is not removable as a separate suit)
  • Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2012).published 2 cites
    (explaining that a supplementary action so connected with an original action as to form a mere incident or continuation of it is not removable as a separate suit)
Other citing cases11 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Show 1 more citing case
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Barrow
v.
Hunton
201.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 14, 1879.
Published opinion
99 U.S. 80
1878 U.S. LEXIS 1511
✓ 9 Otto 80
Mr. Greorge L. Bright for the appellant., Mr. Thomas J. Burant, contra.
Bradley.
Cited by 132 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice Bradley,

after’stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented with regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, whether the proceeding to procure nullity of the former judgment in such a case as the present is or is not in its nature a separate suit, or whether it is a supplementary proceeding so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a continuation of it. If the[*83] proceeding is merely tantamount to- the common-law practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review or an appeal, it would belong to the latter category, and the United States court could not properly entertain jurisdiction of the case. Otherwise, the Circuit Courts of the United States 'would become invested with power to control the proceedings in the State courts, or would have appellate jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens of different States. Such a result would be totally inadmissible.

On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an original and independent proceeding, and according to the doctrine laid down in Gaines v. Fuentes (92 U. S. 10), the case might be within the cognizance of the Federal courts. The distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice, but it may be affirmed to exist. In the one class there would be a mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness of the judgments and decrees of the State courts : and in the other class,' the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual judgment or decree, or of the party’s right to claim any benefit by reason thereof.

It would seem apparent that the. proceeding in the present case was one that affected the mere regularity of the original judgment. In the common-law practice, it would have been a motion to set aside the judgment for irregularity, or a writ of error coram vobis.

It will be more satisfactory, however, to take a brief view of the practice of Louisiana on this subject.

The process for procuring nullity of a judgment in that State is prescribed by the Code of Practice, in which we find the following provisions: —

“Art. 556. Definitive judgments may be revised, set aside, or-reversed: 1, by a new trial; 2, by appeal; 3, by action of nullity; 4, by rescission. The last mode can only be exercised by minors, or persons who were absent when' judgment was rendered against them.”

[*84] “Art. 605. The causes for which the nullity of a definitive judgment may be demanded are twofold: those that are relative to the form of proceeding, and those that appertain to the merits of the question to be tried.”

Art. 606 specifies the vices of form for which a judgment can be annulled; as, when against a minor appearing without a curator, or against a. married woman appearing without the authority of her husband; where the defendant is condemned by default without being cited ; where the judge was incompetent to try the suit; and where defendant has not been legally cited, and has not entered appearance, and judgment is by default.

Art. 607 specifies the grounds of nullity relating to the merits; namely, where the judgment has been obtained through fraud, bribery, forgery of documents, &c.

“Art. 608. The nullity of judgment may be demanded from the same court which has rendered the same, or from the court of appeal before which the appeal from such judgment was taken, pursuant to the provisions hereafter expressed.

“Art. 609. The nullity can be demanded on the appeal, only while the appeal is still pending, and when the nullity is apparent on the face of the records.

“Art. 610. The party'praying for the nullity of a judgment before the court which has rendered the same must bring his action by means of a petition; and the adverse party must be cited to appear, as in ordinary suits.”

From these extracts it is to be inferred that the action of nullity must be brought in the same court which rendered the judgment, or in the court of appeal when an appeal is pending. And so the Supreme Court of Louisiana has decided. Hennen’s Digest, art.'Judgment, XI. (c), and cases there cited. In David, Adm'r, v. Calouret (1 La. Ann. 171) the court says: “ The settlement made before the notary, under the order of the judge, . . . sought to be annulled in this suit, was made the judgment of the court by a decree, . . . and before that court alone ought the action to annul the act to have been brought.” The action of rescission, which is nearly identical with that of nullity, is expressly required by art. 616 of the[*85] Code of Practice to be brought in the court that rendered the judgment.

The fact that an action of nullity can only be brought in the court which rendered the judgment, or in the -court to which such judgment is appealed, is entitled to some weight in determining the question now under consideration. It shows that in the estimation of the legislature of Louisiana there is a manifest propriety in submitting the question of the validity of a judgment to the court which rendered it, or to the court which has the right to revise the judgment by way of appeal. We are not disposed, however, to allow this consideration to operate so far as to make it an invariable criterion of the want of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States. If the State legislatures could, by investing certain courts with exclusive jurisdiction over certain subjects, deprive the Federal courts of all jurisdiction, they might seriously interfere with the right of the citizen to resort to .those courts. The character of the cases themselves is always open to examination for the purpose of determining whether, ratione materice, the courts of the United States are incompetent to take jurisdiction thereof. State rules on the subject cannot deprive them of it.

The classification of the. causes of nullity, in the Louisiana Code into causes relative to form and those relative to the merits is nearly coincident with the classification above suggested, of cases which are, and eases which are not, cognizable in the courts of the United States. Causes of nullity relating to form would fall in that class 'of cases which could not be brought in these courts, or be removed thereto. The present case is one of that character. It is precisely described in the fourth division of art. 60’6 of the Code.

In our judgment, therefore, the case was one of which the Circuit Court could not take cognizance; and therefore the judgment must be reversed, and the record remitted with directions to remand the cause to the State court from which it was removed.

So ordered.