PER CURIAM.

Craig Williams appeals after the district court^[1] revoked his supervised release for the second time and imposed a term of imprisonment, followed by an additional term of supervised release. Williams’s counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Williams raises additional arguments in a pro se brief.

After reviewing the record under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, see United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915-16, 917 (8th Cir. 2009), we conclude the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The sentence is within the statutory limits, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b); 3583(e)(3), (h), (k), and the term of supervised release is presumptively reasonable because it is within the applicable advisory range under the sentencing guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2); United States v. DeMarrias, 895 F.3d 570, 572, 574 (8th Cir. 2018). The district court sufficiently considered the relevant statutory sentencing factors and did not overlook a relevant factor, give significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commit a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Miller, 557 F.3d at 917. The court “was entitled to conduct its own analysis and reach a conclusion of its own, even if it deviated from the parties’ recommendations,” and acted within its broad discretion by imposing the term of supervised release. United States v. Steele, 899 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 2018); see also DeMarrias, 895 F.3d at 572, 574-75. Williams’s other arguments are contradicted by the record, and any attempt to challenge the reimposed conditions restricting his device usage fails. See United States v. Walker, 814 F. App’x 180, 182 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

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